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PREFACE

After th© American colonies or Spain achieved inde*
pendenee in the nineteenth century* their nature! resources
were made accessible to foreign capitalists#

Tim newly

created countries of Latin America recognised the economic
opportunities at hand? but without foreign assistance* they
were unable to develop© their resources on a full scale#
Their need for outside aid can be attributed to one or
several of the following conditions*

lack of capital re

sources* inadequate technical knowledge* indifference to
industrial activities* and pre-occupation with other aspects
of the life of their countries#
Of the Latin American peoples* however* Chileans were
the ones most Interested in economic activities*

Because of

this trait* they have been termed the ^English of South
America#n

The early Peruvian nitrate capitalists could be

included in this category as well* for in reality it was the
citizens of these two countries who founded the nitrate
industry#

Although until 1870, Peruvians and Chileans owned

most of the nitrate deposits * European engineers provided the
technical assistance necessary in operating the nitrate
plants successfully#
For Peru in the 1870*s and thereafter for Chile* the
nitrate industry rose to a position of great Importance#
iv

The

course ©f Its development not only affected th© economic life
of these countries hut their politics and foreign affairs as
mil#

Adjacent Bolivia# too* felt the impact of nitrate

developments#

The conflicting economic interests of the three

countries ©iBaeshed them in a struggle that led to one of the
few major wars fought in Batin America after Independence#
Known today as the War of the Pacific (1079*1303)* hut to
many contemporaries as the "Hitrat© War,H the conflict re
sulted in th© acquisition by Chile of the entire nitrate
region#

This gay# Chilean nitrate capitalists the oppor

tunity to participate more freely in the development of the
industry#
But opportunity for Chilean capitalists m s oppor
tunity for British capitalist© too# and the latter found
occasion to establish their dominance during Chilean re
organisation of th© industry*

In th© years that followed a

tremendous growth in nitrate production occurred, and the
policy of Chile toward the industry was established#

That

policy closely tied the Interests of the Chilean government
with th© prosperity of th© industry#

However# the interests

of nitrate capitalists and of th© government did not always
coincide#

Intermittent conflicts between the two occurred

until a basis for cooperation finally was achieved at the
beginning of the twentieth century*
This dissertation will consider th© developments
outlined In th© above paragraphs#
v

Although the present study

has been limited to a discussion ©f the nitrate industry In
the nineteenth century, it has been necessary to carry the
treatment slightly beyond 1900 in presenting statistics and
in bringing certain developments to an appropriate conclusion.
For several reasons the turn of the century consti**
tutes the end or one period of nitrate development and the
beginning of another.

In the first place# by that time the

formulation of Chile*® nitrate policy had been stabilised
on the principles of protecting nitrate revenues and pro**
moting their gradual increase by augmenting productive ea«*
pacity.

Secondly# after 19 OQ the government reversed It®

antagonistic attitude toward activities of private nitrate
interests and within the limits of its established policy
sought to cooperate with private interest® for the common
welfare.

Thirdly, the attempts made by producers prior to

1900 to control production In their own interests had proven

to be temporary expedients, incapable of solving the basic
problems of th© industry*

A renewed effort by producers

after the turn of th© century, in which the major faults of
earlier efforts to control production were corrected and the
support of the government won# achieved a seemingly permanent
status.

Fourthly, British dominance which was the chief

characteristic of nitrate history prior to 1900 was defi**
nltely on th© wane by that date,

lastly, it was not until

after 1900 that organised labor became a powerful factor In
the nitrate Industry.
vl

Because of the scarcity of data* this study gives
only brief consideration to th© technical* managerial* and
legal aspects of the history of th© nitrate industry#

More*

over* definitive treatment of the subjects emphasised in the
following pages has been impossible* since th© data necessary
for such a study is widely dispersed or cannot be located#
The chief deficiencies lie in th© lack of files of Chilean
newspapers (such as El Ferrocarrll* El Mercuric# and the
Chilean Times)* and in th© absence of materials relating to
activities of Chileans in th© nitrate industry#

Records of

th© Pelegacion do Salitreras (Bureau of Hltrate Affairs) and
court records in Chile are other sources that have not been
available for consult atlorn « An effort has been made* without
success* to find the private papers of leading British par
ticipants in the early history of th© nitrate industry#
However* the sources for a history of the nitrate
industry found in United States libraries are numerous*

The

Library of Congress* Harvard College Library* Boston Public
Library* and th© library of the University of Chicago all
contain valuable materials for such a study*

For the laws

and decrees of Peru, Bolivia* and Chile that pertain to th©
nitrate industry the best sources are the two compilations
edited by Carlos E# Xbahes and Carlos Aidunate Solar re
spectively#

Compilations of statistics are found in th©

reports of the Pele&ado de Salitreras#

in th© appendices of

various books such as those written by Br* Erwin Sei^per and
vll

Dr* Michels and by Francisco Valdes Vergara* and in other
statistical reports Issued by the Chilean government*

Con

temporary accounts of the nitrate industry are helpful but
incomplete in their treatment •

Of those available for use

no better example could be cited than the studios published
by Guillermo E* Blllinghurst, one-time consul in Jqulque and
later president of the Republic of Peru*
fh© best English s o m e for a history of the nitrate
industry is th© South American Journal* but helpful too are
the many financial journals published in England*

A number

of Englishmen who travelled or lived for a time in Chile have
written accounts that include information concerning the
nitrate industry*

She two most worthy of not© were written

by journalists, William Russell and Maurice Kervey*

Publi

cations relating to British financial activities* ©specially
the Stock-Exchange Year-Book* possess considerable information
about English nitrate companies*

Some information is con

tained in th© published reports of British and United States
consular agents in Chile*

Information obtained from the

British consular records on deposit in th© Public Record
Office in London indicates that they contain a wealth of
material on the nitrate industry*

Limited use of these re

cords was made possible by employing a professional research
assistant*
The writer wishes to express his appreciation to Dr*
J* Preston Moor© and Dr# Jan© D© Drummond for their invaluable
viil

suggestions and considerate counsel during the preparation of
this study#

Acknowledgement Is also due to Mrs* Mary B*

Hartssog and to Miss Yvonne Toups* both of whom graciously
performed indispensible services* and to my wife* Elizabeth
Bogers Brown* for her constant encouragement •
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ABSTRACT
Although before 18?9 no *a&Jor deposits of nitrate
were located in Chilean territory# Chilean Industrialists
owned valuable nitrate properties#

Their holdings were lo

cated in the Peruvian province of Tarapacef, where the most
Important deposits of nitrate lay* and near Antofagasta in
Bolivia#

In the decade of the 1870*©, however, Peru

nationalised the nitrate industry In Tarap&ca and tried to
gain control over the deposits in Bolivian territory#

At

the same time, Bolivia attempted to curtail the privileges
she had previously granted Chilean nitrate interests#

Be-

cause of these actions Chilean nitrate interests suffered*
The government of Chile supported the interests of
her industrialists by diplomatic action*

A bitter contro

versy between Chile and Bolivia ensued#

The climax of this

diplomatic struggle occurred in 1879 when Bolivia violated
an agreement not to tax Chilean nitrate Interests#

This

action led to the War of the Pacific (1879~1®®3) I** which
Chile fought Bolivia and Peru#

Th© treaties that ended this

war left Chile in possession of the entire nitrate region#
In 1880, Chile imposed a high tax on nitrate exports#

This tax quickly became th© major source of revenue for the
government*

Other aspects of the nitrate policy of Chile,

and especially th© policy of selling state-owned nitrate

x

lands, were designed to protect and Increase the revenues
obtained from the nitrate export tax*
In returning the nitrate industry of Tarapaca to a
system of private enterprise^ the government of Chile made
possible significant investments by English capitalists In
the industry*

Actually, English capitalists dominated

nitrates until the twentieth century*

Of the English cap!**

talists John Thomas North, nThm Nitrate King, 19 was the most
prominent*

He not only was responsible for the large-scale

introduction of English capital into the industry during the
1 8 8 0 *s; but in addition, he almost achieved success in his

effort to monopolise the nitrate Industry*

North controlled

the profitable Nitrate Hallways Company, which operated in
Tarapaca, as well as many producing companies and other
enterprises in the nitrate region*

Much of th© credit for

frustrating North1® nitrate monopoly plan can be given to
President Balm&eeda (1886-189!)*

Balmaceda also opposed

British domination of th© nitrate industry#
Even though British nitrate capitalists supported the
Congressionallstas who overthrew Balmaceda in the Revolution
of I89 I# the Chilean government continued to pursue an antiBritish policy*

Major aspects of this policy Included op

posing production limitation schemes proposed by British
producers, permitting the construction of competing railroads
In Tarapaca, and encouraging Chileans to purchase stateowned nitrate lands*

3$1

P o p Chile the economic significance of nitrate &e~
velopments m s quite great#

Nitrate exports eventually

comprised three-fourths of the exports of Chile and made
possible a favorable balance of trade#

Th© industry provided

markets for Chilean agricultural products and jobs for
Chilean workers#

Above all* revenues derived from th© tax on

nitrate exports provided the government with a large income#

xii

CHAPTER I
THE HISTORY 0F THE NITRATE INDUSTRY THROUGH THE
WAR OF THE PACIFIC
Nitrate has been discovered In only one area of the
world in quantities extensive enough to allow large-scale
commercial exploitation*

This area, located In South America,

lies between the Andes Mountains In the east and the coast
range on the west, and extends from the eighteenth to the
twenty-fifth parallel, south latitude#

During the nineteenth

century the more important deposits were located in the
Tamarugal Pampa which encompasses the northern hall of th©
nitrate region#

The nitrate beds lie in the western portion

of the Pampa where the terrain rises from the Pampa to meet
the coast range#

These beds are not continuous, however,

since lateral mountain ranges cut the western section of the
Pampa into many parts, each varying in elevation from twentyfive hundred to five thousand feet#

Th© distance between

the nitrate beds and th© sea varies from twenty to fifty
miles#

The coast range which lies between the deposits and

the sea drops abruptly from heights of fifteen hundred feet
and in some cases six thousand feet to the Pacific Ocean
without leaving a coastal plain#

1

Along the coast of this

2
region— *frequently called the Atacama Desert— -there are no
good harbors#***
The nitrate beds have been the subject of numerous
geological investigations% however* their origin has yet to
be conclusively determined#

The nitrate is found in an

impure state in a substance called caliche#

The beds of

caliche vary in thickness from eleven inches to fourteen feet
and may be found as far as thirty feet below the surface of
the soil#

The quantity of nitrate in the caliche ranges from
p
ten to seventy per cent#
Before the Spanish conquests in the Hew World*
Indians living In areas adjacent to nitrate fields utilized
small quantities of caliche as fertiliser* but their method
of refining* if one did exist* was too primitive to allow
extensive exploitation#

The extension of Spanish control

over this region by the middle of the sixteenth century had
little effect on the use made of these deposits* since the
conquistadores failed to realize that wealth could be obtained
by extracting substances other than precious metals and

•*-The best description of this region Is to be found
in Isaish Bowman* Desert Trails of Atacama (Hew York:
American G-eographicai Society*'
#
survey of the various theories on the origin of
nitrate deposits is made by William Koss* tfThe Origins of
Hitrate Deposits*" Popular Science Monthly# LXXXV (Oct**
I9 II4.)* 134—lij-i?* and by W# 8 # Tower* 1fTiie nitrate Fields of
Chile*" Popular Science Monthly# LXXXIII (Se£fe*, 1913)*
209-230* For a dietailed analy sIs of the deposits see Dr#
Erwin Semper and Dr# Michels* La Industrie del Salitre en
Chile* Trans• and Ed# by Javier GanSarlTIas and“ rlando
GhigXiotto Salas (Santiagos Barcelona* 1 9 0 8 )# pp* 6**30#

3
valuable stones#

Th© Spaniards did us© sons© caliche In th©

manufacture of gunpowder, although this was discouraged by
th© Spanish monarch® who reared that any development or this
industry would reduce th© profits obtained from the royal
monopoly on th© sale of gunpowder*

At times* colonial offi

cials permitted clandestine operations in the nitrate fields,
yet th© lack of official sanction was a factor in retarding
th© development of th© industry*

Th© colonial period was

nearing its end before permission to produce was granted* h
Even if encouragement had been given, th© development
of the nitrate fields would hav© remained meager because
there was no adequate method of elaboration*

Not until early

in the nineteenth century was the technique of nitrate pro
duction improved to the point where caliche could be trans
formed in large quantities into a usable product#

By 1810,

this process had been adopted by the ten nitrate producing
establishments--oficinas^--in the Peruvian province of
Tarapaca7*^

^Hoberto Cornejo, El Salltre (Valparaiso:
Brothers, 1930)# PP« 3-9*

Fisher

^The word oficina literally means workshop or plant*
However, when used in connection with the nitrate industry
it refers to any bed of nitrate deposits on which there is
machinery to transform caliche into a finished product*
Oficlnas vary widely bothin plant capacity and in extent of
deposits* They are given names sxach as Primitlva, Rosario,
and Agua Santa*
^Gufllermo E* Bllllnglmrst, Los capitales salitreros
de Tarapaca (Santiago; I6 8 9 ), pp* 1 0 ^ X 2 # -------- -- ---

4
The wars Tor independence stimulated work in th©
nitrate fields* and operations were considered essential by
the revolutionists who controlled the area after the Spaniards
were driven out of Chile# ^

Independence did not bring about

any marked changes in the industry since local consumption of
nitrate as a fertilizer did not provide an adequate market
and its use in the manufacture of gunpowder did not require
expansion of productive facilities#

Ultimately, the farms of

Europe and th© United States came to be the chief consumers
of nitrate; and while these markets were opened during the
decade of the l8 3 0 |s# the attempt to enlarge them did not
gain great headway for at least half a century#

Th© first

successful shipment of nitrate v/as made in 1 8 3 1 when a cargo
shipped to Prance was sold#

In the following year regular

shipments to England begun*^
The gradual expansion of markets, chiefly in Europe
but to some extent in the United States too, resulted in th©
development of the nitrate properties In Tarapaca^ from which
the entire supply of nitrate cam© -until 18?G#

After 1850,

Chilean and British entrepreneurs became active as producers
along with the Peruvians, but the latter still constituted
o
the largest group#0 The commerce connected with the nitrate
6
Carlos £* Ibanez, Minas i Salitreras, Contiene las
leyes, decretos supremos dlc ^ a & o TnrispmclencTa~ vi.lente
sobre estas materials" (Santiago: La Lira, I9 0 O ) , 1 ppVlTIpT*
^Cornejo, El Salitre, pp# 10, 25, 301#
8 Ibid., p* [j_3; Billinghurst, Los capitales salitreros.
PP* 13, 3T^3I#
*--- -----

trad© , however, was largely controlled by Chileans whose
activities centered in their port city of Valparaiso#
Because of this a steady increase in th© strength of Chilean
nitrate interests, who were frequently associated with
Englishmen, was not unnatural#*?

in large part the desire of

Chile to extend her boundaries northward grew out of this
economic expansion as represented by the constant augmenting
of Chilean economic interests in th© Peruvian and later in
the Bolivian territories that stretched along th© Pacific
coast#

Not only Chilean entrepreneurs but Chilean workmen

migrated to the region in significant numbers#

The latter

became an important segment of the population in Tarapaca and
comprised the majority in the Bolivian littoral#*^
To retain the proper perspective concerning the eco
nomic activities in th© nitrate region,it must be emphasized
that the guano industry was the most important economic
enterprise in Peru until 1872#

The chief sources of the

deposits were located on rocky islands off the Peruvian coast,
principally on the Chincha Islands several hundred miles south
of Callao#

The iramense quantities of guano found there were

frequently sixty to one hundred feet in depth? in addition,
deposits of lesser importance were located along the coast of
th© mainland#

At no time before the decade of the l8 6 o*s did

9Gonzalo Bulnes, Chile and Peru (Santiago: Universitaria.

1920), pp. 36ff.

1 Qrbid.. p. i0 .

*

6
th© nitrate industry ©merge from th© dominating shadow of th©
guano enterprises that provided the main source of fertiliser
for Europe, the largest profits for th© Peruvian government,
and the chief incentive for th© Chilean policy of expansion
northward#
Guano was known to and utilised by th© Inc a Indians
and by their successors, th© Spaniards*

Beginning in l81j.O It

was Introduced into Europe where it quickly acquired a large
market*

So lucrative did Peru’s guano trad© beeora© that the

government nationalised the industry; and from 1 8 5 3 through
1 8 7 2 at least eight million tons of this highly valued fei>ti~

liser were shipped from the Chineha Islands#

Th© revenues

from these cargoes enriched th© Peruvian treasury, gave that
country excellent credit abroad, and encouraged the initi
ation of a gigantic public works program#

To finance this

program, which was poorly planned and exceedingly costly,
huge loans were contracted in Europe*

As long as th© guano

deposits remained plentiful, Peru’s revenues were equal to
the burden imposed by this debt and signs of prosperity per
vaded the land#1**’
Although th© nitrate Industry received little offi
cial attention during Peru’s "Guano Age," the government
followed a liberal policy in the disposition of nitrate
deposits which permitted a steady expansion#

Until late in

^Clements H* Markham, A History of Peru (Chlcar-o:
Charles PI* Sergei and Co^, 1 8 9 2 7 ,"'pp* 3 5 3 , 1$GF#' Carlos
Wiesse, Hiatoria del Peru (Lima: Francos© Cientifica, I939),
pp* 55, 70.

7
th© decade of th© i8 6 0 *®* nitrate lands in Tarapaca war© open
to free exploitation on th© basis of grants obtainable from
the Peruvian government to individuals who discovered nitrate
deposits.

Each applicant received two ostacas of land or

approximately twenty-four acres*

Therefore* in order to

obtain a large tract of deposits co-operation between Indi
viduals* frequently within a family, was necessary*

Under

this policy a considerable quantity of nitrate deposits were
acquired* but not all were brought into production immediately#
However* in 1868 the making of grants was suspended by a
decree dated November 30**^
The later imposition of a state isonopoly on nitrate
sales and the subsequent expropriation procedures were
measures that grew out of th© financial necessities of the
Peruvian government and its plan to obtain added revenues
through government control of the industry*

Th© large reve

nues Peru previously obtained by her control of th© expor
tation of guano were no longer adequate to meet th© expenses
of government*

It proved to be impossible to revive th©

industry because of approaching exhaustion of th© guano
deposits and the increasing competition that fertilizer was
encountering in world markets from the expanding nitrate

-^Gustavo Julian* wMemoria sobre la Esplotacion i
Beneficio del Salitre i Yodo*w glaboraclon decalitre i yodo
(Santiagot Nacional* I8 8 9 )* pp*7I?| Julio miaBourgeois^—
M t l M l m w i d© Dereoho Miner© ghlleno (Santiago* Juridica 1
II, 320; Enrique Cuevas, fEeTltrate Industry (Hew
Yorkt Wtai. S. Meyers, 1 91 6 ), p. U T

8

industry*3-3 A diligent search for new sources of revenue be
came imperative*

It was only natural that President Manuel

Pardo (1872-1876) should turn to the nitrate industry.1^
Hot only was the use or the two products similar; but the
supply of nitrate , like the guano deposits, was preponder
antly under the control of Peru*
Initially the Peruvian government levied an export
tax on nitrate in an attempt to augment its revenues; but the
continued competition, th© persistence of the government *s
financial difficulties, and th© desire of Peruvians to monop
olise the revenues of th© industry ^ahlch were in part being
siphoned off by Chileans, resulted In measures being adopted
by Peru that culminated in nationalization*

Thus, the

Peruvian Law of January 18, 1873*established the policy of
nationalizing the sale of nitrate*

This action was th© first

major stop In the process whereby ownership and control of
the entire industry was transferred from private interests to
the government*^

^Bulnes, Chile and Peru, pp* 0Off; Thomas J*
Hutchinson, Two Years in Peru(London: Sampson* Low* Marston*
Low and SearTST TZTTT,~H,~T7Z
.
»
»
»
l^-Pardo Is noted as the first civilian to become chief
executive of Peru* Pardo promoted educational development,
attempted to re-organize the governments finances on a more
economical basis, and nationalized the nitrate industry* The
Secret Alliance of 1873 with Bolivia was also signed during
his presidency* On the whole, he strove to establish law and
order and to steer a middle course between the extreme con
servatives and extreme liberals* See Wiesse, Peru, pp* 92ff*
3*5Ibanez, Minas i^ Salitreras» pp* 282f •

9
Uhder til© law state monopolisation or sales would ox*
tend for a period or two years with the legislature having an
opportunity at that time to review the policy in full*

By

decree the initiation or the experiment was set for September*
1873*

^he government was to accept annually a quantity of

nitrate equal to that exported in the previous year- -lour
and one-half million Spanish quintals— from private producers
each of whom was to be given a quota fixed by a commission
especially appointed for that purpose# *f A

Producers were to

be paid 2 *14-0 soles per quintal and the selling price was to
be established in order to assure the government a profit of
twenty-five soles on each quintal marketed*

But not all

sales of nitrate came under government control as would
appear from the law*

Private export of nitrate was permitted

to continue on payment of an export duty, and nitrate sold
in this manner was derived mainly from oflcinas that did not
have contracts to produce for the government*
Because the profits received by Peru did not reach
the level anticipated, her financial problems remained
iA

A Spanish quintal is equivalent to forty-six kilo
grams and equals approximately one hundred and one English
pounds*
sol® is the Peruvian monetary unit that during
this period was valued at forty-four pennies in sterling
currency* In the Monopolization of Sales Law provision was
made for lowering or raising the price paid producers to
compensate for differences in tb© quality of nitrate sold
to the state*
18
Ibanez, Minas 1 Salitreraa, m>« 28"?-286: ftievnn.
The Nitrate Industry, p. lTI

10
unsolved#

Peruvian leaders thought that the fallure of the

experiment was caused by inadequate government control over
p r o d u c t i o n * T h u s * toward the end o£ the expiration or the
Monopolisation of Nitrate Sales Law* Peru determined to
assume complete charge or the nitrate industry*
Expropriation was enacted on May 28* 18?5#

The Law o£

It authorised

compensation for the expropriated property up to the amount
of seven million pounds* with approximately four million
pounds of this sum to be expended to buy nitrate properties
and the remainder to be dedicated to purchasing the railways
serving the industry* 20
The decree issued by President Pardo putting the lav/
into effect established the following conditions:

those who

agreed to sell their nitrate properties would receive In
return certificates redeemable in two years with an interest
of eight per cent; if the seller desired* the certificates
would stipulate the oficlna represented by the securities;
or if no desire for the inclusion of this privilege was ex
pressed, certificates issued would not represent any specific
property#

Should an owner wish to do so th© law permitted

him to retain operating control of th© of iclna until full
payment was mad© but certificates issued in such cases would

-^However, if the export statistics are correct* the
sales made by the government accounted for eighty per cent
of exports In 18?1|., the first full year of the law*a operation*
20

Ibanez, Minas

Salitreraa * pp# 2u6f #
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not b© transf©rable*

Those operators desiring to sell lor

cash would consumwfcte with the government a promise-of-sale
agreement«

They would be allowed to continue producing and

exporting without restriction but would be required to pay
an export duty which Initially was £ if toon soles per quintal
but was later raised considerably*

The increase was intended

to make private exportation unprofitable and hence to pro
mote the rapid completion of the monopoly*

However, the

final sale price received by those who chose this alternative
plan was to be reduced one-half of one por cent per month*
The reduction was justified on th© grounds that exploitation
of the deposits diminished the property’s value and that
permission to sell privately might constitute an advantage*^
The decree also contained provisions concerning the
financial transactions involved in the expropriation process*
An association of Peruvian banks was empowered to handle
nitrate sales for the government and to pay interest to cer
tificate holders*

By virtue of modifications made in a later

decree, the net profits accruing from nitrate sales on the
government’s account were to be used by the banks to pay
interest installments, and if such funds proved inadequate
to meet these obligations, part of tho export duties would be
available to meet tho deficit*^

21Ibid., pp. 287f£.
22
Guillermo E* Billlnghurst, Legislacion sobre
salitre y bdrax en farapaca (Santiago: C e r v a n t e s ,
pp* klijf•
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The commission appointed to determine the value of
the nitrate lands began its work in 1876*

Apparently the

valuations they mad© were based almost entirely upon des
criptions of the properties submitted by the owners who fr©**
quently exaggerated their value or made Inaccurate reports
in other ways*

For Instance, the method of delineating

boundaries was extremely rudimentary and unsatisfactory#
Boundaries were marked off by digging a furrow around the
property; the furrow could easily be and often was changed
to the disadvantage of the state#^3
Based upon the commission* s reports , Peru had by the
start of the War of the Pacific In 1879 issued certificates
to the amount of 1 9 *2 0 5 ,2 5 2 soles* including 6 0 0 ,0 0 0 soles
in certificates for the Patillos railroad still under con
struction#

At the rate of exchange then prevailing the

value of these certificates expressed in pounds sterling was
3,520,962#

More than one hundred and twenty major properties

and a large quantity of lesser lands were acquired by the
issuance of these certificates#^*

2 3cuevas, The Nitrate Industry# p# 12; Julian* "La
Esplotacion del SaTItr^‘rr’'

^Francisco Valdes Vergara, Memoria sobre la
Adrainlstracion de Tarapaca^ (Sant iago s Republic a, XTJcTL^),
Appendix No# 1, pp * XSo- l^♦ In no two sources does the list
of properties for which certificates were issued agree in
detail* Billinghurst, Los capitales salitreros, p# 3 9 states
that the amount emit eel equalled S 20,339, 20'3# ’A later esti
mate by an English source placed the valuation at fe 3,622,000
Jg-^nal of Finance (London), Ed* by 3* F# Van Oss, II
(lo97), 1^-5•
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However, the process of buying nitrate lands had not
been completed*

At least twenty ofIclnas and probably more

remained unsold, and these were ovaued chiefly by Europeans
and Chileans*

Negotiations for nineteen properties valued

at 1 ,6 1 7 ,6 0 0 soles, or h 3 0 5 ,3 o0 , had been mad© but final
approval by the government was pending*

This sum, when added

to the value of certificates issued, brings the valuation
of the nitrate works in Tarapaca in 1 6 7 9 to h 3 ,6 2 6 ,3 2 2 * ^
The security for the nitrate certificates included
not only those properties represented by issued certificates
but also all

unexploited lands, abandoned lands, and other

properties under the jurisdiction of th© state fiscal agent
in Iquique*^
Under the original plan the railway that served the
nitrate region was to be expropriated also, but nothing had
been done to accomplish this by the outbreak of the war*

In

proceeding with the entire operation the government of Peru
faced many difficulties*

The chief obstacle lay in th© ina

bility of Peru to obtain a foreign loan#

Th© plan had been

to retire the certificates within two years#

To accomplish

this the original expropriation law had authorised the

25Valdes Vergara, Admlnistraeion tie Tarapaca*
Appendix Ho# 1, pp*
Semper and Michels, Industria
del salitre, p# 263 lists twenty-nine such properties*
Twonty-two, for which X'iguros were given, had a combined
value of S 1,538,000#
2 ^BillInghurst, Legislacion sobre sal lira, p* l{lj)j«

Ilf
president to contract a loan In Kurop© Tor seven million
pounds* but European financiers would not co-operate*
Although th© nitrate properties did constitute sufficient
collateral* Perufs large outstanding foreign debt contracted
P7
in previous years had dried up th© market Tor her bonds* *
/
The status of nitrate property in Tarapaca in 1879
can be represented by th© following categories s

lands the

state held title to and represented by certificates; lands
in the promise-of~sale group; unclaimed and unexploited
state properties; lands that reverted to th© state because
they had not been under production for eight months; and
p/3
lands remaining in private possession*^ Nitrate lands could
also be classified according to whether their production was
sold under contract to Peru or whether it was sold privately*
3y 1 8 7 9 * there were at least twenty-six nitrate establish**
ments producing under contract to Peru*

Most of the others

were shut down*^9
The nationalisation of nitrate lands in Tarapaca
gave Peru a virtual monopoly over the industry, but not a
completely secure one*

Th© action quickened th© rate at

2 ?V7iesse, Peru, pp* lOOf*
pP

/

^uBillinghurst, Legislation sobre salitro* pp* 26lf ,
if!2f* Reversion of unop orat©d 1and s to the st;at'e resulted
from a decree issued in 1876* Involved were some sixty
properties, a list of which can be found In Semper and Michels,
Industria del salitre, Appendix No* 10, pp* 281jf*
17of *

29vaid/a Vergara, Admlnistraeion d© Tarapaca* pp*
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which nitrate lands in non-Peruvian territory to the south
were being developed since Chilean producers who sold out to
Peru shifted their activities to the fields of Aguas Blancas
and Taltal in Chile and to th© deposits that lay near
Antofagasta and Tocopilla in the Bolivian province of Atacama*
The economic development of the Bolivian littoral— which was
geographically closer to Chile than to Bolivia— was dominated
by Chilean capitalists*

Thus , while most of the deposits

were located in Bolivian territory, th© initiative in devel
oping non-Peruvian nitrate deposits cam© chiefly from Chile*
In addition, most of the labor was Chilean*

These factors,

of course, strengthened the growing sentiment in Chile for
annexation of th© Bolivian littoral*
Peru became apprehensive about th© growing competi
tion in nitrates and the threat of Chilean control*

Her

leaders sought to devise ways to overcome these problems*
Their concern was solely with the Bolivian bods since de
posits In Chile were considered inconsequential at that time*
Yet Peruvian attempts to curtail If not control nitrate pro
duction In Bolivia were in effect as antagonistic to the
interests of Chile as the nationalization laws in Peru had
been.

Moreover, the process by which Peru hoped to minimize

future competition with her monopoly of nitrate is intimately
connected with the political and economic relations existing
between Chile and Bolivia*

Their relations were marked by

sharp differences that converged In a boundary dispvito, which
grew in seriousness from Its Inception in 18I|^*

16
Th© lack of a clearly defined boundary between Chile
and Bolivia provided the occasion for the controversy between
these two countries concerning the limits of their respective
jurisdictions.
one.

Their dispute, however, was not an unusual

The republics of South America wore plagued by boundary

problems, most of which wore caused by the failure of Spain
during the colonial period to define her political juris-*
dictions#

These colonial territorial divisions were accepted

informally by the newly independent Spanish-American republics as the basis for their boundaries#

Yet in many

instances regions situated on the outer edges of Spanish po
litical divisions were thinly settled if at all#

Since these

regions were unimportant at the time, there was little oc
casion for the exercise of authority in them and no need of
delimiting political jurisdictions precisely#

The disputed

area falls in this category#
The boundary controversy provoked by Chile in iGijft
constituted an attempt to extend her political limits beyond
the line commonly assumed to be her northern boundary and
into an area where Bolivian authority had been exercised#
According to an official map of the colonial boundary bef

tween the province of Potosi (Bolivia) and the Presldencia
of Chile, the territory of the latter extended only as far
as the Salado Hiver, approximately th© twenty-sixth parallelj

^william j# Dennis, Documentary History of the TacnaArica Dispute (Iowa City: PubiTshod by' the UniversTty, 1^2777
University of Iowa Studios in the Social Sciences. VIII.
N o . 3 , p . 3^7------------ --------------- ---- ----
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The Nitrate Region, 1878
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and official and unofficial reports from American and British
representatives confirm that Chilean authority extended no
farther north than th© port of Paposo, on the twenty ••fifth
parallel#31

Because they are so indefinite regaining bounda

ries, th© constitutions of both Chile and Bolivia fail to
provide a basis for judgement of the boundary line*32
Thus, when in 181*2 President Manuel Bulnes (with the
support of Congress) claimed th© twenty-third parallel as
the northern boundary of Chile, th© northward expansion of
that country had taken an important first step*

This claim

was made with the expectation that guano would be discovered
in the region and with the hop© of sharing in th© wealth and
revenues such deposits would produc©*33

j3Ut no such develop

ment occurred for many years and then only on a small scale.
The Bolivian government consistently rejected Chilean
claims, and no actual extension of Chilean authority oc
curred until 1857*

At that time the landing of Chilean

forces at Mejillones, just south of the twenty-third parallel,

33-ibld*, pp. 30, 32-31*., 38-1*0.
32xbid», pp* 3 6 -3 8 *
33Bulnes, Chile and Peru, pp* 2-7% The claim was mad©
shortly after large guano™™d!eposTts wore discovered In Peru
vian territory* The text of th© presidential message in
which the claim was mad© can be found in Dennis, Tacna-Arica
Documents, pp* 1*1* In this same work, pp* 30-l|3, the ref©-""
vant documents pertaining to the boundary disput© are tran
scribed* They clearly show that the Chilean claim did not
rest upon historical precedents*
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brought the boundary question to a critical stag©#

War

seemed Imminent until th© crisis with Spain developed#

That

crisis, during which both Chile and Bolivia co-operated with
Peru against the mother country, drew th© two together suf
ficiently to make possible a partial settlement of the
boundary

d i s p u t e # ^ *

Negotiated as the Treaty of

1 6 6 6 ,

th©

agreement established a provisional boundary at th© twentyfourth parallel, provided for the sharing of export duties on
guano and minerals in the disputed area, allowed citizens of
both countries equal rights to work in the area, and required
mutual agreement on the export duties to be levied#

In

addition, the treaty provided for the establishment of a
customs house at Mejillones, north of Antofagasta, to be the
only one authorized to receive these duties, and permitted
the Chilean officials to oversee the operation of the customs
house*^
It soon became apparent that the treaty did not lessen
the difficulties#

Disagreement arose over the Interpretation

of the treaty and dissatisfaction with the treaty was wide
spread In both countries#

The occasion for th© controversies

lay in discoveries of nitrate deposits in the disputed region*
The most important discoveries were made north of the pro
visional boundary in the area around Antofagasta#

South of

3^*Bulnes, Chile and Peru, pp# 6-10#
^Dennis, Tacna-Arica Documents# pp# ij.9 f for the text
of the Treaty of Xooo#
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the boundary nitrate deposits were round in the areas of
Tait&l and Aguas Blancas, but these were of lesser desira
bility because of their low-qu&lity caliche and the dlfficulties encountered in transporting the product to the
coast#36
Bolivia regretted the concessions previously granted
to Chile and sought to regain complete freedom of action at
least in th© territory north of the provisional boundary*
In order to win independence of action in matters affecting
the exploitation of nitrate deposits, Bolivia asserted that
nitrate did not come under the provisions of th© Treaty of
1 8 66 sine© it was not classifiable as guano, mineral, or

m e t a l # T h e s e three words wore the only ones used to desig
nate the resources coming under treaty regulations^ therefore,
from a strictly technical point of view the claim was justi
fiable#

However, lack of precision in the use of terms in

the treaty permitted Chile to contest the Bolivian interpre
tation*

It was argued that since the words "minerals" and

"metals" were used interchangsbly, it was unreasonable to
exclude nitrate deposits from coming under the stipulations#
A second major controversial question involved the
article of the treaty that required the establishment of a
Bolivian customs-house at Mejillones and restricted exports
to that institution#

This limitation would not have

^Bulnes, Chile and Peru, p# 13#
37Ibid#m pp# llff#
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adversely affected the guana trade Tor which, it was designed
because no important deposits or guano were discovered in
Bolivian territory outside that region#

But it did seriously

imped© the exploitation of nitrate since th© natural port
for that trad© was Antofagasta#

Bolivian refusal to es

tablish facilities for collecting customs duties at that port
rested upon th© strict language of th© treaty# yet it natu
rally appeared to Chile as an unfair and toe strict reliance
upon treaty terms#
tension between th© two countries over this situ
ation reached alarming heights from 1872 to l87if*

What

appeared to Chile to be Bolivian violation of the letter and
spirit of the treaty was viewed by Bolivians as Chilean ex
pansionism and a threat to continued Bolivian rule in her
increasingly valuable coastal region*

Th© interests of Peru#

too# were intimately involved in the boLindary controversy
which occurred at a propitious time for that country*

It

was to her interests to prevent Chilean expansion northward
and to forestall the development of competition with the
Peruvian nitrate monopoly*

Since Peru and Bolivia both

vigorously opposed Chilean expansion# there existed a basis
for co-operation between the two#
At the height of th© crisis in 1873# Peru and Bolivia
signed a secret mutual defense treaty that stiffened Bolivia’s
attitude and prevented her ratification of an agreement
signed with Chile in 1872 designed to resolve the controversy

22
over the Treaty of 1 8 6 6 *3 6

basic aim of Peru was to aid

in maintaining the claims of Bolivia and in return for such
support to obtain Bolivian co-operation in preserving her
own nitrate monopoly#

Had the position of Bolivia been suc

cessfully maintained, later events indicate that Peru would
have received th© co-operation she needed#

However, th©

Bolivian determination to oppose Chilean demands quickly
weakened#

Political instability and the inauguration of a
/
new president, Tomas Frias, who desired a pacific solution
to the controversy, were factors that promoted the change in
policy#39

But the adamant stand of Chile, reinforced by the

arrival of new naval vessels,may well have led Peru and
Bolivia to a more careful consideration of the implications
of their policy#^-0
Within a few months after the signing of the secret
treaty a settlement was reached between Bolivia and Chile#
Known as the Treaty of l8 ?i^, it was ratified by the Bolivian
legislature only after heated debate revealed strong oppo
sition to it*

Chilean capital and enterprise in th© now

•ip

description of this controversy may be found in
Ibid*, pp# 18-20; Dennis, Tacna—Arica Documents, p# 57;
For th© text of the Tro aty~oF‘T87Tge e "Ibid#, pp # 57-59#
39^0mas Frias became president of Bolivia in 18?^.
and served until 1876 when he was overthrown by his Minister
of War, Hilariop Daza# Both before lie became president and
afterwards, Frias served M s country as a diplomat#
^Dennis, Tacna-Arlca Documents* p* 6 l#
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fully recognized Bolivian area north of the twenty-fourth
parallel was to be protected from the imposition of addition**
al taxes for a period of twenty-five years#

For her part,

Chile renounced any claim to share in the custom-house reve
nues which were made payable at Antofagasta as well as at
Mejlllones#^-

This treaty gave full satisfaction to Chilean

demands#
The strong position maintained by th© Chilean govern
ment in her controversy with Bolivia was based in large part
upon the desire to protect the interest of Chilean nitrate
producers in the disputed area#

The development had been a

rapid one beginning in 18 66 with the discovery of nitrate
deposits by th© Chileans Francisco Puelma and Jose* Santos
Ossa#^

In th© same year the discoverers obtained from

Bolivia a concession to work their find, th© Saiar del Carmen,
nine square leagues In extent, in return for building a mole
at Antofagasta#43
Based upon their concession, Puelma and Ossa formed
f

the Companla Bxplotadora del Desierto do Atacama which In

h^-For text of Treaty of 187^ see Ibid#, pp# 62f; See
also Bulnes, Chile and Peru, PP* 30-36#

^Jose Santos Ossa played a loading role in th© early
economic development of northern Chile and the Bolivian
littoral# See Samuel Ossa Borne, "Don,Joss' Santos Ossa,"
Bevista Chilena de Historia y Geo&rafia* LXIX, I8 6 -2 1 I4. and
UCXII,178—228#
^Bulnes, Chile and Peru, pp. 36f; Chile, Minisfcerio
de Hacienda, La Industrie del salitrora de Chile (Sairbiar-o;
La Kacion, 1935)7T T ^ I -----------------------

21*.
negotiations with Bolivia in 1868 obtained additional con
cessions*

By virtue of this agreement of 1868 the company

received the exclusive privilege of working nitrate deposits
in Atacama, exemption from taxation tor fifteen years, and
grants ot approximately fifty additional square leagues of
land*

Their sole obligation was to build a railroad between

their lands and Antofagasta some twenty-two leagues away—
which by necessity the company would have built anyway*
/

Shortly afterward, the Compania Bxplotadora was reorganized
with the aid of the great Chilean financial house, B1 Banco
Edwards, and a wealthy English guano and nitrate investment
firm, Anthony Gibbs and Company, into Melbourne Clark
Ciia.^4

Realizing the extent of their concession, th© new

company strove to preserve its privileges in the face of de
mands by discoverers of new deposits and adverse public opini on in Bolivia*

Heavy investments were mad© by this

company yet indefiniteness regarding its privileges mounted*
Political instability in Bolivia x>rolonge&

'uncer

tainty of the company as to th© permanence of its privileges*
Revolution overthrow th© government of the notorious dictator

^ I b l d *% Bulnes, Chile and Peru, pp* 37f 3 Melbourne
Clark was one of the few EngXi’sISon lio’'work in the nitrate
fields of Peru prior to 186£># Anthony Gibbs and Company
of London established commercial houses in Peru and Chile
in 1826* This company was until I86 i|. the exclusive agent
for Peru in marketing guano* Beginning in 186£, the firm
became important as investors and merchants in the nitrate
industry*

Melgarejo who had originally granted the concessions.^
Several years later in 1 8 7 2 * a new government restricted th©
company *s grants by reducing to fifteen square leagues its
territory and by annulling its exclusive privilege#

But this

action was short lived, for in the following year compen
sation for rescinded concessions was made by granting th©
company an additional fifty estacas in th© nearby Salinas
region and by affirming th© fifteen years exemption from
taxation*

The agreement of 1873 also laid down rules for th©

operation of th© company railroad, for tax exemption on im
ported railroad equipment, and for th© appointment by the
company of an agent to reside in Antofagasta*

In return the

company agreed to pay to Bolivia 2,000 bolivianos annually*
The final status of the company, which had again re/
organised as the Compania de Sail tree y Ferrooarril de Anto
fagasta, gave to it th© advantages that its owners felt
necessary in order for Bolivian nitrate to compete with the

^Mariano Melgarejo who ruled Bolivia from 1861$. to
1 8 7 1 was, perhaps, the worst ruler that misruled country ever

had* In two boundary treaties (on© each with Brazil and
Chile) he alienated lands over which Bolivian claims were
strong, and by debasing the coinage and selling Indian
communal lands he disrupted Bolivia*s economic life* Vain,
bloodthirsty, and debauched in his personal life, he seems
to have had no redeeming characteristic#
iu6 '
*^RuIz Bourgeois, Perecho Mlne.ro Chlleno* p# 321;
Bulnes, Chile and Peru, pp* 39^50;~Wrl^os^^Aidiinate Solar,
Leyos, Decreto1T"f Documontos Helativos a Salltreras
(Santiago! iJervahtVs, ItyOY),"Bolivian '3'ection, pp. 23*,£>»
33-41.
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more cheaply produced nitrate or Tar&p&ca*^'^

Although th©

company eventually fell under "tine control of its British
investors, many prominent Chi loans held stock in th© enter*
prise*

It has been asserted that these Chileans everted f,an

undue influence on the government of Chile, * 1 in th© company1a
behalf#^
Development of the nitrate deposits In th© Anto
fagasta area and in the Chilean areas of Taltal and Aguas
Blancas continued throughout th© decade of th© seventies*^
Th© major new addition, however, lay north of Antofagasta in
the area known as Tocopilla*

While Tocopilla was to surpass

in production the fields of Tarapaca^ a half-century later,
its development in no way threatened the Peruvian monopoly
since it came under Peruvian control#

That control was &c-

quired indirectly by an arrangement between Peru and John G,
Meiggs*^

In 1 6 7 6 , Meiggs leased from Bolivia most of th©

deposits in Tocopilla, free from taxation, for a monthly
rental of 10,000 bolivianos#

Th© contract expressly per

mitted Meiggs to engage in arrangements with foreigners

b? ibid# # p* 3 7 *

^Dennis, Tacna-Arica Documents* p# $1*
^Aldunate Solar, Pocuxaentos Relatives a Salitreras,
Bolivian Section, p* 2Jj b hows"T h a t "Boll'via "grantedother
concessions in the Antofagasta area# See also Bulnes, Chile
and Peru* pp* 38, 1|3«
*n

50John (am Meiggs was associated with his more famous
brother, Henry, in the letter’s railroad construction pro
jects in Peru* They were citizens of the United States#
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concerning th© us© of His concession#

Within © Tow months

his lease had been transferred to Peru whose policy in r©gard
to these deposits did not* however, prevent son© exploitation
since portions of the Tocopilla properties were re-leased by
that government#^

But the provision for alienation in the

original contract and th© rapidity with vhich Peru obtained
control of th© deposits show conclusively that Bolivia was a
willing partner In Peru*s monopolization schemes#
In spite of Peru’s efforts during these years her
monopoly of nitrate production had not been fully realized#
With th© failure of Peru and Bolivia to co-operate closely
in the period from 1873 to 187^ the expansion by Chilean
nitrate interests continued In following years#

Later in the

decade when th© Irresponsible Bolivian, Hilarion Baza, ac
quired dictatorial power, Peru was afforded another oppor
tunity to gain support from Bolivia#^

Daza’s pronounced

anti-Chilean attitude, his need for immediate revenues, and
Chilean involvement In a boundary dispute with Argentina
were circumstances that augured well for a successful move
designed to reduce and perhaps eventually eliminate compe
tition from nitrates produced by Chileans#

Thus, with th©

^Aldunate Solar, Documentos Relatives a Salitreras*
Bolivian Section, pp# 93f % Suiz bburgooT^V
L_
Chlleno# p# 323#
—
~
^Hilarion Baza stands next to Molgarojo as Bolivia’s
worst ruler# Almost as intemperate as his predecessor, his
stubborn and blundering diplomacy precipitated the War of
th© Pacific# As a result, Bolivia lost not only her portion
of th© nitrate region but also her only outlet to the soa#
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assurance that if needed,Peruvian support would be available ,
D&za decreed on February llj., 18?8, the imposition of a tax
of ten centavos on each quintal of nitrate shipped from
Bolivian ports#-*3
This was a conscious and premeditated violation of
th© Treaty of I8 ?lj. which mainly affected the privileges of
th© Antofagasta Nitrate and Railway Company*

Th© agent of

this company, Georg© Hicks, protested th© action and refused
to pay the tax, while th© owners exerted their influence to
obtain diplomatic support from C h i l e T h a t government
willingly and vigorously supported th© position of the com
pany, but these efforts were to no avail#

For almost a year

th© controversy raged, operations of th© company ceased, and
the agent fled Antofagasta to avoid arrest#

Bolivia declared

the company *s concessions null and void, confiscated its
property, and announced an auction of them on th© grounds of
non-payment of taxes*

However, on the day designated for

the auction naval forces of Chile took possession of Antofagasta#^ This 3measure, deemed necessary to protect Chilean

Bourgeois, Derecho Minero Chlleno, p. 322;
Aldunato Solar, Document os Re'lativos a ^alitreras, Bolivian
Section, p# 1|8#
**“
agent, Georg© Hicks, was lator associated with
the important English nitrate investor, John Thomas North*
See william Ii* Russell, A Visit to Chile and the Nit rat o
Fields of Tarapaca {Londons Tf* S* Virixxe ul Co*,
p V

Iff.

^Aldunate Solar, Documentos ftelativos a Salltroras,
Bolivian Section, p* I4.8 ; Buinos, dxiil~and PeruT pp* lOl^-iOo*
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interests, was later regarded by a renowned Chilean historian,
as warranted sine© Chile1© ^legitimate economic expansion
was being cheeked in a shameful and humiliating manner#
Actually, the Peruvian government was reluctant to
participate in hostilities because both its army and navy
were in a state of unpreparedness*

Her efforts to mediate

the differences between Chile and Bolivia not only proved
fruitless, but also revealed a hostile attitude in Chile
toward Peru*

Both of these factors along with the war senti

ment in Peru and the obligations of the secret alliance made
the early entrance of Peru into the conflict unavoidable.^?
Even though the war lasted for four years, a victory
for Chile was made certain in half that time*

The landing

of Chilean troops in Antofagasta was followed by the complete
acquisition of the Bolivian littoral*

By the end of the

year 1879* fck© seas had been swept clear of the Peruvian navy
and the flag of Chile waved over th© nitrate province of
Tarapaca!

Decisive Chilean victories over th© allied armies

in i8 6 0 and early in 1881 brought to an end active Bolivian
participation in the war and brought about Chilean control
of a large part of Peru, including Lima*

Even though desul

tory fighting in Peru continued, the supremacy of Chile on

^Luis Galdames, A History of Chile, Trans* and Sd*
by I* J, Cox (Chapel Hill: ~ T O F # oFHorfii"'Carolina Press,
19 ^ ) , p* 3 2 5 *
^Ib i d * , p* 326; V/iesse, Peru, pp* 102ff*

30
th© west coast was assured***®
Chilean war aims were not clear-cut at the outset of
the war5 however# as the dominance of Chilean arms became
apparent# her terms of peace became more stringent*

At first#

Chile demanded the annexation of th® Bolivian littoral and
an indemnity from Peru for the restoration of peace*^9

with

her occupation of the coastal province# Chile sought to
assure th© defeat of Peru by breaking the alliance of 1873*
To accomplish this design Chile proposed Bolivian acceptance
of territory from the Peruvian coastal area to compensate
for her lost littoral if Bolivia would denounce her ally and
/

a

join with Chile in fighting Peru*
The first indication of this design came in April#
8l
1879* and an official proposal followed in May*
However#
it was rejected by th© Bolivian president Hilarion Da&a*
Still# Chilean leaders continued to discuss among themselves
the advisability of establishing a Bolivian corridor out of
Peruvian territory north of Tarapaca*

Besides providing

compensation to Bolivia# the security of Chile would be

^Caldames# History of Chile# pp* 327-335*
^9see the 11Chilean v/ar Circular#" in Dennis, TacnaArica Documentsa pp* 83ff # and ?fOpinion of Minister Osborn
on Chilean Objectives in the War#" on p* 83*
6 oibid.. pp. Girr.

^ X b l d .. pp. 10 2 f.
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strengthened by a third power lying between herself and
Peru*^
Th© attitude of Chile in favoring the acquisition of
territory north of Tarapaca^ by Bolivia indicates her in
tention of annexing Tarapaca*

The proposal of May* 1879#

did not specify annexation; however* that was strongly hinted
at by the inclusion of an article requiring the nitrate works
as a guarantee for Peruvian indemnity*

But it was not long

before Chilean views crystallized on this matter* A letter
/
/*
written by Chilean Minister Jose Santa Maria on November 20*
18?9# when Peruvian forces were being expelled from th©
nitrate province states:

wWe can say that Tarapaca^is ours#"

After discussing the military situation h© more pointedly
declared* ffWe##*are owners of Tarapaca*"^

By the middle of

1880* annexation had definitely become one of the major war
aims of Chile*^*

Actually* the failure of the mediation

efforts of the United States In the fall of i860 can be at
tributed to Chile1s determination to retain the nitrate
province and Perufs refusal to treat on this basis

^Jbid#* pp* 138f*
6 3 i b l c U ,

p #

H 7 f *

^^Herbert Millington* American Diplomacy and the War
of the Pacific (How York: Columbia UniV# Pr©VsT X qTlQTT"
p

T

7 X 7

6%bid** pp* 71ff* Senate Documents, 14.
7 th Congress*
1st Session* IV* Doc# No# 79f Pp7 l^OB-I^o#' Millington*s
account is a thorough study and presents an authoritative
account of the role of th© United States in the War of the
Pacific#
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Later onf Chilean war aims expanded to include the
annexation of th© territory beyond the nitrate province known
as Ariea and Tacna*

Not only did Chile want to establish a

buffer region between herself and Peru but sh© hoped to find
additional sources of nitrate in this area*

This extension

created a serious diplomatic problem which was to plague th©
Americas for the next fifty years*
In large measure the fat© of Tarapaca determined th©
future economic status of both Chile and Peru*

Loss of th©

province by Peru seriously impaired her public finances al
ready damaged by the decline of the guano industry*

Faced

with an immense foreign debt contracted in the Guano Age*
Perufs ability to satisfy her obligations rested upon th©
growth of revenues derived from the developing nitrate
industry*^
Chile, on the other hand, had experienced a serious
depression during the decade of the 1870*s*

As a result of

the acquisition of the Tarapaca nitrate fields, these diffi
culties were overcome*^®

In this respect, the significance

of the bar of the Pacific has been stated as follows;
The victor would gain a source of revenue
that Insured a steady income to its government,
and thus taxes would be reduced; the loser would
AA
u For a summary of the controversy see Dennis, TacnaArica Documents* pp* 11-29*
^Millington, American Diplomacy^ p* 9*
^Galdames, History of Chile, pp* 319*321*
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b© forced to seek other measures fox* raising
money and would remain a poor country#
Not only was th© disposition of Tarapaca of importance
to the warring states; foreigners also had an interest in th©
matter#

Because the economic interests of North Americans

in Peru and Chile were slight* the welfare of capitalists of
the united States was not seriously affected by the war or
its outcome*

European interests* however# had significant

holdings in these countries*

Tliese foreigners wore repre

sented mainly by Peruvian bondholders; and nitrate certifi
cate holders, although not nearly so important financially#
constituted another catagory whose interests were at stake
in the conflict*^

European interests can be classified in

the order of their importance as British* French# and German#
They# along with several groups in the United States# at
tempted to influence the decision regarding the fat© of
Tarapaca#
The loss by Peru of the nitrate province would make
the redemption of Peruvian bonds difficult# if not impossi
ble, for Europeans#

That is, unless Chile accepted responsi

bility for the bonds along with the province#

But Chile

persistently refused to accept responsibility#*^

Thus, many

^Henry C# Evans* Chile and Its Relations with the
United States (Durham: DukeTlJhiv# Pross",_"T9"2!7T$ 'JpV^f7#
?£lbid♦* p# 100; Billington# American. Diplomacy#
PP# 33#
7^Sen# Docs.* lj.7th Congress* 1st Session* IV, Doc#
No# 79* pp#
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bondholders, particularly th© French, tried to prevent Chilean
annexation of Tarapaca#

They formed an organisation for th©

specific purpose of forestalling annexation by th© neutrali
sation of Tarapaca under the protection of th© United States#
Called the Credit Industriel* th© group devised a plan which
they claimed would protect the interests of the warring states
and the creditors of Peru#^

Their scheme involved the cre

ation of a monopoly for the sale of guano and nitrate which
it would operate#

The profits derived from the monopoly

would be used to redeem both th© Peruvian bonds and the
nitrate certificates, and to provide annual payments to Chile
as well as to Peru#

The proponents of this plan reasoned

that the distribution of nitrate profits in the manner de
scribed above would satisfy the legitimate demands of all
interested parties#
The promoters of the Credit Industriel realized that
Chile would oppose their scheme and that its acceptance could
by achieved only by the intervention of th© United States#
Since the North American republic was apparently sympathetic
toward the cause of Peru, th© Credit Industriel held high
hopes of obtaining her co-operation#

Nevertheless, efforts

made by agents of the company to gain the support of the
United States for their plan were unsuccessful* *3

7 2 Ibid«. pp. LfiO-lg2 .

7*3
1-'Millington, American Diplomacy* pp, 97ff#
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The failure of the scheme of the Credit Industriel
was due In part to lack or support from th© United States#
Other factors which contributed to its downfall were opposi**
tion from British bondholders and th© government of Chile# ^
Furthermore, President Pierola of Peru, who succeeded
Mariano Prado, reversed the policy of his predecessor and
vigorously opposed the scheme of the organ! zat ion#
British bondholders followed a more practical course
of action#

They entered into agreements \fith th© Chilean

government, who controlled the guano deposits during th© war,
that permitted a portion of the profits made from guano
shipments to be paid to the

bondholders#^

Early in i860,

the Chilean Minister of Public Works noted that the creditors
of Peru (probably including the nitrate certificate holders
as well as the bondholders) ”have been a powerful lever in
Europe to prevent the Peruvians from securing war elements
and to create for us a beneficent atmosphere in th© opinion
of those peoples • • #”^

He referred to a meeting of these

creditors which supported 11the annexing of farapacaT by Chile,”

^^Sen# Docs#, IfTth Congress, 1st Sees#, IV, Doc# No#
79, PP* 70T5T7
^I b i d ## pp#
pp# 131f#

Dennis, ffacna-Arica Documents#

^Ibid#, p# l6 0 j Millington, American Diplomacy#
P* kl*
^ Ibld# # p# lj.7 #
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and th© reference undoubtedly referred to a meeting held by
British creditors in London early in i860*
Th© foreigners among th© nitrate certificate holders
wished to recover their properties or were apprehensive about
receiving payment for their securities from th© Peruvian
government*

These dispossessed owners included, in th© main,

Chileans and English although some German and French interests
were represented*

While they did not agree as to the best

course of action for th© protection of their interests, some
of them apparently favored Chilean acquisition of Tarapaca*
Probably they felt a greater confidence in the ability of
Chile to make the payments on the certificates or els© hoped
that the industry would be returned to private enterprise by
t h a t

c o u n t r y *

Th© English comprised the largest group of Peruvian
creditors*

Early in the war Chileans became fearful lest

the English government Intervene to protect her investors
from severe losses when it was declared in Parliament that
British interests would be protected*

However, th© United

States Minister in Santiago reported that he had been assured
by the British Minister that the policy meant only to provide what was considered normal protection* 80 American

^Dennis, Tacna-Arlca Document aj

pp* 87f«

pp* 133f*

79lbid*m p# 61^*
80
Sen* Docs*, Itfth. Cong*, 1st Sess*, IV, Doc* Ho* 79,
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diplomats believed England, Prance, and probably Germany
favored Chilean annexation of Tarapaca#

However, th©

possibility that these countries were responsible for Chilean
annexation is slight#

The commercial interests of England

probably inclined her toward a policy favorable to Chile5
yet th© interests of British bondholders were allied with
the fortunes of Peru#
situated#

The French interests were similarly

French bondholders actively attempted to promote

the cause of Peru, whereas those who owned nitrate certif1**
cates might well have been in the group desiring th© trans
fer of Tarapaca to Chile#
American economic interests uniformly favored the
frustration of Chilean expansion during the War of th©
Pacific#

Some support from capitalists of the United States

had been given to th© scheme of the Credit Industriel# and
two other groups requested help from th© State Department
during the war in an effort to make good their claims against
op
Peru# ^ One of these was th© notorious Peruvian Company#
Its interest was based upon an early guano claim of Alexander
Cochet which had been determined by congress in l8 6 l to be
"vd*thout foundation#"®^
Landreau#®^

^ second was th© claim of J# T#

Both of those claims wore originally of French

®^Ibld## pp#
Oo
Millington, American Diplomacy, pp# 9^f#
83 rbid« , p. 106,
8TTbid. , pp, lllf«
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origin, and their importance in determining the issue of the
cessation of Tarapaca lay in the damage they did to American
diplomatic efforts to mediate the quarrel#®
The ratification of the Treaty of Ancon by Peru and
Chile in 1883» and the signing of the Truce Pact between
Chile and Bolivia early in I88 ij. brought the war of the
Pacific to a close#^

As a result of these agreements, Ghile

gained possession of the entire nitrate region#

While title

to Tarapaca was accorded Chile at Ancon, Bolivia steadfastly
refused to cede her littoral permanently*

To Bolivia access

to the Pacific Ocean was a necessity, and her government was
willing to grant Chile title to the Antofagasta region only
if another outlet was provided.

In 189£, Chile formally re

cognized Bolivia*s right to an outlet, but it was not until
I90 I4. that the two countries agreed upon details*

Only then

did Bolivia surrender to Chile her title to th© coastal
province#®

heritage of the War of the Pacific, however,

®I bi d*, p# 11^2 #
BA
^Dennis, Tacna-Arioa Documents, pp# 221-227 gives
the text of the two agreement's*
Q7Ibld., p. 232.
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continued to disturb relations between Chile and her former
opponents# R8

^Sinee 190l{-, Bolivia has kept alive her aspirations
for a corridor to the Pacific Ocean* Peru and Chile were
involved in a serious dispute until 1929 over th© provinces
of Tacna and Arica# Although the Treaty of Anc<ih had left
Chile in temporary possession of both areas, provision was
made for a plebiscite to be held in l89lj-* Disagreement over
the method of conducting the plebiscite prevented it from
being held# The dispute continued until 1929 when a settle
ment was reached* As a result of the treaty ratified in
that year, Peru regained the province of Tacna and Chile kept
Arica*

CHAPTER II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CHILEAN NITRATE POLICY
Prior to th© War of th© Pacific* th© nitrate policy
of Chile was designed to promote th© rapid exploitation of
the deposits under her control and to create conditions
that would allotv those deposits to produce In competition
with th© more favorably situated producers in Bolivia and
Peru*
try*

Because of that aim no taxes wore imposed on th© indus
This policy* formulated in full with th© issuance of

the last of a series of decrees on July 28, 1877# facilitated
-I
the acquisition of nitrate deposits by Chilean capitalists*
Discoverers of deposits were permitted to lay claim to lands
up to three hundred hectares in extent, but each new claim
had to be located at least ten kilometers distant from any
previously existing claim*

The decree also stipulated that

if within one year the recipient gave evidence that the de
posits were being worked he was to receive final title to
the property#

This requirement could be fulfilled by prov

ing the existence of nitrate producing equipment on th©

-^Ibanez, Minas i Salitroras* pp* 168-170, 175»
A1dimate Solar* Docxmiontoa ReiatIvos a Salitroras, Chilean
Section, Ho. 2, pp.' U Y
aobre salitro, pp# 397~399* ip-9% Semper andTicHeTsi
industria del rJalitre* pp* 128, 1 3 0 #
ko
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property or th© achievement of a production rate of one
hundred metric quintals per month*

To the last mentioned

requirement an exception was made in 1881*

Producers in

Taltal and Aguas Blancas wore relieved from fulfilling that
condition because lack or rail transportation In the region
hindered rapid development or th© deposits*

Finally, the

decree stated that the Intendent in each province was ©ra-*
powered to administer the provisions of the decree and to
grant a six months extension or the production rule in the
event special circumstances warranted the privilege*

But in

spite or 01110*3 liberal policy, her nitrate fields did not
give serious competition to the older Bolivian and Peruvian
fields*
When Chilean authorities acquired control of the
Bolivian and Peruvian nitrate fields late in the year 1879,
the status of the industry and the relation of Chile to it
were completely altered*

The new situation required a

thorough revision of the nitrate policy of Chil©| however,
for many months no steps in this direction were or could b©
taken because of the indefinitoness of her control and her
preoccupation with military affairs*

Then too, Dihen

Tarapaca was occupied Chilean authorities were baffled by
the complex arrangements Peru had established in th© prose
cution of her scheme of monopolization**^
At first the transfer of the province to Chile
/''siaTP'n
ii UBKmkY ml

f

»

rAdmlnifflbraolon do Tarapaca, p* 12

k2

resulted in a sharp drop in production#

This occurred be

cause most operators reared that should they continue oper
ations under Chilean rule* Peru would institute reprisals
if she regained control of the province#

Their apprehension

was justified, since on December 6 , 1679* a decree pro
mulgated by th© Peruvian government prohibited shipments of
nitrate from Tarapaca and warned that fines would be imposed
on violators of this directive*

Others, whose sympathies

were with Peru, hesitated to aid the war effort of Chile#^
On November 2ij., 1879, the Chilean Minister of War attempted
to allay the feeling of insecurity among nitrate producers
of Tarapaca#^*

He stated that both commerce and industry

would be given every encouragement and that property owners
would receive protection in the enjoyment of their rights#
But the statement was too general to achieve its purpose#
While it did mark the initial statement of the intentions of
the Chilean government, actually, Chile was not in a position
to announce a settled nitrate policy#

Without one, of course,

she could not gain the confidence of the producers#

Moreover,

the war was still being fought5 and although. Chile was in con
trol in 1 8 7 9 , the final status of th© nitrate region remained
doubtful#

%illinghurst, Degislacion sobre salitre, pp* 25\5fs
Daniel Mariner, Es tudio de ii^itlea comorcTal~"cliiIona e
historia economica nacTonal f£fantj a/so2 Hniv'eraXtarla» T 9 2 3 ),
ii,
Miliington, toerican Diplomacy, pp# Ifj6f#
tel 11 incurst, Dogislaoion sobre salitre, pp# 2 ljlf*
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Meanwhile, Chile hoped to obtain revenues from the
export of nitrate from Tarapaca to aid in financing the i$ar*
She sought to stimulate exports by ga^anting permission for
private export with the payment of a tax of $1#£>0 per Spanish
quintal (§3*26 per metric quintal)«^

However* producers

failed to respond to th© opportunity for the reasons previ*
ously cited or because they thought the tax might soon be
reduced#

A

Failing in her effort to gain revenues in this

manner, Chile deemed it necessary to revert to th© Peruvian
policy of selling nitrate on the government's account#

A

decree issued in February, i860, directed all who had con**
tracted to deliver specified quantities of nitrate to Peru
to fulfill their obligations by delivering their quotas to
Chilean authorities*?

While this arrangement brought almost

three million pesos to the Chilean treasury and government
sales of nitrate exceeded all other sales for the year i8 6 0 ,
the policy proved to be temporary#

A

Since Chile now occupied militarily and later annexed
the entire nitrate producing region, she had it in her power
to achieve the monopoly Peru had tried so long to establish*

%bid., p. 21*2.
°See the letter written by Agusto Matte, Chilean
Minister of Public Works* dated Feb* 6 , 1880 in Dermis,
Tacna-Arica Documents, pp# 133f♦
?Valde7s Vergara #/ Admini&tracion de Tarapaca, p* I4.;
Billinghurst, Legialacion"Tobre salitre, p* 'S^# “ *
6 Xbid*, pp# 2lf7 ff* 2 6 9 #

However, she did not do so#

It was not until later that many

Chileans had cause to regret the decision— mad© in 1381— -to
discontinue the Peruvian policy#

Discontinuance, when it was

instituted, seemed necessary Tor several reasons:

tre

mendous war expenditures made expropriation appear to be a
financial impossibility; heavy demands placed upon officials
in the prosecution of the war made administration difficult;
and the Chilean government was disposed to give her influ
ential entrepreneurs the opportunity to manage the industry# 9
Realizing the advantages as well as the necessity of
forming a concrete nitrate policy, the government initiated
studies and surveys in an. attempt to discover the proper path
to follow#

In January, 1880, the first Comiaion Consultiva

de Salitre was appointed to review conditions In th© nitrate
fields and to offer recommendations#

This committee worked

for several months collecting data, hearing testimony, and
touring the northern provinces, before presenting its findings
to the legislature# 10

It made two major recommendations:

first, to return the control of nitrate properties and commerce
to the system of private enterprise; and secondly, to obtain
a share of nitrate revenues for the public by the imposition
of an export tax which it recommended to be $2 # 2 0 per metric
quintal#^

^Martner, Politics comercial chilena, II, 38Ij.-88#
i0 Billingliurct, hegislaclon sobre salitre# pp# 26 £, 1|*3 2 #
1 1 Ibid.. pp. 2 7 2 -2 7 6 .

The report or the .first Comision Consultiva met with
a varied reception*

Producers accepted both proposals in

principle* yet displayed considerable opposition to th© high
rate at which th© tax had been set*

On the other hand, the

administration of President Pinto refused to commit itself
to return the industry to a system of private enterprise,
although it strongly supported the tax recommendation#

12

Sine© the initiative in the implementation of these
proposals lay with the government and because the Pinto ad
ministration was chiefly interested in acquiring additional
revenues, the tax on nitrate exports became the focus of
controversy#

It was th© amount of the tax and not the tax

per se that provoked outspoken opinions on the subject in
the Chilean press and caused heated debates in the legislature
where the issue was finally decided#

Producers in the nitrate

fields of Antofagasta, Aguas Blancas, and Taltal raised
vigorous objections to the imposition of a duty that would
apply to them equally with the producers in Tarapaca#

An

Antofagasta newspaper that voiced the opinions of nitrate
producers outside of Tarapaca published numerous petitions
objecting to the proposed duty#

In an editorial severely

critical of th© tax recommendation, it assorted that such a

^Anibal Pinto (I82j?-1881j.), Chilean diplomat and man
of letters, entered political life in 1 0 6 2 and rose to im
portance as Minister of War In the administration of President
Errazuriz# Elected to th© presidency in I8 7 6 , Pinto’s term
of office was marked by serious financial difficulties and
the momentous War of tho Pacific# See Gal&amos, History of
Chile, p# 506*
* —

proposal could be made only by a government that did not
understand th© status of th© industry#^

In all probability

producers In Tarapaca and nitrate merchants In Valparaiso
held similar views#

Producers in Tarapaca, who believed

the existing tax of $3 # 2 6 to b© exorbitant, opposed th© levy
too; and the nitrate trading firms feared an excessive tax
would lessen commerce in nitrate and thus reduce their profit
Even though such strong opposition to the tax was manifested,
the view of the administration, at first, remained unchanged#
It upheld the level of the impost as reasonable, and in an
attempt to justify it the Finance Minister declared that the
$2 # 2 0 rate was requested in the interest of th© war effort#^
It proved to be a difficult task for the government
to resolve the differences that had developed over th© amount
of the export tax#

Nitrate interests received effective sup

port in the legislature inhere opposition to th© tax recomnA
nendation was strong# ^ An effort by the president to con
ciliate the opposition by proposing a reduction to $2# 00
failed, and the most the executive could obtain from th©
legislature was authorization to impose a tax of §l#6 o silver

~^Sl Pueblo Chileno (Antofagasta), May 19, 1080#
^^his trend of thought is illustrated by quotations
from the Chilean Times (Valparaiso) and El Comoroio de
Valparaiso pufcTisheet in El Pueblo Chileno# May 17,' ‘itfBo#
^Billinghurst, Leglslaclon sobre salitro, pp# 282f•
l6 Itaid., pp. 2 7 9 -2 8 1 .
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Tills law* passed on October 1* 1880, did not automatically
^PPly to Tarapaca#

Until 1881^, the authority of the Chilean

legislature did not legally extend to that region since Chile
did not have formal possession#

There th© tax was placed

into operation by presidential decree# ^
Th© report of the first Com!sion Consultlva and the
legislative action based upon it left pending vexing problems
that required additional consideration by the government#
Even the tax law of 1800 was not accepted as final by pro
ducers who still hoped for a reduction; thus, there existed
a need for further study of th© nitrate situation#

For that

purpose a second Coz.ilsion Consultlva was created on April 9#
1881#

18

The new commission was especially charged with the

consideration of how to bring Chilean policy into harmony
with the concessions made in th© nitrate regions when Bolivia
and Peru had been in control*

This involved a study of th©

obligations Chile should accept arising from jp©rufs expropri
ation policy#

The agenda also provided for a reconsideration

of the question of taxes# ^
Apparently, the deliberations of this committee were
not as extended as were those of its predecessor, yet its

x7lbld** pp# 279^286, 292, 2 9 6 ; Aidunat© Solar,
Document os BeTativos a Salitrer&s, Chilean Section, p* 71*
^Chile, Ministerio do Hacienda, La industrla
salitrora (Santiago: La Hacion, 1935>)# I,~15q #
-^^Billingliurst, Leg islac ion sobre salitre# pp# [jl6,
1^2 1 #
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major recommendations received the immediate approval of the
government#

To the disappointment of many the committee

recommended the retention of the same nitrate tax#

Those who

disliked that provision* however* could certainly give their
approval to the other recommendation made: the return of full
title to th© nitrate properties to certificate holders#

In

decrees issued in 1881* this policy was announced; and the
procedure to be employed in th© transfer was outlined#
The most important of these decrees was Issued on
20
June 6* 1881#
It announced that nitrate certificates
issued by Peru would be recognised as valid obligations by
th© Chilean government*

It also provided that properties in

Tarapaca would be returned when seventy-five per cent or
more of their certificates and th© remainder in cash were de
posited with th© government#

Th© cash deposit would be re

funded if the outstanding certificates were brought in within
ninety days*

Three months later* the seventy-five per cent

requirement was lowered to fifty per cent*

The Decree of

March 28* 1882* initiated th© policy of accepting certificates
for nitrate properties* with th© previously outlined pro
cedures in effect#

By th© end of 1882* certificates amounting

to #8*787*155 and representing fifty-seven separate ©stablishmonts had been redeemed# 21

Although extension of th©

^Aldunate Solax», Documentos Relativos a Salitroras*
Peruvian Section, pp* 75-7Y#
^Valdes Vergara, AdminiatracIon de Tarapaca, pp*
9-12; Ruiz Bourgeois* PoreciicTMTriero’"SETleno. II, 321f.
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redemption decree of 1882 had not been planned* the provision
.

was revived again in 1886*

22

In the following year, 1887* & fairly successful at
tempt to call in all outstanding certificates was undertaken#
It began with the cancellation of the privilege to redeem
certificates and the enactment of a law providing for the
buying of certificates by the state at the rate of h 105 for
a certificate originally valued at one thousand soles— the
23
equivalent of h 183#
To obtain funds to carry through the
plan a foreign loan to be no larger than & 1,113,781 was
authorized#

The retiring of certificates began in July, 188?

and was completed by the end of the following year#

Seventy-

one oficinas with a value of 10,1|50,623 soles (fe 1,097*250)
were acquired by the state in this transaction#

Owners of

certificates representing eighteen oficinas refused to sell
under the terzns of this arrangement, and the government de
clared their rights void#^

Nevertheless, holders of these

22Aldunate Solar, Documentoa Helativos a Salltreras#
Peruvian Section, p# 91*
23This arrangement was made with th© government of
Italy in a protocol signed on Feb# 15, 1887* Other countries
followed suit and obligated themselves not to support contra
ry claims of their citizens# See Great Britain, British and
Foreign State Papers # LXXXIX, 1290f#
2ij*Aldunate Solar, Documentoa Helativos a Salitreras,
Peruvian Section, pp# 97-99* i02# a VablV giving^he ata-'
tlstics of this transaction appears on pp# 103ff#
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certificates war© allowed to redeem them beginning in 1892#
The return of the nitrate Industry of Tarapaca to
private enterprise had been rapidly completed#

Yet in the

process the government had managed successfully to preserve
for itself large parcels of nitrate property#

Consequently*

in future years* it was able to gain larger revenues from th©
sale of the lands and to exert a greater influence on th©
development of the industry by the manner of their disposition*
The calling in of nitrate certificates in 1887 preserved to a
pA
great degree this power of the government• v
Even before the process of redeeming certificates was
finished* Chile *s taxation policy had been established#

Her

policy in this regard was quite different from that of her
predecessors* because in none of the nitrate fields did export
taxes serve as a major source of public revenue prior to the
War of the Pacific#

In Tarapaca, until the policy of mo

nopolisation was inaugurated in 1873* Peru allowed free expor
tation#

Thereafter* export taxes wore imposed; yet they were

secondary in importance from th© standpoint that they operated
as either supplementary income to the monopolisation of sales
policy or as a means of promoting the accomplishment of

Ibanez, Minas 1 Salltreras, p# Z$lm In all proba
bility this ac11onlly the Chilean government constituted a
reward to the foreign holders of these certificates who
supported the revolution of 1 8 9 1 #
^uTh±s action was taken by President Balmaceda* For
further Information on his nitrate policy see Chaptor VIII,
pp* 212ff#
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complete state ownership*

Beginning at the nominal level of

S 0*Qk per Spanish quintal, th© tax was raised by a series
of increases in 18?6 to S l*lij. (fifty pennies) and again in
1878 to S 3«00*

These raises were especially designed to

make private sales impossible and thus to force those who ha:1
not already don© so to exchange ownership of their properties
for nitrate c e r t i f i c a t e s * T h © tax was bringing results by
the time the war started*
Nitrate production in Bolivian territory was still in
its early stages of development during th© decade of the
seventies*

While Bolivia had granted tax exemptions to th©

first enterprisers in th© fields near Antofagasta, that
generosity would surely have ended within a few years had not
treaty agreements with Chile forbad taxation of producers in
that region* 28 Th© protection of the privileges given th©
Antofagasta nitrate producers by th© Chilean government
prevented Bolivian taxation in that field*

In th© second

major Bolivian nitrate field, the district of Tocopilla,
Chileans possessed no special privileges*

But th© decision

to give Peru control over the deposits led to the adoption
of the rental procedure whereby Bolivia assured herself of a
fixed Income regardless of whether Peru worked th© deposits

2?Miguel Cruchaga,^ Estudio sobre La Qrganizacion
Economica _i la Hacienda Pub'lica die CnTle T^antiagos
Guienburg, "lBHoTT II Appendix Ho* 2, p* 13*
P8

Actually, a tax imposed by Bolivia led to th© War
of the Pacific*
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or n ot,^
Chilean policy changed from what It had been prior to
1879 Q-nd was gradually re-orianted toward an export tax basis
as a result or new conditions created during the war*

Mhen

nitrate was discovered In her fields in Taltal and Aguas
Blancas in 1872, the Chilean government recognised that pro
ducers in these regions could not pay an impost and still
compete successfully with the richer deposits of Tarapaca*
But during the war need for additional revenues led to passage
of the Law of September 11, 1879 which imposed an export duty
on nitrate of forty centavos per metric quintal,^0

This tax

was applicable only in the fields of Taltal and Aguas Blancas,
which lay south of the twenty-fourth parallel, and the de
posits In Antofagasta as far north as th© twenty—third paral
lel,

This latter area Included th© portion of the Bolivian

littoral that Chile incorporated at th© beginning of the war*
The law, however, granted a two year exemption to producers
in Taltal and Aguas Blancas because th© lack of railway fa
cilities handicapped the marketing of their product,'***’ When

^9cruehaga, Estudio Economica de Chile, II, Appendix
Ho* 2, p* 13? Sernper "and IllVncXsY ESu¥FrTa d"eI salitre,

p* 123,
^°Billinghurst, Le/:islacion sobre salitre, p* 302*
^Aldunate Solar, Documentos Helativos a Salltreras,
Chilean Section, pp* 53f« ..
~~
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th© tax was increased a year later and mad© theoretically
uniform in all areas under Chilean control* the full exemption
was reduced to fifty per cent and th© privilege was extended
32
to June 30* 1883*
The exemption was granted because the
producers in Taltal and Aguas Blancas were Chileans who origi
nally had been encouraged by th©
fields*

government to develop those

Nevertheless* the government showed no disposition

whatever to continue the policy when the privilege expired#
As a result, operations in both fields ceased; for without
railway facilities* competition on an equal basis with pro
ducers In Tarapaca was impossible*

Producers in Aguas Blancas

and Taltal protested the change in policy* but their efforts
were in

v a i n *

33

The immediate imposition of a tax by Chile which in
effect was paid mainly by the Antofagasta Nitrate and Railway
Company shows that Chile did not consider the tax exemption
privilege previously enjoyed by that company necessary to promot© the development of th© Antofagasta fields during the
latter part of the 1870 »s*

Moreover, the Chilean action

placed her government in the position of fighting a war to
protect a privilege that she herself had rescinded even before
the war was concluded*^

Recognizing that this charge could

3 2 Ibld.. pp. 65, 71, 75, 77, 101; Ibanez, Minas 1
Salltreras* p* 257#

33sernper and Michels* Industrie del salitre* pp* 3l!|ff*
3^of course* Chile was not legally prohibited from
levying a tax on th© Antofagasta nitrate producers#

b© levied against her# th© Chilean government maintained that
it was the principle involved and the ultimate motives behind
th© Bolivian taxation that impelled her annexation of Anto
fagasta*^

Nevertheless* under Chilean rule heavy taxation--

such as th© Chileans had feared Bolivia would impos©**-became
both characteristic and permanent*
As has been noted* th© forty centavo tax levied on the
southern nitrate districts was not applied in Tarapaca#

In

stead* in the latter district a much higher tax of 4>1 * 5 0 was
imposed in 1879*

The tax in Tarapaca, until equalization

occurred in the fall of i8 6 0 * amounted to $3 * 2 6 per metric
quintal*

This was a level some eight times greater than the

tax in Chilean territory but only slightly less than half as
great as the Peruvian duty of 18?8*
Admittedly* the Peruvian tax had been prohibitive*
but the Chilean rate was not*

Although that rate was changed

to $1*60 silver in 1080, producers in Tarapaca wore still not
satisfied; however* their ability to produce nitrate at a
good profit remained undirainished as proved by the great ex
pansion of the industry In following decades*

The tax of

i86 0 was retained into the twentieth century and was paid
throughout its period of effectiveness at th© rat© of exchange
prevailing when imposed— thirty-eight pennies*

An important

modification in th© procedure of paying the tax was made In

3*see the Chilean War Circular of April 12* I8 7 9
printed In Dennis* Tacna-Arica Documents, pp* 83ff*
^Blllinghurst* Bos capitales salitreroa, p, 2g2*
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1 8 9 2 when th© regulation requiring thirty per cent of th© tax

to be paid in sterling became effectives no modification was
made in the ratio of exchange
The nitrate tax was recognised by the government and
considered by individual producers to be at a high level, but
not until the nineties was considerable pressure exerted byproducers to bring about a reduction#

This pressure coincided

with the deepest depression yet to be experienced by the
nitrate industry and led producers to blame the high export
tax for their ills*

Yet in no way did th© government seri

ously consider lowering the tax#

It parried such demands by

arguments to the ©ffoct that tax reduction would benefit con
sumers, not producers, and that recognition of th© value of
nitrate as a fertiliser, not th© price, governed its use#3®
So important had th© nitrate tax become in providing
the government with revenues that reluctance to alter the
tax is understandable#

As ©arly as i860, twenty-on© per eent

of Chile *s revenues were derived from that tax or from govern
ment sales of nitrate#

The proportion increased in following

years becoming twenty-five per cent in 1 8 8 3 , forty-eight per
cent in I8 9 O, and thereafter declining slightly to thirtyeight per cent in 1901#

After 1901, nitrate revenues continued

3?Martner, Politic© comercial ch.ilena* II, pp. 3 0 8 ,
il37» l|-93f«
^ Chile, Delogaclon Fiscal de Salltreras j Guaneras,
Memoria del Deler.ado en 1897 (Santiagoj Hacional, 1897),
pp. 29f.
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to account Tor more than one*third of the total revenue® of

Chile*39
Table I
The Nitrate Revenue® of* Chile, l880-1909a

Year

Amount

Year

1880

§ 7 ,6 4 1 ,0 0 0
1 2 *1 0 5 ,0 0 0
1 6 .5 4 1 .0 0 0
1 9 .7 0 7 .0 0 0
',9 1 7 ,0 0 0
.,5 2 3 ,0 0 0
',3 0 5 ,0 0 0
.,0 9 3 ,0 0 0
,5 0 8 ,0 0 0
3 i,iiiii.,o o o
3 4 .6 9 0 .0 0 0
3 0 .1 4 2 .0 0 0
2 6 .9 6 9 .0 0 0
3 2 .0 1 1 .0 0 0
3 6 .5 5 0 .0 0 0

1095

1881
1882
1883
188k
1885
1886

1887

1888
188 9
189 0

1891
18 9 2
1893
189k

Amount
$41,2 53 ,00 0
3 7 .7 4 8 .0 0 0
3 5 .7 5 0 .0 0 0
4 3 ,7 4 7 *0 0 0
4 6 .6 7 0 .0 0 0
4 9 .5 5 1 .0 0 0
2 3 .6 7 1 .0 0 0
22-,977,000
2-9*090,000
5 0 .2 3 6 .0 0 0
56.215.000
59.722.000
55.760.000
68.720.000
71.325.000

18 96
1897
18 98
1899
1900
1 9 01
19 02
1903
1904
19 05
1906
1907
1908
1909

ahrnncisco Valdes Vergara, Problems3 gconomlcos
d© Chile (Valparaiso: Universe, I9 1 3 ), p* 527# Compu- '
tat ions are adjusted to the rate of 1 <3d*
The over-all nitrate policy of Chile was designed to
preserve the revenues derived from th© industry and even to
bring about a gradual increase in them*

In pursuance of this

plan the government sold state-owned nitrate properties to
tho highest bidder to obtain revenue and to add to the pro
ductive capacity of the industry*

Such additions, if was

39jPartner, Pol.itlea comercial chllena, II, 390f, 477
Semper and Mlchela. Induafcrla del salitre. p, 118#

$1

thought # would eventually increase the quantity of nitrate
exported and the revenues derived therefrom#

Throtighout the

nineteenth century the formation and operation of combinations
in the Indus try--which sought to curtail product ion-*-were in
most instances vigorously opposed by the government#^

As

the adjoining table of the nitrate revenues of Chile shows#
there was a total annual increase in revenues derived from the
export tax in almost every year for which the statistics are
given#

During those years when a decrease is shown# the

primary determinant was the effective organisation of a combi
nation*
Nitrate revenues were the chief source of public funds#
and nitrate shipments quickly became Chile*a major export#
replacing the copper industry early in the decade of the
eighties#

It accounted for forty-six per cent of the exports

of Chile in 1881# sixty per cent by 1893* and seventy-six
per cent by 1 9 0 2 #

The significance of this development and

of the reliance placed by the government on nitrate revenues
was that the single-product economic order that prevails in
many Latin American countries prevailed also in Chile#

Thus#

being dependent upon th© functioning of th© nitrate industry#
Chile fs economy was unduly affected by fluxions

In that

industry#^*
^Combinations in th© nitrate industry are discussed
In Chapter VI#
^South American Journal and Brasil and River flat©
Hail (tondon) j,r"xX (Jan.- l8 # T883)#
i TAprlT T? #~T0or6 )#
TS3T Chile# Suporentendoncla de Aduanas# Memoria en 1902
(Valparaiso i He Ifman# 1903)# p# if8 #

$Q

It has already been noted that a major aspect or th©
developing nitrate policy of Chile related to the disposition
of her public lands in the nitrate region#

In the newly ac-

quired northern provinces the government of Chile gained con**
trol over lands that possessed a variety of natural resources
large in extent and valuable in nature#

Among these, nitrate

was the resource of most immediate importance since the
markets for it were rapidly expanding, and th© entire world*s
supply now rested under the control of a single nation#

Th©

greater portion of the lands in the northern provinces had
been public property under Bolivian and Peruvian rule;
therefore, these automatically devolved upon Chile#

The

Chilean policy of returning to a system of private ownership
obligated that government to some extent in the disposition
of its public lands; but once those obligations were settled,
there still remained public lands known to possess nitrate
deposits as well as other areas in which deposits were likely
to be discovered#
Possession of these lands gave th© government a potent
weapon for exercising, In conjunction with her inherent powers
of taxation and regulation, a decisive influence on the course
of th© industry’s development#

Th© future prosperity of indi

vidual producers frequently depended upon their ability to
obtain new nitrate bearing lands with which to replace their
worn-out properties; and after 1 8 9 0 , this could be achieved
only inadequately and sometimes not at all by private trans
actions#

Thus, most producers were forced to rely tipon th©

$9
government for replacements#^

From this standpoint, it w&®

fortunate for the producers that their acquisition of new
properties normally met with the interest of th© government.
Ownership of nitrate bearing lands gave the government
another significant means of controlling the development of
the industry In that th© sale of lands could exert a decided
influence on the volume of production.

The government, in

pursuance of a desire to increase production, could offer
such lands for sal© or achieve th© opposite effect by re
fraining from selling state properties#

But th© desire to

increase production was a persistent one, and its basis lay
squarely in the relationship between th© volume of nitrate
exports and public revenues#

Productive capacity largely de

termined the former while the chief determinant of th© latter
was th© tax on nitrate exports#

This relationship and the

specific desire to increase revenues obtained from the nitrate
tax continued to be the major influence in shaping the policy
regarding the sale of state-owned nitrate lands#

A final in

centive for government sales can be ascribed to the need for
the immediate revenue that the sal© of the valuable state
assets would bring#
Although initiated in 1302, the sal© of nitrate lands
on a large scale was postponed until after the Revolution of

^ I n 1 8 8 9 a company was formed in JSngland to purchase
a nitrate property. Their agent was unable to locate any
property for sale. The company was finally liquidated# See
South American Journal. XXVII (July 27. 1889)* 100s and
SSr*(AugV,-227 189177*215.
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1891#

Th© process of retiring nitrate certificates occupied

the attention of the government until 1088, and the increase
in the quantity of lands being exploited that resulted from
certificate transfers obviated any necessity for sales from
the standpoint of the producer*

Likewise, it tended to reduce

the chance that properties offered on a strictly cash basis
would find buyers*

Certificate sales, as is noted elsewhere,^

had led to a great increase in foreign ownership of nitrate
properties*

A strong aversion to this trend grew among Chileans,

of;idiom , the most prominent was

President Jose" Balmac©da#^

Chileans feared that should a sale be held, foreigners would
obtain most of the properties offered and foreign dominance
of the industry would be increased*

The sentiment, although

widespread at the time and destined to develop to an even
greater extent later, proved insufficient to bar permanently
such interests from obtaining additional lands from th© state*
So intense was President Balmaceda1© dislike of foreign domi
nation of Chilean nitrate that in I889 he threatened to for
bid the sal© of state-owned lands to them in the future*^
However, after Balmaceda*s death, his views were largely
ignored*

^ S e © Chapter XIX, pp* 88 ff*
^ F o r a fuller discussion of Balmaceda*s ©ntI-foreign
attitude see Chapter VXII, pp* 212ff•
^William II* Russell, A Visit to Chile and the Hit rat©
Fields of Tarapaca (London: J#~3*"Virtue araT'Co*, IH9 0 ),
p* 315; William' H* Russell, “The Troubles in Chile,” The
Graphic * Feb* Ilf, 1093-# P* l8 Ij-*
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Th© sale In 1882 offered lands located in Tarapac/ to
the highest cash bidder#

There was no machinery Tor exploit

tat ion on these lands; however , the quality ©f the deposits
indicated by the price paid for them* supports th© conclusion
that th© state possessed properties not inferior to those al**
ready under production#

Chile received only slightly less

than th© valuation placed on th© properties by th© government
for those oh© sold*

Even so* the results were disappointing

since only fifteen out of one hundred and four properties
offered found purchasers#^

Th© Jefe Politico of Tarapaca,

Francisco Valdes Vergara, in his official Inform© of 1883 as
cribed the failure of the initial auction to th© fixing of an
absolute minimum price that frequently had no relation to th©
value of the property#

He suggested that a specific, well-

considered evaluation of th© worth of each property b© es
tablished if future auctions continued to be based upon pre
announced minimum prices*^

This advice was later followed#

With the subsequent decline in th© need for added
revenues after 1 8 8 2 , a factor that partly accounts for th©
sal© in that year, and the absence of th© other motivating
factors, no sale of state-owned lands was forthcoming for over
a decade#

But in l893~9lf# some nitrate producers, especially

^Semper and Itiehels, Industrla del salitre# Appendix
No# 18, pp# 290f; Aldunate Solar, Documentoa Helativos a
Salltreras# Chilean Section, pp# 17Y-ITS#
—
-—
^Valdes Vergara, Administracion de Tarapaca# pp*

1^8-l60#
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among Chileans, began to clamor for new lands} and more im

portantly, the government round it sell* in need or additional
revenues in order to permit resumption of specie payments and
to meet payments due on the foreign debt#

Thus motivated, it

announced that auctions would be held in l89i^#4®

During that

year two sales were held (on June 15 and October 15) offering
properties in various nitrate districts#

From the forty-

three oficinas and estacamentos placed on the market, twentythree found purchasers who paid more than one million pounds
sterling for these properties*

The sales were quite suc

cessful, and the government obtained prices that at least
equalled and frequently surpassed the officially estimated
value.

Another of the same series of auctions was held on

May l6, 1895, when three properties were bought for a total
of nearly one thousand pounds sterling# 49
One other sale was conducted before tho end of the
century, but it was not as important as the auction of l89 lj,f
since only minor properties were placed on the market#

These

deposits, bordering on working oficinas, were npt of a suf
ficient size to warrant the use of separate machinery#

Oc

curring in 18979 the sale produced twenty-seven thousand

4^Aldunate Solar, Documentos Belatlvos a SalItreras,
Chilean Section, pp# 181-193} ^oub|T"Amerlcan Journal, ^
I
(Sept# 1, I89 I4.)# 222} Oct# 20, TcJ94/ p* 395 See also Fetter,
Monetary Inflation in Chile, p# 82*
49semper and Michels, Industrie del 3al.itre, Appendix
No# 18, pp# 292f#
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pounds sterling for the eighteen properties bought#-^
The most effective us© of nitrate land sales by the
government came aftor the turn of th© century when in 1 9 0 1
and 1903 rich deposits were ©old#

For th© twenty-nine proper

ties auctioned in 1901, Chile received one hundred eighty*
three thousand pounds#

It was alleged that eighteen new

companies were formed on the basis of the lands acquired by
private interests at this time#^

Certainly th© sale of 1901

greatly increased the productive capacity of th© industry#
While that had been one objective of the sal©, by far th©
most influential factor had been th© need for fund© to meet
th© costs of expanding Chilean military forces so that the
country would be prepared for wliat seemed to be an unavoidable
war with Argentina#-^
For established nitrate interest© th© sale had meant
a serious reduction in their relative strength in the industry
and seemed to compromise their effort to restrict the growth
of production#

Therefore, this group strongly opposed th©

holding of other auctions— which the government was then
contenp 1 atIng— and maintained that due to present over
production, the freeing of new lands for exploitation through

5°Ibid., pp.

2 9 k£f.

^United States, Department of State, Consular
Reports. LXXX (1902), 1 6 3 .
^ T n e basis for the war scare was a boundary dispute.
It had boen a pressing question for several decades, but was
eventually settled peaceably In 1902# See Caldamos, History
of Chile, pp# \\06 f#
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government sales served to aggravate unduly the problems of
the industry*

From the nitrate port of Iquique this attitude

was echoed by the chief of the governmentfs supervisory agency
for nitrates {the Delegado)* ^

I2v©n with his support» a new

sale was forestalled for only two years*

While an apparent

conflict between the interests of the government and of pro*
ducers occurred* the difference was* rather* a matter of
opinion concerning the course of action to be taken to promote
the interests of both*

Th© government reasoned that th©

nitrate market was expanding; therefore* capacity for produc*
tion should be increased*

The nitrate producers* for their

part, held the opposite view*
operators were wrong*

As events soon showed, th©

When in 1903 state lands were again

placed on the market, buyers willingly absorbed fifteen new
properties for which they paid almost five and one-half million
pesos*^

The alacrity with which the lands found purchasers

gives an added indication of the profitable state of th©
nitrate trade*
Thus, the sales policy that had been projected in the
minds of Chilean leaders in the eighties and established in
practice In the nineties was continued on a broader and more
significant scale after the turn of th© century*

In the

nineteenth century sales of state-owned nitrate lands had
bean few and relatively ineffective in bringing into th©

^ S e m p e r and ITichols, Industrie del salitre, p. 1 7 6 .

54lbld., Appendix IIo. 18, pp. 29lj.»299,
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industry important now producers with the partial exception
or the one held in l89lj-*

For the most part existing pro*

ducers had been the beneficiaries until after 1 9 0 0 *

Indi-

cations after that date show that competition in the industry
increased as a result of the government1© policy regarding
the sale of lands*

with the entrance of new producers working

new lands, productive capacity and exports climbed steadily*
Beginning with th© sal© in 18 9 )4., a n0w procedure that
altered the old cash payment system wont into effect*

Stated

in the Law of November 2 9 # 1893, it provided that two years
would b© allowed before full payment was due*

An initial

payment of twenty per cent would be required with thirty per
cent more to be remitted within a year and the remainder at
the end of the second year*

Luring the payment period an

interest of eight per cent was to be charged, and failure to
fulfill the obligations would result in penalty charges*
Under this plan many purchasers met with difficulties in
meeting their obligations principally because they over
estimated the rapidity \7ith which the properties could be
made productive*

To remedy this th© Law of February 23, I897

provided that purchasers in that year would have the period
of payment lengthened to three and one-half years*

This pro

vision was also made applicable to those who had purchased
lands under th© previous law excepting those who had already
exploited thirty per cent or more of the nitrate on mortgaged
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lands
The inauguration and extension of this time-payment
policy was primarily designed to aid Chilean investors to ob»
tain nitrate interests*

They had claimed that they were

hampered in obtaining such interests by their inability to
compete with the superior capital resources of foreign in
vestors.

Stilly the time~p ayment policy in its practical

operations suggests that even that consideration did not
fully equalise opportunities between Chilean and foreign
purchasers*

Those who had difficulty in meeting their obli

gations on time were mainly Chileans#

Too, $. measure of

their difficulty arose from the falling exchange rate that
made conversion of pesos into sterling increasingly costly#^
Because of this hardship, Chileans also considered the policy
of the government of selling lands for sterling adverse to
their interests#

This objection was satisfied in 1&97 when

Chilean pesos were made acceptable*
As a result of the sales held by the government,
foreign investors wore able to maintain their dominant position
in the Chilean nitrate industry#

With the exception of th©

auction of 1 6 9 If in ^diich Chileans obtained approximately fifty

^Aldunate Solar, Dpcmontog Rslativos a Salitreras.
Chilean Section, pp# 197-SOoj lbaSeg,
rT "'Salltreras^
pp* 250f; Delegaci<fn de Salltreras, Memo'rla cm X897# p'*' '21#
^ M * Jos<f Vicuna, Conf erencia sobre la industrla
salitrera dada on el Congreso ilinero de" KJ^hTTSan^a7soT'"
Barcelona.“TUQkTT ot. 'MTTi'S o u ^ r A a e H ^ I ^ o u r n a l . XL
(Feb. 22, 1896), 206.
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per cent of the lands purchased at that time* foreign inter
ests* and those predominately English* obtained the majority
of the properties

Table IX
Sales of State-owned Nitrate Lands* 1602*1903a

Date

No# of
Properties

Extent
(Hectares)

1882

15

2 ,3 0 0

l89 l|.

23

6 *0 3 5

878,533

1 ,0 5 5 ,6 3 5

1895

3

32?

10l|.A95

1 0 8 ,0 9 2

1897

18

1 ,3 1 3

3 6 1 ,2 6 0

1901

29

2 ,0 6 5

1 ,9 6 0 ,3 2 1

2,147,671

1903

15

2 ,8 9 3

3,915,021

5 ,it81j
.,2 6 2

103

iij-,9 3 3

6 1 ,6 1 0 ,0 2 9

6 1 ,7 1 0 ,0 0 8

TOTAL

State Assessed
Value
6

6 6 0 ,3 8 1

Price
Received
6 i|j6 ,2 8 l

6

#

389,l{10

,A3.2l.,.3l0
62,119,171^

62,33lf,10lf

aCorrpiled from Semper and Michels* Industrie del
Salitre* appendix #10* pp# 290-299*
^In pesos of l8 d#
All public and to an extent private nitrate lands were
supervised by an organization that was carried over from Peru
vian rule#

Peru had established an official known as the

Inspector General of Nitrate as her chief agent In th© nitrate

^This is indicated by the list of p4irchas©rs given
In Semper and Michels* Xn&ustria del salifcre# Appendix No# IB*
pp# 290-299*
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area*

The office continued to operate under Chilean rule but

was not permanently established until September, 1883#

An

Englishman named Robert Harvey held the post in 1679* when
Chilean authority was established in Iquiqu©#^

Retained in

the office until 1881, he performed a valuable service Tor
Chileans by drafting several reports outlining th© status of
the industry* According to the testimony of the Chilean Jofe
✓
✓
Politico of Tarapaca, these reports were indispensibl© in the
forrralation or Chilean nitrate policy*^
For years the Inspector General strove to enforce the
laws regulating the industry and to oversee public nitrate
properties with a staff and organization wholly inadequate to
perform properly the numerous duties#

One of th© malpractices

that illustrates th© prevailing confusion during the early
years of Chilean control was that unauthorized individuals
were operating oficinas*

This condition can b© largely ex

plained by noting th© lack of knowledge of Chilean authorities
regarding the policy that Peru had followed*

It was not until

repeated complaints had been made by certificate holders that
official investigation revealed the existing condition and
the practice stopped* ^ 0

^ S e e Chapter III, pp# 83*
Other aspects of
Harvey1s career as Ifltrat© Inspector considerably modify th©
favorable evaluation noted below*
12, 28*

^Valdes Vergara, Administradon de Tarapaca^ pp* I4.,

^°Aldunate Solar, Documentos Relatives a Salitreras#
Peruvian Section, p* 79 * Ruiz BourgeolsV Dorecho Minero
~
Clixleno« II, 321*
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Not only did. Chilean officials become confused whan
dealing with situations that arose out of Peruvian arrangements*
but for a tine the Chilean Jefe Politico of Tarapaca issued
nitrate grants on his own initiative and without author!**
At
sat ion from the government in Santiago*
That practice* too*
was halted when it was revealed*

As a matter of fact* the

policy of accepting nitrate land claims was stopped In 188if*
shortly after the end of the war*

During the war* grants

could be obtained in the provinces south of Tarapaca* but
apparently few werei while in Tarapaca no grants could be
legally consummated*

In l88 i|.* the Chilean government ceased

making grants In all her territories under the Decree of July
62

28, lo7'7*

That action was necessitated by a provision In

the Treaty of Ancon of 1083 which made Chilean laws applicable
to the province of Tarapaca*

Had no suspension occurred*

private interests would have been able, and were eagerly
planning,to make advantageous acquisitions under the decree
of 1877*

In bringing about repeal the government followed

the precedent set by Peru in 1868* and clearly indicated its
expectation of gaining revenue from the sale of such lands*
Revocation was also indicative of the intention of th© govern
ment to organize the industry on a basis that would gain large

^Bllllnghurst* hegialaclon sobre salitre* pp. 3 7 6 f*
^Ruiz Bourgeois* Perecho Minero Chileno* II* 327*
^Billinghurst, Legislacion sobre aalltro* p* Ij.0 9 .
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revenues Tor the treasury and permit a measure or public con
trol over the development of.the industry without involving
the government in nationalisation*
The Chilean policy of preserving a large portion of
the nitrate lands for the state placed a heavy responsibility
upon the Inspector General*s office, since it was in charge
of the administration of public nitrate lands*

Correction of

the unsatisfactory status of th© office, however, did not
come until 1 8 8 9 *

Then, President Balmaceda transformed it

Into the Dele&acion Fiscal de Salltreras 2 ftuaneraa and di
rected that it function under the supervision of th© minister
6k
of finance* *
In his decree that brought about this reform, Balmaceda
bestowed numerous functions upon th© Delo&acion*

It was

charged with caring for state-owned nitrate lands, measuring
and evaluating both public and private nitrate lands, defend
ing judicially public nitrate interests, and recommending
means to increase consumption and to develop the Industry*
The Delegacion was also responsible for gathering statistics,
checking to assure that transportation facilities complied
with the laws, and assuring personal security to the workers*
To perform these many duties th© staff of th© Defenseion was
enlarged, and an official known as the Delegado was placed in
charge of the office*

lie had an assistant, five deputies, a

statistician, five engineers, and a host of lesser officials

^Ibanes, Minas j. Salltreraa, pp* 2 3 6 , 2 )4.9•
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working under himt

Xn th© perforraance or their duties the

more important officials or the DeIej%&cion made regular inspect ion trips through th© nitrate region* 6*3
In discharging its runetions, th© pelepcacion main
tained a high level or efficiency*

Its routine duties con

sisted oT gathering statistics and keeping a careful watch
over public property! its more important obligations were
measuring and evaluating the quality or nitrate lands, pro
tecting the interests or th© government, and submitting
recommendations Tor future policies*

Recommendations mad©

by the Dele^ado in his report ror 1 8 9 0 not only Illustrate
the high calibre or th© advice given, but also show that it
was often, though sometimes not immediately, followed*

In

the first place, the Dele&ado observed that since an increase
in world consumption of nitrate would be advantageous to the
state, the government should give financial support to adver
tising and sales promotion measures undertaken by the pro
ducers*

While the Balmaceda administration did not Implement

this Idea, the following administration gave effect to the
proposal and eventually, In 1 8 9 7 , the policy became a perma
nent one*

A second proposition pertained to the disposition

of nitrate properties, particularly those too small to support
independently an oficina*

In the sale of these lands the

Delegado believed that preference should be given to operators
whose lands were Insufficient to continue profitable production

bid.» pp. 237f, 2 IP.-2 I4.Q.
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or to producers whose lauds were contiguous to the properties
being sold*

To an extent this was done in the sal® of 1897•

In a third plan, designed to preserve the public Interest,
£>eleRado counselled the sale of public nitrate lands to
forestall the formation of a combination in th© following
instances;

if the government considered that such an organ

isation was detrimental to Its Interests, if after permitting
one to form it caused a serious decline In nitrate revenues*
Circumstances in 1893 generally conformed to the latter situAA
ation and the device was effectively used* ^
The influence of the Delegado upon Chilean nitrate
policy, however, was not always as strong as is suggested by
the examples recorded above*

For instance, in 1901 and fol

lowing, the Delegado exerted his influence, without consider
able effect, to prevent new sales of lands

The recommen

dation was based upon the belief that th© sale of 1 9 0 1 had
increased productive capacity sufficiently to provide for a
steady expansion of exports, and that further increases would
lead to over-production*

Th© opinion Indicates that th©

PeleRado gave consideration to th© interests of producers as
well as to those of th© government#

Thus, it cannot be main

tained that he merely reflected prevailing sentiment among

For the report of th© Delegado for I8 9 O see Al&unat©
Solar, Documentor Relatives a SaTitreras, Chilean Section*
pp. 123-I3S>#
^Semper and Michels, Industrie del Sailtre, p* 1 7 6 #
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private interests nor that he was unmindful of th© need for
balancing the interests of the government with those of
producers#
In two other important aspects the Deie&aolQn ac
quitted itself admirably#

The first entailed testing all lands

in the nitrate region to ascertain th© extent and quality of
th© nitrate deposits#

Officials worked continuously In this

endeavor, and the government relied upon their reports in
AA
establishing the minimum prices for lands being sold# w The
second field of activity involved establishing accurate
boundaries of private nitrate lands*

It has already been

pointed out that usurpation of public lands was a practice
carried over from the era of Peruvian control#

Little had

been done to correct this situation before the creation of
the Delegacion# and evidence exists that the problem was
aggravated during the early years of Chilean control when
nitrate Inspectors overlooked or abetted illegal extensions
of boundaries#0^

Considerable losses were Incurred by the

state as a result, since such usurpations diminished the value
of th© usurped properties to the degree that the caliche on
them had been exploited#
During the decade of the nineties rectification of

^®For an example of th© method of evaluating th©
quality of nitrate lands see Ibid#* Appendix No* 9# PP« 200203#
Ibanez, Minas 1 Salitreras# p# 25i|.# It was r©x>orted
that usurpation of state lands was practiced again during
the Revolution of 1891#

7k
boundary proceeding® were numerous •

This activity was spurred

on by a presidential decree issued in 1 8 9 5 # but the magnitude
or the undertaking and the necessity or relying upon unenerge—
tic local orricials to prosecute th© cases in court hindered
and slowed the entire operation#*^

After repeated urging©,

bbe Delegado obtained in 1 8 9 7 the assistance of a lawyer (to
b© free from legal ties with private interests) specially
charged with th© responsibility of conducting cases initiated
by the Delegado#

By 1901^* the boundaries of nitrate es

tablishments in Tarapaca had been definitely drawn#

Th© im**

portanee of that function of the Delegacion Is indicated by
the subsequent removal of its headquarters from Iqulque to
Antofagasta because it had corrected boundary irregularities
in Tarapaca#^
At the same time a lawyer was added to the Delegado1s
staff, the office itself was more firmly established by the
passage of a law regulating its activities#

The law ratified

in the main the organization and activities of the Delegacion
as it had been previously established by decree#^
The Chilean nitrate policy promoted the growth of the
nitrate Industry, but it was not solely responsible for the
great strides made following 1860#

Chileans claimed credit,
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1 Aldunate Solar, Documentos Relativos a 3alltreras#
Chilean Section, pp# 103-ltio#
~
Ibanez, Minas _i Salitreras, p# 2 6 3 #
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Aldunate Solar, Documentos Helativos a Salitreras.
Chilean Section, pp# 103~i®?F#
~
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however, for th© expansion of th© industry, and in an official
publication after th© turn of th© century, four of the poll**
cies of the government were noted as being Instrumental in
this developments

(1) government subsidisation of propaganda

(2) introduction of a superior method of refining "after th©
first years of Chilean dominance;" (3) "devolution of the
nitrate beds to private property;" and (J4,) "disposition of the
taxes on exportation, although high, « # # which would stimu
late th© cheapest production*
i&hen properly evaluated, these assertions do not en***
tirely uphold the contention they were intended to maintain.
In reality, government support of propaganda did not assume
major importance until th© end of the century; moreover, the
development of the technical advance alluded to began during
the period of Peruvian rule and apparently was not developed
by Chileans#^

On the other hand, the return of th© industry

to private enterprise was a positive and important factor in
bringing about the enlargement of the industry#

Furthermore,

the method of carrying out this aspect of the Chilean nitrate
policy had the merit of preserving th© interests of th© state
and preventing the monopolisation of th© Indus try#
The high tax on nitrate exports, however, cannot b©

73ohiie# Satadistlca Miners de Chile ©n 1903
(Santiago: Barcelona, 1965)5 1, 39* **
?^See Chapter V, p#l£3; Semper and Michels, Industria
del Salitre, pp# olf.
11"1
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credited with promoting the expansion of the industry? nor
was it imposed for the purpose of encouraging economy in
working the nitrate deposits*

Actually* the tax seems to have

promoted the unwise practice of selecting first only the
higher grade caliche for processing*

This procedure resulted

in progressively greater costs of production* not tame economy*75

pa?om the standpoint of th© government* the chief

virtues of the high export tax were (1 ) that it preserved to
Chile a large portion of the wealth produced by th© nitrate
industry that otherwise might have been siphoned off by
foreign interests; and (2) that it provided Chile with a
lucrative source of revenue*

On the other hand* the taxation

policy created two imfortunate results*7&

first lay in

the government*© excessive reliance xipon nitrate revenues*
Secondly, th© high tax may have kept the price of nitrate at
a level that encouraged th© rapid search for a synthetic
substitute*

Even before 1900* ^h© nitrate trad© felt th©

competition arising from a synthetic fertilizer; and while
the development of a practical substitute was not forthcoming
for a decade and a half more* a number of experiments leading
to that end were being

conducted*77

Thus*

in th© long run it

7^lbid*» pp* 97? Miguel Cruchaga* Salltre y Guano
(Madrids Heus* I9 2 9 )* P* 203* Cruchaga asaoFEs^mt^nEH©"*
combinations caused producers to exploit their best lands
first*
^
7^See Francisco A* Encina, Nuestra Infer!oridad
economic a (Santiago i Univers itaria,
}* pp*r 278f •
77south American Journal* XLIV (Jan* 2 9 , I8 9 I), 12lj_#
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might have been more prudent Tor Chile to exact a lighter
tax#

with lower prices and greater production forthcoming,

Ghile would have, perhaps, retained her nitrate revenues
intact without promoting competition#

The heavy tax on

nitrate exports in the nineteenth and early part of the
twentieth centuries may have had a more profound influence
on the history of present-day Chile than has previously been
realized#

CHAPTER III
ENGLISH INVESTMJESSfTS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP
Th© capitalists oF Great Britain dominated th© in**
vestment Field in Latin America throughout the nineteenth
and Into the twentieth century.

They made their First major

investments in Latin America in the 1820 *s$ however* losses
resulting From these investments curtailed th© Flow oF cap!tal to Latin America For several decades* 1 By the middle oF
the i8601s English capitalists again began to expand their
interests* and English investments in Latin America mounted
steadily For the next thirty years*

As a matter oF Fact,

during the last years oF the l8B0*s there occurred a great
boom on the London stock market centering around enterprises
2
in these countries*
Although Chile did not receive as large

English investments in Latin America during the
1820 *s had been placed chieFly in government bonds and min
ing enterprises* There Followed a spree oF speculation
which ended with a crash in 1825* In the market collapse
most oF the investments wore liquidated with disasterous
losses For investors* J* Fred Hippy, "Latin America and
the British Investment Boom,” Journal oF Modern History,
XIX (1947), 129# See also C* It* llobson, "British Overs ©as
Investments, their Growth and Importance," The Annals oF the
American Academy oF Political and Social ScTeiice^~T^XViTl
(Hov* , 1 9 1 6 ) Z( *
^J* Fred Hippy, "The British Investment Boom oF the
l880fs In Latin American Minos,” jnter-AmorIcan Economic
AFFaira * I (March,
, Tip-,n-
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investments as did many or her neighbors , English, capital
placed in Chilean enterprises was extremely significant to
that country*

This was ©specially true because of investments

made in th© all-important nitrate industry*
While French and German capitalists acquired import ant
interests during the nineteenth century, they never serious
ly challenged British supremacy in this field* Investments
in Latin America mad© by citizens of the United States were
q
relatively unimport ant ***
Although European investments in nitrates began in
1 8 5 3 9 they were significant only after 1 8 6 5 *

Th© first

Europeans to acquire interests in the nitrate industry wore
engineers who came to Install nitrate producing machinery*
Many stayed and later obtained nitrate properties of thoir
own or as frequently occurred, in partnership with Chileans
or Peruvians*

Their holdings, however, wore not largo and

the men who founded them commanded too little capital to ex
pand their interests*

For th© most part, these pioneers

from Europe came from either England or Germany*
Only after 1865 did Europeans with sufficient fi
nancial resources to establish strong enterprises awaken to
the opportunities that th© fields offered*

In that year the

English commercial and Investment firm of Anthony Gibbs and
Sons transferred Its activities from the guano trade to th©

^Hebert Pels, Europe the World1s Sankor, 1870-X9llj.
(Hew Haven: Yale Univ* Pro as, Y536), PP# 3-8? gives a
summary of European foreign investinonts*
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nitrate Industry.14- This company joined two other English
producers already In the field who had become indebted to it*
In forming th© Comoania de Balitres de Tarapaca* they operated
two oficinas and claimed nine others*^

Other Englishmen,

several Germans and a few Frenchmen also acquired important
nitrate assets*

Many of these individuals were later to

participate in th© incorporation of th© industry on the London
stock market*^

By 1872, European interests controlled ap

proximately forty-six per cent of th© productive powers of
the industry, while Peruvians possessed less than one-third*
In spite of these new foreign enterprises, statistics
denoting th© productive power of the various nitrate pro
ducers during the decade of the seventies ©how th© growth of
Peruvian concerns and the decline in relative strength of

^ibbs and Sons began operating in Peru in 1826* Xt
ia possible that the capture of th© Ghinoha Islands {where
most of the guano was located) by the Spanish in 186!^ was
a major cause of th© company’s action* See 11Bon Jose"
Santos Ossa, 11 Revista Chllena* L3CIX (Ho* 73), 19$*
^Billinghurst, Los capital©© aalitreros* pp* 31f•
L

The more important foreigners active in th© nitrate
industry at this time were th© following* of English ex
traction, G* E* Brooking, J* D* Campbell, Mllbourne Clark,
P* J* Eck, J* M* Xnglle, S* T* Humber©tone, H# B* James,
E* Hainsworth, Maurice Jewell, and G# Lomax; of German ex
traction, J* Glldermeister, and th© partner© invariably
identified as Folsch and Martin#
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foreign operators*

{Be© Table No* III below#)
TABLE III

Distribution of Productive Power
in tli© Nitrate Industry* l872**l878a

National of

1872

18714.

1878

Peru***••••
Chile•**•*#
England**•#
Germany* ***
France# #*#•
11 aly##••*#

29.3$
25.0
23..8
20.1
1^.0

56.8#
20.0
1^ 5

58.8#
19.7
13.4
7.6

—mm mm

7.6

1.1

«**«**■

0 .5

aAdapted from BIXlinghurst, Los
capitales salitreros* p* 1 8 *
These trends resulted from the policy of nationalization
followed by Peru**7 A more detailed analysis of th© distributton of nitrate interests by nationality Is presented in
th© following table* number four* on the allocation of
nitrate certificates#

According to these statistics, Peru

vians held over one-half of the certificates* Chileans owned
eighteen per cent, and Europeans possessed almost twentyeight per cent*
The decline of Chilean productive power in Tarapaca
was partly compensated by the encouragement given by Chile
to its industrialists to open th© newly discovered fields of

^See Tables III and IV on pages 81 and 32 respectively*
While the data In these tables cannot be accepted as com
pletely accurate* th© trend of development Is probably re
liably indicated#
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Taltal and AguaX Blancas#

Production there and in Anto

fagasta were not taken into accoimt in the above table?
therefore* Chilean and English nitrate interests* too* would
be slightly greater than is indicated in either Table III or
IV.
The minority status of European capitalists In 1079#
however, became a dominant one soon after the change to
Chilean rule#

Among the foreign Investors the English quickly

became the ascendant group#
TABLE IV
Distribution of Nitrate Certificates
by Nationality, l8?9a

National
of

Value of
Certificates

Per
Cent

Peru
Chile
England
uemany

S 10,665,033
3,554,726
2, 825,000
1, 508,000

54

is

£

Nat ional
of

Value of
Certificates

Italy
Spain
Bolivia
Prance

s

847,900
337*01)4
14*500

4,000

Per
Cent
4# 3$
1 .7
~o*l
~0#1

aBillinghurst, Los cap!tales Balltreros# p# 23#
Total value of certificatesaccorciing^bo
1e is
s 19,756,203#
The vast Increase in British investments rested in
part upon the incorporation of properties already in English
p
hands in 1879#
Yet British dominance was the result of the

8Examples of this characteristic may be found in
the following references: Chile, Ministerlo de Hacienda,
F omento de la industria salitrera (Santiago: Debates, I8 0 9 ),
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activities or three men, John Thomas North* Robert Boyd Harvey*
and John Dawson* who prior to th© War of* th© Pacific had not
been prominent in nitrate affairs*

Even though these men had

been unimportant earlier* they achieved a position of leader**
ship within a short time*

As the lists of directors in

English nitrate companies show* many of th© pioneer English
operators allied themsolves with the trio*

By co-operating

with one another* North* Harvey* and Dawson were able to acquire potentially valuable nitrate deposits at greatly reduced
prices*

Later they used these as the basis for th© numerous

companies, whose formation in England they promoted in suc
ceeding years*
Because two of the men held influential positions
and because of their unusual ability* these men were in a
position to capitalize upon the uncertain situation regarding
the future of the industry created by the war*

One of the

triumvirate* Robert Harvey* was an engineer working for an
oficina in Tarapaca7 in the 1870*s*^

just before the war be

gan he had been made Inspector Genera! of Nitrate by th©
Peruvian government*

Harvey had the good fortune to ingrati

ate himself with the Chilean authorities when they invaded
Tarapaca* and he was retained in his position for many months*
/

p* 129* Augustin Ross* Llemoria sobre las Relaciones cornerdales ontre Chile y la Bran Bretafia "{LoVidoriT icjQRJ, Appendix
~
south American Journal and Brazil and .River
Plate Mail (l55355)7 H v H J m T ; 1U 99 ) T S g 7 “
—
^
9j* w* Merriarn to Dept* of State, Ho* 7 9 * Dec* 26,
1879* Iquique, I*
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As Inspector General* Harvey was able to acquire In partner
ship with North and Dawson the right to operate several
pricings belonging to the government*

He was* likewise* in

a position to obtain a thorough knowledge of the various
nitrate establishments in Tarapaca" and to assess their value*
Thus he gained within a short time priceless Information that
enabled him to engage in the buying of nitrate properties
with a minimum of risk*

Moreover* as a Chilean official he

was ever aware of the attitude of the government on the
question of whether or not th© industry would b© restored to
private enterprise* 10 It has been alleged that he was certain
— *as early as the middle of i860*— that Chile would honor the
Peruvian certificates and return the properties to holders of
those securities*

It is equally probable that he possessed

no sure knowledge* but merely a strong suspicion that the
devolution of the nitrate establishments to private ownership
was the more likely course of action by th© government**^
Although Ilarvey held a strategic position* he

•^Billinghurst* Los capital©a salltreros* pp*
I4.7* Cornejo* 131 Salitre* pp* GUf* l'obf$' soe also Osgood
Hardy* "BrltisK titrates and the Balmaceda Revolution*'*
Pacific Historical Review* XVII (May, I9 I1-8 )* pp* 165-175*
I have also used the Spanish translation of Hardy *s article
which may be found in Revista Chi Iona* Ho* 113* PP* 6o~8l*
and is entitled "Los inter©Wes salitroras y la revalueion de
Balmaceda*"
^ B y mId-1800* the first Chilean nitrate commission
reported in favor of restoring private enterprlso In the
nitrate industry* However, the government took no stand on
this question until a year lator* Bee Chapter II, p*
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probably would not have acquired such vast holdings during
the war years had he not joined another Englishman, John
Thomas North, in the utilization of his knowledge#
youth North had studied engineering Tor a few years#

As a
12

Be**

fore completing his studies, he began working In a manufac
turing plant near his home in heeds, England*

In that occu

pation he demonstrated sufficient ability to rise to the
position of subforwman#

North1s great opportunity came in

1 8 6 9 , mien his employer sent him to th© west coast of South

America to supervise the Installation of some nitrate ma*
chinery#

Instead of returning to England after the job was

completed, North remained to seek his fortune#

Although

virtually penniless, the future "Nitrate King" obtained work
which enabled him to gain a reputation as an engineer#

By

1871 he had become manager of an oficina in Tarapaca#
Before long, he entered into other enterprises
that gave him a sizable income#

North held contracts with

Peru to sell guano; he established a mercantile business in
the major nitrate port of Iquique; and he became an agent for
several shipping firms#

Prom the standpoint of later events,

the most important interest North acquired in the early

s

1870fs was the Companla Proveodora#

Based upon a concession

granted by the Peruvian government, this company supplied

■^%Iardy, "Los intereses salitreras," pp# &9f#
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water to the towns along Peru’s nitrate coast*^

These

various enterprises, developed without mueh capital, pro
duced quick profits*

Apparently, North promoted them in.

order to establish himself in the nitrate industry*

To do

this required a large amount of capital for the purchase of
lands and for the erection of a processing plant*

It may

have been that North approached his goal in 18?5 only to be
prevented from continuing his plan by Peru’s nationalization
scheme*
At any rate, North left for England in 1875 and
did not return until shortly after Chile conquered the region*
Upon arrival in Iquique early in i860, he and Harvey became
close associates*^"

Like Harvey, North ingratiated himself

with the Chilean authorities by placing the ships of his
water company at their disposal*

Within a short time th©

favor was returned in the form of a lucrative concession to
lg
export guano*
In 1800, both North and Harvey had important
business relations with a third Englishman resident In
Iquique— John Dawson.

Dawson was the manager of the Iquique

branch of the strong Chilean financial institution, the Bank

^Pedro Pablo Figueroa, Dicclonario blografico de
extran.jeros en Chile (Santiago, I9 6 0 ) "pp* ^!}^)~16lj 'OoutK
American JoumalV XL (Hay 9 # I8 9 6 ), 52q*
^"Se© the letter written by Harvey in Billlnghurst,
Los capitales salltreros, pp* l^iff, foot-note no* 1*
^Dennis, Tacna-Arlca Documents, pp* 169, I92*
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or Valparaiso*^*

Because of his authority to lend money,

Dawson was a necessary partner in the business designs or
North and Harvey*

The former had some capital of his own,

but Harvey had no source of income sufficient to allow him
to engage in the buying of nitrate certificates on a large
scale*

That Dawson did materially aid the pair in their
«| n

transactions and held an interest in them is quite certain*
As a result of a serious disagreement between himself and
his employers, Dawson resigned his post in 1883*

The misun

derstanding miglit well have been over a reportedly controversial loan he made to North and Ilarvey in 3.880* "I8 Some
16

Billinghurst, Los capitales salitreros, p* 58*
Billinghurst asserts that many Englislimen'T^orrowed the capital
needed to get their start from Chilean banks* See pp* 9, 59*
Dawson and Maurice Jewell, another associate of North *s, were
members of the Municipal Council of Iquique from 18?9 to
1883* Valdes Vergara, Admlnistracion de Tarapaca» p* 38*
^ I n a pamphlet published in London toward the end
of the nitrate boom the following charge was made: Mien "Hr*
Dawson, was the agent of the Bank of Valparaiso, all the
power and influence derived from that post were at the
service and disposal of Mr* North* All the companies in
which he was a shareholder and their friends had credit there*
Those who could not count themselves among the list of his
friends, or who had the indiscretion of not winning the sympa
thies of the almighty lord of the province, wore condemned
to find the funds of the bank inaccessable, however good
their securities*" See Anon*, The Nitrate Craze (London,
1 8 0 9 ), p* 16* This quotation is an exc©rpt”from the Chilean
newspaper Libertad Electoral*
^ I n his book, Los capitales galitreros, pp# ^ 9 , 6 3 ,
Billinghurst asserts that after Daws on’*0 loans' to North and
Ilarvey became known to his superiors, they ordered an im
mediate recall of then* But Dawson allowed the account to
remain outstanding anyhow* v/hen the eventual reckoning came
in 1 8 8 5 , the bank suffered a great loss because of the fall
in the rate of exchange, from "^thirty-five to twenty-five
pennies, occurring in the Intervening years*

years later, Dawson was again in charge of a bank In Iqulque*
But this time* It was with a British firm and one controlled

fay North. 19
The opportunity for these thro© Englishmen to os-*
tablish themselves as nitrate producers came with the repeated
disasters suffered by Peru during the war*

Those occurrences

and the feeling of uncertainty on the part of certificate
holders concerning the future policy of the Chilean govern
ment caused nitrate certificates to undergo a great decline
in their market value*

At this time many certificate holders,

Peruvians particularly, believed that Chile might well follow
the Peruvian example of monopolizing the industry and even
refuse to honor the securities issued by the latter country*
Especially in Lima, where the majority of the securities were
located, owners of certificates displayed an eagerness to
sell their interests*
North and Ilarvey journeyed to Lima to purchase
oficinas at reduced prices on the supposition that Chile
would recognize private rights and with a six hundred thousand
peso letter of credit obtained from Dawson*

All reports

Indicate that their venture was most successful*

Some au

thorities claim they bought as many as nineteen ofIcinas at
prices as low as twenty per cent of their face value, but

*^In 1Q8l\.p Dawson established in Iquique a newspaper,
El Progreso, for the purpose of supporting the nitrate
Industry* P* P* Figueroa, Piccionarlo do extran.ieros * p* 77*
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it cannot be stated with certainty just bow many they purchased
or at shat cost#^

It appears* however* that North and Harvey

acquired nq .less than seven oricinas valued by the Peruvian
government at S 800*000 (about & 150*000)#^

Based upon these

properties lour companies were formed in England vfoose total
capitalisation equalled h 835*000.

Although the details of

the North-Harvey transactions in Lima are obscure* North gave
a general description of the situation some years later#
X comprehended* better than any other
foreigner* the precise value of these certifi
cates* inasmuch as I knew* by my past work and
travels* that some of these lands contained
important nitrate deposits# I bought* then* at
a great discount* a considerable quantity of
them* convinced that the Chilean government
would triumph in the war and that* once vic
torious* she would respect completely the proper
ty right that these securities emitfcdd/fcy /the
vanquished constituted # • # • I practiced then a
selection of these certificates with the object
of increasing the exploitation of the nitrate
fields that they comprised#“
Thus* by the time North and Harvey returned to Iqulque*
they possessed the rights to most of the properties upon which

2°Comejo* El Salitre. p# 116*

^ ►Ibid.i The oficinag purchased by North and Harvey
at this time were the Suen rietiro* Jaapampa* Nueva Carolina*
Primitive, Peruana* Poao Almonte* and Hamires#
^Article by Graston Calmette In El Figaro (Paris)*
April 23* 1895 and quoted in Cornejo# El^alltre. pp# llof#
The quotation continuesj”• # « wishing tjo assure forever the
prosperity of this Industry# of which no one In Europe sus
pected its great importance# I bought along with some friends
the greater part of the shares of the railroad that served
the region where the major nitrate lands were located. Thus*
I became the arbiter of the future • # • #tt
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they founded an immense nitrate interest*

It may well be*

as a contemporary alleged# that during this trip the two men
acquired for little more than one hundred thousand pounds#
oficinas

that were capitalised at approximately one and a

half million pounds on the London stock market*^
the acquisitions were fortunate ones*

Certainly#

For that# neither can

be criticized as they have been by some Chilean and some
British authors*2^- But if Harvey did possess the confidential
information that Chile would return the nitrate properties to
the certificate holders# then malfeasance in office could be
legitimately maintained*

Of course# the liberality with

which Dawson gave credit for this speculation fails to measure
up to the equality of treatment that Is today deemed desirable
in loan transactions*

Nevertheless# one cannot view these

dealings as either un-buslnessllke or as an isolated Instance
of favoritism*

They were fortunate speculations that were

made possible in part by privileges in no way unusual then*
Considering the risk involved in speculating in depreciated
securities whose ultimate worth depended upon their validation
by a government not originally responsible for their Issue#
the profits resulting from the certificate purchases of North
and Harvey were, in reality# partly justified*

Others were

trading in certificates at the same time# and there Is reason
to believe that the firm of Gibbs and Company was undertaking

^Billinghurst# Los capitales salitreros* p* l|$*
^ Tbid* # pass 1ml The Nitrate Craze, passim*
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come speculations in certificates when North and Harvey made
their eoup*^

These men were, as a matter of fact, akin to

some of their North American contemporaries who, perceiving
great developments to come in a particular industry, sought
to capitalise upon the opportunities arising in like situ*
ations*

That a degree of chicanery was involved in the early

development of tee nitrate industry should not be surprising
t© North Americans whose own economic history is filled with
similar incidents*
In the spring of 1882, North designated Dawson as his
agent in Iqulque and sailed for England*

pA

Within a few years

he was to become a leading financier and the recognized head
of the group of English investors who held strong interests
in the nitrate Industry#

The plans North formulated for the

future monopolization of the Industry were grand in design^
and in spite of adverse circumstances, h© was partly sue*
eessful in carrying them through*

He headed, along with

Harvey, a group that controlled three*fifths of the producing
companies formed in England by I89 O*
Of the six producing companies that North personally
promoted, three were organized shortly after his arrival In
England#^

The first, and by far the most remunerative, was

^Billinghurst, Los oapltales salitreross p* 49
^Cornejo, HI Salitre, p# 128
^Por the English nitrate companies and their capi
talizations see Table V, p# 96 below*

9&
the Liverpool Nitrate Company, Limited*

Capitalised at;

& 110,000, it purchased the oficina Ramirez from North and
Harvey for ten times the price paid for it by those men in
Lima*

The differences existing in the purchase price in

Lima (h £#000), the value of the oficina in certificates
{& 13,750), and the selling price (h 5 0 ,000 ) led to the
charge of over-capitalization*

pA

The record of the Liverpool

Company, however, refutes the allegation} for it was the most
profitable English producing enterprise in the industry for
the next thirty years*

Of the two other producing companies

formed by North before 1888, the first, the Primitive Nitrate
Company, Limited, was justly criticised for being over-*

capitalized*

The second, the Colorado Nitrate Company,

Limited, achieved a status midway between the Liverpool and
the Primitive*^
During this period when North was establishing him
self in the industry as a major nitrate producer he extended
his interests by acquiring control of the Nitrate Hallways
Company, the railroad that provided transportation for
/ 30

Tarapaea*

With hi© extensive holdings, North represented

the chief British Interest in Chilean nitrated by 1887*

His

^Cornejo, El Salitre* p. 117} Billinghurst, Los
capitales salltreros* p. I$*
^9por the dividends declared by these and other
English companies see Table VII, pp* ll5f# See also. Ibid**
PP. 79-33# 90.
3%»or the history of this railroad (Nitrate Hallways)
see Chapter XV*
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importance was i^eognised In the financial circles of London
as is indicated by the favorable estimate of North that ap
peared in an issue of the Stock BxehanR© in 1888*
The introduction of this great article of
commerce is due to the ability and energy of
Col* North* It is he who has practically intro
duced this fertilizer into the European mai’kets,
he having discovered its valuable qualities in
Chile* He has been rewarded for his exertions
and prescience by having realized a princely
fortune, which no on© Who knows him begrudges
him* In making a fortun© himself he has been
the cause of numbers of other persons also largely
benefiting by his knowledge and influence* A©
everybody knows, he is a self-made man, who
carries his prosperity with a cheerful modesty,
which indicates the innate true gentleman, and
has brought him troops of friends*31
But North was still far from th© goal he had set for
himself| and in ensuing years, he attempted to solidify and
assure the dominance of his interests by monopolizing the
industry*
achieved*^

In part, the basis for monopoly had already been
with transportation facilities under his control

and with a significant share of productive power, his chance
for success was great*33
To fulfill th© plan a major increase to th© produetive power of the North-Harvoy group was necessary*

Thus,

North undertook the floatation of a vast number of producing

^Stock Exchange* as quoted in South American Journal*
XXV (Oct* 5$,
|
^See excerpt from Libertad Electoral in Nitrate
Craze, p* 16*
"There may have been on earlier attempt. In XdQli,
on th© part of Chilean producers to monopolise the nitrate
industry* See South American Journal* XXI (May 8 , 1081$.),
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companies on the London market, and in order to obtain the
required response from purchasers of stock in England, he
Initiated actions that brought special attention to nitrate
securities* 3!f

'Those companies that had already been formed

were to act, in his scheme, as the attraction for this capi
tal*

The Primitive, Liverpool, and Nitrate Railways per-

formed their function especially well#

The first declared a

ten per cent dividend in 1888 and in 1889# announced an as
tounding seventy per cent return} for the second straight
year the Liverpool came forth in 1888 with a forty per cent re
turn andi iu I8 8 9 , increased that to fifty-five per cent#
Meanwhile, Nitrate Rails, which had returned only ten per cent
in I8 87 , declared cash dividends in both of the following
years of twenty-five per cent#

Th® London Nitrate Company,

Limited— the one other company formed before 1888 but not
within the North-Harvey orbit— declared a return of 8I4Z per
cent in I889 , its only dividend to common stockholders in the
nineteenth century#
Th&ae immense profits produced the desired result, a

great demand for nitrate shares#^

To capitalize upon this

^ 1B1 think, ” said North in an interview, "that# * •
/nitrate securities/ form one of the best investments possi
ble# Nitrate is as yet in its Infancy} its properties are
not realized# It is at once the best, the cheapest, and
most successful fertilizer In tho world# In time every
country will be obliged to use it#H New York Herald, quoted
in the South American Journal* xxvi (F0E._^7"iOT§T,“ i79.

" A a early as October, 1887, the South American
Journal wrote of a boom in nitrates and commentecT'that "from
a joint-stock point of view this nitrate industry is quit©
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"market boom" the interest group floated seven new producing
companies and three service organisations whose combined capi
tal equalled & 2#1*72#000#^

The eight other producing compa

nies organised during the boom had a combined capitalization
of & 2#857#800#

Since four of these enterprises probably

were connected with the North-Harvey group through inter
locking directorates# the influence of the "Nitrate King" ex
tended beyond the interest group

p r o p e r #

37

Several service companies# whose activities were di
rectly related to the nitrate industry# were formed by the
North-Harvey group#3^

The first of these was the T&rap&ca

Waterworks Co*# Limited# organized in 18 88 #

It acquired a

new# but private capital has for years been employed in
working nitrate factories • * • • i/ahd there is/ ample scope
for the favorable utilization of joint-stock funds#” See
XXIV (Oct. 1# 1887)# 562.
36*j3iQ seven new North companies were the Lagunas
Syndicate# Paecha and Jazpampa# San Donato# San Jorge# San
Pablo# San Sebastian# and Santa Elena* See Table V below#
37Th0 four companies connected by directorships wares
Rosario# Santa Luisa# Lautaro# and Tamarugal# It was alleged#
too# that the London company was under North *s influence#
For the lists of directors see Stock Exchange Yearbook (London)
(I89 D # passim; See also Ross# ^eXagiones comeroialeg entre
Chile y la gran Bretana# Appendix 25, jp* 236X# la© Wsario
company represented the Incorporated holdings of the German
J# Gildenaelster, and the Tamarugal was formed from the nitrate
lands possessed by A* Gibbs and Sons# See Billinghurst# Los
capitalea salltreros* pp. 8 7 , 90 «
3^North had other enterprises in the nitrate region
not represented by English companies# He was th© principal
stockholder In the gas company that served the nitrate port
of Iqulque# and he was part owner of the Tarapaca Foundry •
See Cornejo# El Salltre* p# 130
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TABLE V
British Investments In Nitrate Enterprises* 1090*

Bate
Organised

Company
Producing Companies
^Colorado Nitrate Co.* Ltd.
Julia Nitrate Co.* Ltd. •
^Lagunas Syndicate9 Ltd. •
Lautaro Nitrate Co. 9 Ltd..
^Liverpool Nitrate Go., Ltd.
London Nitrate Co., Ltd. .
New Tamarugal Nitrate Co., Ltd.
Acquired Tamarugal Nitrate Go
Termed in I8 8 9
•a-Paceha and Jaspampa Nitrate Co* Ltd.
*Prlmitiva Nitrate Co., Ltd.. .
Rosario Nitrate Co., Ltd.. , .
©San Donato Nitrate Co., Ltd. «
*San Jorge Nitrate Co., Ltd.. *
#5an Pablo Nitrate Co., Ltd.. .
*San Sebastian Nitrate Co., Ltd.
•sSanta Elena Nitrate Co., Ltd..
Santa Luisa Nitrate Co., Ltd..
Santa Rita Nitrate Co., Ltd. •
Taltal Nitrate Co., Ltd. . . .
Tarapaca' Nitrate Co., Ltd. « •
Total Gapltal of Producing Companies
Service Companies
©Bank of Tarapaca and London, Ltd.. .
•sTarapaca Waterworks Co., Ltd.. • . .
titrate Provisions Supply Co., Ltd.*
Anglo-Chile&n Nitrate and Railway
Co., Ltd. • * . «
^Nitrate Railways Co., Ltd. • « « « .
Taltal Railways Co., Ltd.. • . . • .
Total Capital of Service Companies .
Total Capital of A H Companies . . .

1885

*

1889

I8 8 9

Total ,
Capital0

165,000

150,000
162.000
300.000
1 1 0 .0 0 0

1883
1887

160.000

X8 9 0

6 5 0 .0 0 0

I8 8 9

3 6 0 .0 0 0
2 0 0 .0 0 0

1885

,

1 2550,000

I88 9
I8 8 9

1888

1 6 0 .0 0 0
3 7 5 .0 0 0

1888

160.000

I889

1 4 5 .0 0 0

110.000
1888

2 5 0 ,0 0 0
9 6 ,3 0 0

I8 8 9
1888

81,000

,

80,500

1 889

4 964,800
1888

1888

h

5 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0

I88 9

100,000

1888

7 0 0 *0 0 0
3 ,4 4 3 * 0 0 0

1882
1882

514.800

610,622,600

aContplled from the Stock Exchange Year~Book (I8 9 I),
passim. ^ ^
^Total Gapital Includes outstanding bends as well as
shares.
#North*Harvey Companies
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going concern by purchasing the Proveedora Cia, which had
long supplied water to Iqulque and controlled the water supply business in Pisagua#

Col# Horth, th© owner of this enter

prise and the promoter of the English concern# received a
total of & 150,000 for his interests*^

Before the Tarapaca7

Waterworks was created# the water-supplying monopoly of Col*
Worth was seriously challenged by a project engaged in by
another Englishman* Thomas Hart*

In 1885 the latter obtained

from th© Chilean government a concession to pipe portable
water to Iqulque from th© Pica springs that lay southwest of
Iqulque on the eastern edge of Tamarugal Fampa*

Horth tried

to discredit Hart and his project, since it threatened M s
water business with complete ruin*

Fortunately for Horth#

Hart died before completing his project, and wTh© HItrate
King* purchased the concession from Hart1s heirs for some
i* 35,000*^°

With a capital of & lj-00,000, Tarapaca f/aterworks

enjoyed a steady prosperity and returned to its shareholders
slightly more than Its capital by 1900*

Iqulque, Pisagua,

Arica, the Nitrate Hallways, and some of the oficinas were
served by the company*
At the time the waterworks firm; was being organised,
the North-Harvey group founded the Bank of Tarapaca and
London with a capital of h 500,000*

John Dawson, still a

^investor*s Heview (London), II (I8 9 3 ), pp. 135f.
verbid.$ Libert;ad Electoral quoted In The.Nitrate
Crase, p. 17} Guillermo E* Billinghurst, OeoCTafTa <fe 1.
Tarapaca (Santiago1 El Progreso, 188?), p# Ill, '^
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close associate of the interest group, was placed in charge
of the bank*

It was not an immediate success* however# since

Its activities were solely with the nitrate industry and with
companies whose precarious position lowered Its reputation.
Nevertheless, It slowly established itself until by I8 9 2 It
was able to return profits to Its owners# which# while low in
comparison with tt©ae made by other service companies# were
steady.^
In I8 8 9 # th© Nitrate Provisions Supply Company#
Limited* with a capital of h 100*000# was added to the growing
list of North-Harvey companies.

Its purpose# as stated in the

prospectus* was to establish a fleet of steamers to supply
foodstuffs* merchandise* and other goods to the oficinas of
Tarapaca.

The design* though never realised* was to obtain

a monopoly on supplying the company stores.

It was claimed

that success was assured because the directors also held po
sitions of influence in eight producing companies and in the
water and railway enterprises.

As Billinghurst noted at the

time* the enterprise had no chance of success since its eapi*
tal could in no way b© considered sufficient to monopolise a
trade in Innumerable articles whose annual Import value ex*
ceeded two million pounds.^2

Th© prediction proved correct.

The company never prospered.

^ "South American Journal* XLVII (Oct. 28* 1899)#
5>0*?1 Stock"SESEan^e Yearbook YX&91). p. 3»
^Billinghurst# Los capltales aalitreros. pp. 106-

112.
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Much later, in 1895# the North-Harvey group floated its
final service company* th© Nitrate Producer1© Steamship Compa
ny*

Its operation was given to another firm with the stipu-

lation that no renmmeration would be received by th© operators
if net profits fell below ten per eent#^

Th© company operated

several ships competently, and an average dividend of eight
per cent on its h 100*000 capital was declared during th© first
six years it functioned*
These service companies, capitalised for a total of
one million pounds, were organised by North as part of his
plan to monopolize the industry#

While they provided neces

sary services, the banking and provisioning needs of th©
Industry especially were far greater than North1® resources
could supply*

Thus, only the waterworks company, already a

flourishing monopoly prior to its incorporation in England,
experienced better than moderate success#
By 1690, nitrate companies formed in England domi
nated the industry#

British investment® in th© nitrate

industry totalled, h 10,622,600, and English producing compa
nies represented more than half of th© productive power of
the industry*^

The investments were distributed as follows:

& li-,9 6 4 ,8 0 0 into eighteen nitrate producing firms* h 700,000

^South American Journal, XXXVTII (March 16, 1895)#
293#
44xbld* XXX (Feb# 7, 1 8 9 1 ), 1 6 3 # According to my
ealculatIons eased upon th© reported production per ofielna
in I8 9 O, the British controlled almost fifty-six per cent In
that year#

into a combination produc ing and railway enterprise; and
& ^ 9 5 7 # 8 0 0 into the three service companies and two railroads*
or the total British capital# the North-Harvey interests con**
trolled approximately sixty per cent {$» 6*390*000)*

Of the

capital devoted to producing companies# the group represented
about forty per cent (& 1#9^7#000)*

Because of the relative

unity among British producers provided by the inter-locking
directorates of th© chief interest group# the "Nitrate King"
held an even more significant place in nitrate affairs than
is indicated by the productive power of his producing compa
nies*^

His primacy# although not complete# was recognised

by his election as president of the Permanent Nitrate Corn**
mittee established in bondon in 1 8 8 9 * ^

Until his death#

North held that position*
North*a Influence in the industry was further enhanced
through his relationship with British consular officials sta
tioned in Tarapaca*

In 1 8 8 9 the vice-consul at Iqulque#

Maurice Jewel# was promo ted to the consulship*^

Because

Jewel was a partner of North# a special relationship was
apparently established favorable to th© interest group*

The

Fred Hippy# "Iniciativas economic as del *Rey del
Salitre* y de sus socios en Chile#" Revista Chilena* No* 113
(Jan*-June* 1 9 ^9 )# p* 83 and f0 0 tnote1
,rno*™" If5rffls "artlole 1®
a translation of an article appearing in th© Pacific His
torical Review* XVII (Nov*# 194#># i*57-if65.
^Asociacion Salltrera d© Propaganda# Circular
Trimestral* Iqulque# No* 12 (Aug* 21# I8 9 6 )# Appendix#' p* 3#
k7j?. 0* to Maurice Jewell# No* 1# June# I8 8 9 # F* 0*

16/257.
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British Minister to Chile recognised the Inadvisability of
this situation and recommended a change#

He advised th©

Foreign Office that Ww© want a regular consul at Iqulque***
the present man and his vice are partners of Col# Horth, wh
is not quite correct and Iqulque is an important Fort# » • • 11^
In all probability nothing was done to oust Jewel, sine© as
late as 1 8 9 5 the vice-consul at Fisagua was connected with
the Horth group as an agent of the Nitrate Railways company#^
Just before th© boom collapsed the producing compa
nies possessed a market value of almost nine million pounds—
approximately sixty per cent above their par value#-*®

Compa

nies formed before the boom days had declared by I8 9 O no less
than forty-eight per cent In dividends, and on© had returned
to its stockholders 181 per cent#

Meanwhile, many of those

created in the early years of the boom had already made
profits#

Squally promising were th© adjunct enterprises,

although only Nitrate Rails had proved Its worth#
Th© rapid floatation of these companies had been
aided by the current wave of prosperity in the industry#

That

in turn stimulated rampant speculation in nitrate securities#
The extent of this speculation can be seen in th© table on

^Kennedy to Sanderson, May 27, I8 9 O, F# 0# 16/2^9*
The action taken by The Foreign Office on this matter was
not revealed in the transcripts obtained from th© Public
Record Office#
Hayes Sadler to Salisbury, No# 6 , Jan# 23, IS9 6 ,
F# 0 # 16 / 2 9 6 #
Journal of Finance (London), II (Oct*, I8 9 7 ), 11^9#

ioa
the market value of nitrate stocks during the boom years*
The deflation that followed in I6 9 O is also shown*

North*

himself, seems to have encouraged speculation in the shares
of his companies, although he denied the charge*

A few

TABLE VI
Stock Market Quotations
For Some Nitrate Companies, l888**189Ga

Far
Value

Company

Highest
Quotation
1888

Colorado

* 5

11 7 /a

10

Lautaro

Highest
Quotation
1689

11 15/16
9 1 /8

Highest
Quotation
Quotation on Nov* 28,
I8 9 O
I8 9 O
5 1 /2

2 1 /2

8

4 1 /2

Liverpool

5

33 3 A

31

18

7

London

5

31 1 /8

31 1 /2

10

h

Primitive

5

39 1/2

38 3 A

23

6

San Jorge

5

*»«*«•«•

12 1 /8

7 5 /1 6

5

San Pablo

5

18 3 A

15 1 /2

5 lA

2

aInvestorfs Monthly Manual (London), Nov* 2 9 , I8 9 O,
p* f>6 6 *
unheeded voices had warned of the vicissitudes for investors
who recklessly participated in this speculative mania and
pointed out the lack of stability in the nitrate industry*-^

^^Flnanclal Times (London), April 30, 1 8 8 9 , quoted
in Henry SewelX iXana, BrTtlah Capital and Chilean Industry
(London* T* I* Johnson, 1 0 8 $} ,pp. T-2* In" l¥82V' Gana tried
to gain the assent of the producers In Aguas Blancas to
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Perhaps the sharpest of these warnings came in 1687 from a
British consul In Chile whose report predicted a sharp decline
in nitrate prosperity and stated that the promoters in London
"wrer© going out on top of the tide* 11
Col* North*a importance in the nitrate industry led
the press to give him the title of the "Nitrate King*" and
he lived the part in both public and private llfe*^

A

leading gossip columnist of stock market affairs who called
himself "Diogenes," repeatedly remarked that "whatever he
touches seems to turn to gold*"^ Another comment, equally

th© formation of an English company which would monopolise
operations in that field* He failed* Judging from his
attitude as expressed in this book, the experience soured
him on the nitrate industry* See p* 5>*
^Great Britain, Foreign Office, Diplomatic and
Consular Reports* Misc* Series, I889 , No*’
1
'122V “'',rrri,,ri
^Lat© In the year 1888, North attended a dinner
given by the financier Rothschild* Also in attendance were
Lord Randolph Churchill and the Prince of Wales* The Weekly
Bulletin consnenteds "We wonder what the Colonel1s introduction to the Prince and the rest of th© aristocracy will
cost him?" Quoted in the South American Journal* XXV (Dec*
29,1888), 1060* A week earlier It was reported that Col*
North "is going to start the season with a big fancy dress
ball at the Hotel Metropole* He has become Master of the
Mid-Kent Staghounds, and it is boasted that at the first
meet under his mastership, at Farmingham, the other day,
l)|l) bottles of champagne were opened before the hunt com
menced* Col* North is a rather well-built man, with a florid
full face, whiskers, and a moustache* He is Col* of a
Volunteer regiment*" Ibid** Dec* 22, 1888, p* 1026* For a
description of the fancy dress ball see Hardy, "Los intereses
salltreros," p* 7i}-#
^South American Journal* XXV (Nov* 17, 1888), 868 *
North had many other enterpris©a outside the field of nitrates*
He invested in the Arauco Co*, which mined coal in southern
Chile, and he held interests in a West Australian Gold Mine*

remarkable* noted that "Rothschild in financial topics occu
pied a lesser place to Mr# North#

Two other English

publications, the Pall Mall Gazette and the Financial Times,
largely concurred with the prevailing opinion of Col# North
and added their laudations of th© "Nitrate King#"^

However*

at least one contemporary journal, the Financial News, used
critical language in referring to th© activities of North and
regularly disparaged his interests*^?
The opposition to North rested* first, on the belief—
largely substantiated at a later time— that he was more of
a promoter and speculator than a businessman#

Secondly, the

antagonism against him was concentrated among th© nitrate
enterprisers outside of the interest group, ©specially among
those trying to form companies to exploit the deposits of
Taltal*

North mad© vigorous efforts to frustrate th© plans

of others, and what was called by some a "Nitrate War" raged
between th© Taltal and North groups for many months#

At a

gathering of North *s followers early in 1889 , a lieutenant of
the "Nitrate King" virtually declared war on the Taltal group
in a "remarkably outspoken speech," while North himself
asserted that any investments placed in companies operating

^Cornejo, El Salltre# p# 128#
£6See South American Journal. XXVI {Feb. ?, I8 G9 ),
177I For the comment of "the Stoctc Scchanpte* that "newspapers
that have spoken well of his ventures have not found him un
grateful," see Ibid*, Feb# 16, 1889 , p# 211#

^North carried on a feud with th© Financial News#
See Ibid** Feb# 9 , 1889 , p# 177#
_ r
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in Taltal would be wholly lost*^8

Referring to North*8 fight

with the Taltal interests* the South Amerlesm Journal made
th© following observation*

"With the beet intention©* hie

opinions may be affected by his interests*

These are evl**

dently hostile to th© Taltal competition**1^*?
North *a campaign against th© Taltal Interests is on-*
tirely understandable*

He had reaped a fortune in the boom

years* but he had not achieved his objective of monopolising
th© industry*

To b© sure, th© group h© headed controlled

slightly less than fifty per cent of the productive capacity
possessed by English companies*

Aa

Yet that strength was more

apparent than real because the Primitive company* which ac
counted for almost on© quarter of the production of the group*
had virtually exhausted its deposits*
productive power was imminent*

A sharp decline in

Then, too, lacking a much

greater control over production, North could not hope to
dominate the non-Bnglish producers*

His opposition to the

development of the deposits outside of Tarapaca constituted
an attempt to minimis© the magnitude of th© task that he still
had before him*

£6ibid.. pp. 163, 177*
•*9Ibid.. p. 177. The oossnent continued* "With all
respect for Col* North, we are disposed to think he Is a
little arrogant when he virtually proclaims that every con
cern, not brought out under hie auspices, m o t b© undeserving
of public support*f<
^Calculated on the basis of production reports for
th© year IS90 *
^Billinghurst, Loo capital©© aalitreros* p*

91*

/
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To pursue

M s plans, North found It necessary to go

A2

to Chile in 1869 *
establishments*

He wanted to obtain additional nitrate

Since the possibility of buying from private

holders was small, the realisation of the scheme rested upon
the "Nitrate King*s” ability to pursuade the Chilean govern*
ment to revive its policy of selling state-owned properties*^
With this in mind, North began his well-advertised and osten
tatious voyage to Chile * ^

He used all means at his command

to gain a favorable press in Chile and to convince the
Balmaeeda administration of the wisdom of offering state
Ap

°tfNorth obtained a letter of introduction from the
Foreign Office to the Charge d* Affairs at Santiago* Since
these letters were rather freely granted, it does not appear
that North received special consideration* See letter of
introduction given North, Jan* 2 I4., 1889 , F* 0* 16/256*
Another was provided W* E* Spencer, Jan* 30, I889 * F* 0*
16 / 2 5 7 .

■^North also wanted to check on his other Interests
in Chile* The most important was the Nitrate Railways, whose
monopoly was being threatened by the government of Chile*
In addition, North was part owner of the Arauco Go*, a coal
mining and railroad concern operating in southern Chile, and
he was part owner of several enterprises located In Iqulque*
One was th© commercial firm of North and Jewel, and another
was the Tarapaca' Foundry* See William H* Russell, A Visit
to Chile and the Nitrate Fields of Tarapaca (London? 1J* s*
vTrtue & Co* , I8 9 O ), p* V?*
% 0 v e r two hundred persons were reported to have
cheered North at the train station when he and his party were
starting their journey to the seaport of Liverpool* Among
the twenty people in the group were two newsmen, William H*
Russell, formerly of the Times (London), and Montague
Vltzetelly, representing the Financial Times* Apparently,
North hoped these reporters would provide him with favorable
press contacts in Chile* North stated that the expenses of
this trip amounted to h 20,000* See South American Journal*
XXVI (Feb. 9, 1 8 8 9 }, 17 6 and XXVII (Dec'.Sl, 1889), 1 W ?
Also consult Hardy, "Loa interoaoa salitreros," p. 75.
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nitrate deposits for sale*

But even in personal talks with

the president and other government officials, he met with
hostility*

While formerly Balmaceda had contemplated a new

auction of state properties, he had abandoned th® plan be
cause he feared foreign interests would obtain most of th©
lands offered*

A sale, he felt, would enable them to es

tablish a monopoly over Chile’s most important industry*^*
The official and personal attitude of the president toward
English investments in th© nitrate industry and regarding
Col* Berth specifically was so unfavorable that he publicly
criticised the "Nitrate King’s” private transactions. fih We
can, therefore, credit Balmaceda’s policy with preventing
th© culmination of the design that North had in mind when
making his voyage to Chile*
Before North returned to England in the summer of
18&9* there were indications that a period of depression was
in store for the industry*^

Although this fact was not

fully recognised immediately, the years I89 O,
ones of reduced earnings*

I89 I were

Only five of the nineteen pro

ducing companies paid dividends in these years*

The aftermath

^Russell, A Visit to the Nitrate Fields, p* 312*
^Ibld** p* 62* For other aspects of North’s voyage
to Chile see Chapter VIII, pp* 2l£ff*
^See Chapter VI for more about the depression* At
the same time, the market for nitrate securities weakened*
The stock market gossip, "Diogenes," claimed North’s absence
was the cause* South American Journal, XXVI {Feb* 9 , 1 8 8 9 ),
193f* But others said investors were selling while prices
were still high* Investor’s Monthly Manual (London), XIX
(March 30, I8 8 9 ), 99# ~

of the boom revealed the instability of th© nitrate trade and
showed the weaknesses of many of the enterprises*

It also

demonstrated that the high expectations stimulated by the
high dividends of th© boom years would not be reached for
most companies*
While the heritage of the boom remained to plague
some enterprises until the end of the century, two companies
in particular suffered harshly from the effects of being
formed hastily and unwisely*

On© of these* the Tarapaca

Hitrate Company, Limited* was organised in

18 89 by

promoters

who had no particular property in mind for th© firm to oper«*
ate#

The promoters expected to purchase an oficina either

from the Chilean government or through a private transaction#
Eighty thousand five hundred pounds were subscribed as th©
capital* and the chairman of th© company proceeded to Chile
to buy a property#

When it proved to be impossible to purchase

an oficina* it was decided to invest in th© shares of a new
North-Harvey company, th© Faccha and Jazpampa#

Poor business

management* however# led to th© exhaustion of the entire capl~
tal# leaving no funds to meet past and current expenses*

A

threatened foreclosure was forestalled by an exchange of
shares with the Paecha but Involved a severe loss to in*
vestors#^®
The second example was the Primitive, one of th© first
companies associated with the Interest group#

During th© boom#

6 8Soath American Journal. XXXI (Aug. 21, I89 I), 215.

there had been a great deal of speculation in Primitive stocks
Much of it* of course* was stimulated by the dividend of
seventy per cent declared in I889 * But when the Primitive
failed to declare a dividend in IQ90 * it was revealed that
the previous one had been distributed on expected profits and
with borrowed money*

Faced with a debt of h 200*000 and with

exhausted soils* it could not regain its former position of
eminence*

No further dividends were declared by this company*

When making plans in 1895 for a reorganisation* which failed*
North announced at th© stockholder1© meeting that he owned
5*J|3G shares bought at a total of 3» 122*000*

Intended to

gain the confidence of the stockholders, his attempt backfired
when It was revealed that he originally held 16*000 shares*
Other directors of the firm also were charged with selling
out at th© high boom prices*^

As on© financial Journal

pointed out* North and his friends 11sold and sold1’ while they
were urging others to "buy and hold*"

With such revelations*

North began to lose his influence among nitrate Investors*^®
Those who had previously relied upon his financial keenness
and refused to believe th© allegations made against him* now
began to regard him with resentment*
As so often happens* the majority of commentators
accepted the boom while It flourished with few reservations*
but later on evaluated it more critically*

The South American

6 9ibld., XXXIX (Nov. 9, 1 0 9 5 ), 491* Grt* Br., Consular
Reports* Mise* (1 88 9 )* No* ll|2*

70south American Journal* XXXIX (Nov* 2* 1895)*
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Journal could well be placed In this category#

The estimate

of th© Economist in 1896 reflected th© opinion of nitrate
Investors who were facing with apprehension a period of sever©
depression*

It stated that ”in its limited sphere there ha©

been no more outrageous boom* * * than in th© shares of th©
companies* which under th© auspices of* * * Colonel North,
were formed in such rapid succession for working nitrate
properties in Chile.”^

North provided a convenient scapegoat,

and in some ways he deserved the abuse heaped upon him*
The companies floated under the auspices of North and
Harvey provided huge profits to the promoters, #10 reaped
additional rewards by speculating in th® securities of their
companies.

Because they were primarily interested in gaining

immediate returns from their Investments, as well as attract

ing support for their stock floatations. North and Harvey
followed the practice of declaring as high dividends as possi
ble*

This, of course, led to future financial weakness for

their companies*^

Most contemporary observers, too, testify

that the North—Harvey enterprises were over-capitallaed.73
The Lagunas affair provides a clear, although ex

aggerated, example of the methods employed by Col* North*

^ The Economist (London), LIV (Aug* 1, I8 9 O), 999*

7^Xbld»1 Excerpt from th© Financial Times (Sept* 2,
1 8 9 6 ) quoted in South American Journal,^‘"&f (Sept* J>, 1 8 9 6 ),

260$ The Investment itSex*''a11'quarVerljy supplement to th©
Investor*© MonthiyManual, March 30, 1889 , p* 99 *

73r0 ss, Helac .tones comerciales entr©; Chile y; la Gran
Bretana, p* 111*

Ill
While in Chile in 1889# Horth had purchased for h 110*000
the nitrate lands known as

L a g u n a s #

^

^ney were located south

of the main deposits in Tarapaca and had no rail facilities#
That same year he organised the Lagunas Syndicate Company*
Limited* and transferred the property to it for seven hundred
pounds In cash and shares valued at Is 109*300#
Syndicate had a total capital of Si 162*000*

7$

Lagunas

In X8 9 2 the value

of the property was greatly enhanced when nitrate Rails****
also controlled by North*— contracted to extend its track to
Lagunas#
By I89J4. the time was propitious for floating a new
company because prosperity for th© nitrate industry had re**
turned#

North was ready and he organized the Lagunas Nitrate

Company, Limited, with a capitalization of & 900*000#
Lagunas Nitrate bought one-third of the property of Lagunas

Syndicate for h $$0,000 In cash and fc 300*000 in shares*^

In

this scheme, the important fact was that the directors of
both companies were identical*

North and his cohorts, as

heavy investors in Lagunas Syndicate, were organising Lagunas
Nitrate solely for their own profit*^?

prom the money derived

7^Comejo, El Salltre* p* 13$
7%outh American Journal. XLIV (June

2 9 * 1 8 9 8 ),

122f.

Railway Time8 (London), LXXIII (May lit* I8 9 6 )» 61^.7.
Apparently, tagunas Syndicate sold Its shares of Lagunas
Nitrate (since th© directors undoubtedly knew their true
value) for h 32lj.,000#

77xnve3tor'a Review. VIII (Oct., I8 9 6 ), 3 05 .
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In the sale* Lagunas Syndicate declared a dividend of one
hundred per cent— the first return it made*

The deal*

likewise, made possible a significant increase in the eapi~
taliaation of Lagunas Syndicate*

By 1896 its capital had

risen from h 162,000 to h 1*100,000*

At the same time, North

contrived in another way to profit from the floatation of
Lagunas Nitrate*

In distributing the shares of the company

he and his friends retained most of the stock#

This had the

effect of creating a great demand for it on the stock exchange#
Speculation in Lagunas Nitrate shares ensued, and some paid
as high as h if93* for the ii 100 shares#^
been described as follows 1

North*s scheme has

,fBeyond the bare number required

to keep the stock exchange in a good humor, all the shares
were allotted to the directors and their entourage# whom the
public were subsequently induced to relieve of their holdings
• # « #«79

a comparison of the records of share ownership

in Lagunas Nitrate reveals a startling amount of selling in
the manner described above#

North, his wife and son, Lord

Rothschild, Dawson, and others too decreased their holdings
tremendously, tfhile only two stockholders increased the
number of shares they held at the time of the allotment#®^
Fortunately for North, the details of these dealings were

?^South American Journal* XXXVI (June 16, I89 I}.), 651#
^Investortg Review* II (Oct#, 1 89 3 ), 332#
80 Ibld.. VIII, (Oct., I8 9 6 ), 305.

not revealed until after his death*
In spite of the recession of 1890*1891 and the debacle
of the Primitive* Col* North retained his leadership of
English interests*

throughout the period from I8 9 0 to

1896#

most of the British companies returned adequate dividends*
This was ©specially true during the prosperous times from
I8 9 3 through 1 8 9 5 *

Among the companies sponsored by North

and Harvey* the most successful producing firm continued to
be the Liverpool Company#

From

1890

dividends amounting to 125 per cent#

to

1896

it declared

This brought the total

returns made in thirteen years by the Liverpool enterprise
to three times its capital#

While this company was called

"the bright particular star of the North group" It was also
alleged that "it has acted • • # as a decoy duck to the public
by attracting money Into similar but overcapitalised ventures
# * * ^"81

3 an Jorge company delivered 8?^ per cent

during an equal period and brought its total returns to
slightly over on© hundred per cent for the eight years it had
operated*

The record of the Lagunas Syndicate ©quailed that

of the San Jorge#

Other profitable North*Harvey companies

and the total dividends they declared from I8 9 O to I89 6 were
the San Pablo (IjX)#)* the Paccha and Jasp&mpa (324$)# and the
Colorado (234$)#

The New Taraarugal paid its eight per cent

preferred shares* but the other producing companies in the

^Financial Times as quoted in the South American
Journal# xfeSTTSeptT X l & 1 8 9 5 ) * 2 8 5 #
------

™L~ m
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interest group declared low dividends or non© at all*
Of the eight companies outside the North-Harvey group
the London company continued to be the moat profitable#

It

distributed dividends of 95 per cent on its preferred stock
between 1688 and 1896 *

Three others* the Santa KIta (1*.8$£)#

the Rosario (38^)* and the Consolidated (26^) mad© good
records*

After the Lautaro merged with the Santa Luisa in

I8 92 * It paid ifO per cent in dividends before I8 9 6 * Both the
Julia and the Taltal companies experienced continued weakness

throughout the prosperous period* and even an amalgamation
of these two firms in 189 !^ failed to improve their statu©#
Between the sunsser of 1895

summer of I896

important changes occurred in the nitrate Industry with the
development of a depression*

This decline continued with

little abatement until the close of the decade*

ap

The do-

press Ion in turn led to a serious diminution in the market
value of the shares of companies engaged in or dependent upon
the nitrate industry#

Prom June to September, 1895# pro

ducing companies suffered a loss In market value of on®
million pounds* and a like amount was lost by Nitrate Rails#
The lack of confidence in companies in the North-Harvey
group* with the exception of the Liverpool* caused investors
in those companies to bear the brunt of the losses*®^

®%ee Chapter VI* p*l80ff far a discussion of this
nitrate depression*
®-%*inane ial Times as quoted in the South American
Journal# xffiBT(Stept# l^*" 1895 )* 285#
--- -

TABLE VII

Dividends Declared by English Nitrate Producing Companies*
(Common Stock)
1890 1890
Allansa
Amelia
^Colorado
Consolidated
Bsperansa
Julia
Julia-Taltal
^Lagunas NI*
^Lagunas S&#
Lautaro
^-Liverpool
^London
New Julia
lew Paccha
& Jazpampa
cN@w Tamarugal
^Paccha h
Jaspaapa
^Primitiva
Rosario
Salar del
Camen

lj£| nil

nil

1891

nil

1892

1893

6
8^

3

I89lf 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 I9OO
6
nil
6
nil
Org# nil
nil
nil
nil
Org. nil
6| nil nil nil nil nil
8
2
2
2
2
13
5
k
G*g. nil

nil
Org.

74
nil

5
181
81^2

nil
nil
nil
nil

nil

nil

nil

nil
nil
nil

5
izi

10

nil

nil

22k

nil
15
35
nil

nil
nil
100
10
30
nil

nil
jj.
10
25
nil
Org.

nil

nil
nil

nil
3

3

k

15

12|?

35

nil
nil

2§
nil

15
2|

Org#

nil

nil

nil

2
6

k
6
8

-S

80

nil

nil

nil

nil

nil

nil

nil

nil

nil

nil

nil

2§

2§

nil
71

nil

6
nil

124
nil
6

9
nil
124

nil
nil
10

6

nil

nil

nil

34

Org.

nil

6

nil

?§

10
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To

I89 O
Santiago
#San Donato
*San Jorge
«San Fablo
tfSan
Sebastian
&Sant& Elena
Santa Luisa
Santa Rita
Taltal
Tarap&ca

I89 O
nil

15
20
10

nil

10

2i
nil
5
nil
nil
nil
nil

I89 I
nil
15
10

nil
5
nil
nil

1892

nil

12k
12 |

1893

nil
24
i7i 20
10
5

nil
k
74 nil
13

I89 I1. 1895

1$

24
124
nil

1896

1897

1899

1900
16

nil
74
24
2

nil

nil

Ik

7k

nil

nil

nil

Org*
nil
7§
nil

2

2

Ik

nil

nil

24

nil
10

nil

nil
nil

nil

nil
nil

10

10

nil

nil

10

189A

nil
5

aCompiled from the Stock Exchange Year-Book (I889 -I9 OI}* passim*
^Of this companyfs h l6o*O00 capital* h 110.000 is in preferred shares
of 7 per cent*
c0f this company *s 6 3 9 0 *0 0 0 of share capital* h 195*000 Is in preferred
shares of 8 per cent*
%his eonpany paid common shareholders 2k per cent in the years 1892 -1894 .#
Original Morth-Harvey companies#

Then* as the decline set in* another blow hit the
industry.

Col* North died or apoplexy at a stockholder*s

meeting*®^-

Coinciding with the depression* North1s death re

moved the sole remaining symbol of a thriving era for the
nitrate investors.

And even though much criticism had been

leveled at him for several years* on© newspaper* ishlch had
been quite unfavorable toward the man in his later life* re
marked:

"His removal from the field whatever the ultimate

effect will be must cause disorganisation* and his blunt
bluffness will be missed from many a company meeting for some
time to come*"^
For a while* the market reflected the loss of North
who had been chairman of six nitrate companies (this number
Includes service companies) and a director in three others#

^Ibid# * XL (May 9# IS9 6 }* 510* A short biographical
article follows on p*
North built an "Italian Palace"
at Sltham* Kent which he called Avery Hill* It was located
on an estate approximately i|50 acres In extent* Avery Hill
contained a picture gallery 1 0 0 feet by 5 0 feet* a dining
room 5 0 feet long* and a wbig* brilliant ballroom decorated
in crimson velvet* Th© picture gallery was panelled In
mahogony and marble* onyx* and til© mosaic were used In
various rooms •** The cost of building was between & 250*000
and h 300*000* See South American journal* XXVII (Sept* 21*
1 8 8 9 )* 381; XIiI (July 11* 18^6)*
SoFEli entertained at
Avery M i l all important Chileans visiting In England*
P. P* Figueroa* Dlccionario d© extrani ©ros* p. 160*
^Pall Mall aa&ette (London)* May 6 * I8 9 6 * p* 4*
Flowers were sent to North's funeral by over on© hundred
persons or businesses* Included In this group were the
Prince of Wales* the King of Belgium, and th© Khedive of
Sgypt. See South American Journal* XL (May l6 * I8 9 6 )* 51^9*

118
In addition* North had many other enterprises independent of
nitrates*^

The belief that he held large blocks of stocks*

however* was not justified by the fact*

Apparently* Horth

had reduced his holdings considerably or transferred them to
his son*^

The market recovered after this disclosure* but

the depression continued to harass the industry during most
of the remaining years of the century*

A&

Actually* the strength of the North-Harvey group was
declining by 1 8 9 6 * and it virtually dlsintergrated within a
few years after the death of its leader*

Harvey* who sue**

seeded North as chairman of Nitrate Rails and of soma of th©
other enterprises* was unable to maintain firm control*

He

was eventually ousted from his positions with several of the
c o m p a n i e s *

^9

o?h© formation of a number of new producers as

a result of the state land sales of

bad likewise

served to lessen the power of the Interest group*
During the period of depression from 1896 to 19 00 a
few companies suspended production entirely* and most others

86ibid., xxxvii

(h o v . 1 0 ,

iBglj.), k?j+.

^Reports concerning the relatives of Horth conflict.
On© report states North had two sons* Harry and Arthur* Jr* *
on© brother* Gamble* and a son-in-law named Dockett* See
Ibid** XL (May 16* 1 8 9 6 )* 51^9* Another report states North
ha<T one son* Harry* two brothers, Harry and Gamble* a sonin-law named a* A* Lockett* three daughters * for vahom only
two names are given— Louise and Florence* His wife was
named Jane* Ibid* * XLI (July 11* I8 9 6 )* i|8 *

88Ibid.. XL (May 9, 1 8 9 6 ), 510.

89rbld., XLiiI (Aug.

1 4 , 1897), 176f.
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table

vtxi

British Investments in Nitrate Enterprises*

Company

Date
Organised

Producing Companies
Aliansa Nitrate Co*,
Amelia Nitrate Co** Ltd** • *
^Colorado Nitrate Co** Ltd*# *
Consolidated Nitrate Co*# Ltd*
Eeperansa Nitrate Co** Ltd* *
^lagunas Nitrate Co* * Ltd* * *
^Lagunas Syndicate, Ltd* * * *
Lautaro Nitrate Co*, Ltd* • •
^Liverpool Nitrate Co*, Ltd* •
London Nitrate Co*, Ltd* • «
New Paceha and Jazpampa Nitrate Co
Ltd* * • *
« • * * « « « «
New Tamarugal Nitrate Co*, Ltd
Rosario Nitrate Co*, Ltd* * •
Salar Lei Carmen Nitrate Co*, Ltd
*San Donato Nitrate Co*, Ltd**
«San Jorge Nitrate Co*, Ltd* *
«3an Pablo Nitrate Go*, Ltd* •
*San Sebastian Nitrate Co*, Ltd
Santa Catlllna Nitrate Co*, Ltd*
#Santa Elena Nitrate Co*, Ltd*
Santa Rita Nitrate Co*, Ltd**
Santiago Nitrate Co*, Ltd* *
Total Capital of Producing Companies
Service Companies

S> 1,200,000

18

<

1 8 8 5

1893
1899

lCompil©d from the Steele B
^Original North-Harvey Company,

3 9 1 .0 0 0

160.000
lij.0,070
4 0 ,0 0 0
9 0 0 ,0 0 0

1094
I809

1,190,000

1883

110,000

1889

603,340

1 6 0 .0 0 0

34,850
5oo,4&0
1 ,108,000

188

180,500
160.000
300,000
1 6 0 ,0 0 0

1889
1900
I8 8 9
1889

Anglo-Chilean Nitrate and Railway Co*
Ltd* * • • « * • * * « * • * • * * .
■^Nitrate Provisions Supply Co*, Ltd* *
•^Nitrate Railways Co*, Ltd* * * * * * *
#Hltrate Producer*© Steamship Co*, Ltd
#BsnR of Tarapaca and London, Ltd* * *
TaXtal Railways Co*, Ltd* * * * * * *
•sTarapaea Waterworks Co*, Ltd* * * * *
Total Capital in Service Companies* * * •
Total Capital In All Nitrate Enterprises*
passim*

tfotaS,
Capital

1888
1895

1888
1882

143,750
100,000
107,875
1 2 0 ,8 0 0
2 9 0 ,0 0 0
7 ,6 0 0 ,6 4 5

1 ,0 4 7 ,1 0 0
100,000
3 ,9 3 8 ,0 1 0
100,000
500.000
6 0 0 .0 0 0

1888
, 4 0 0 ,0 0 0
* * • 6 6,685,110
* * *

614,311,755

:e Year-Book (1 9 0 1 ),
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found it necessary to work only part tlra©#^0

Of the twenty-

two English companies that operated throughout th# latter
half of the nineties, only four made significant profits#
While most others failed to declare any dividends, a few of
th® six new enterprises were making profits by 1 8 9 9 *
A growth in capitalisation of the English nitrate
companies occurred, during the decade of the nineties#

In

I8 9 O, eighteen producing and seven service companies
represented an investment of over ten million pounds#

In

1 8 9 6 , with seventeen producing and eight service organisations,

the total investment climbed to almost thirteen million
pounds#

In 1900, the total investment of over fourteen

million pounds represented twenty-two producing and seven
service companies#^

However, these increases did not en

hance English power in the saltrate Indus try.
After I9 OO, the industry underwent significant changes
brought about chiefly by the government sale of vast new
nitrate deposits#

As a result of properties acquired in

^Journal of Finance, IV {Oct#, 1897), ll|9* Only the
Liverpool company was at par on the stock market at this
time#
^This sum includes only the capitalised value of
companies listed by th© Stock Exchange Yearbook# Evidently,
some British interests were Incorporated I n ''(jixile# For
instance, Horth partners, Jewel and Dawson, vmre part owners
of the San Agustin do Huantajaya Mine Co# utios© headquarters
were in Iqulque# Se© South American Journal# XXIII (Jan# 9 ,
1887), 4# In additimTj^itisEin^s^mnts in property lo
cated in Iquique were considerable# See th© report of the
British consul at Iquique, P# 0# lo/333 (Get# 3, igOl)#

these sales* forty-six new oficlms began producing by 1907#
Half of these new nitrate establishments appear to have been
owned by Chileans* while English interests accounted for only
one-fifth of the total*

A return of prosperity* likewise*

made possible the revival of twenty-four oflcinaa that had
not been operated in 1 9 0 0 * ^

Fifty per cent of th© offeina^

in this group were of English ownership*

These changes led

to an increase in production and to a shift in the ownership
characteristics of the industry# ^3
The distribution of ownership of th© nitrate industry
during the years immediately following the War of the Pacific
is difficult to determine accurately*

Detailed statistical

reports on capital invested in the industry or regarding pro
ductive power are either lacking or unavailable*

The earliest

and most authoritative estimate is for th© year 1 8 8 1 ^ 9 4

At

9%>ata taken from tables in Semper and Michels*
Industrie del salitre* pp* 338-3iiii* Salvador Soto* Botes on
oEHe
w
.........
.
ex
isting In 1900* Among the seven he list© as being the" largest
producers* four are English* and on© each was listed for
German* Spanish* and Chilean interests*
^Adolfo Ortuzar* Chile of Today {Bew York# Tribune
Assoc** 1907), p* 87* Accordingto an official calculation
by Chilean authorities In X9°&*
of th© capital invested
in nitrates was foreign* 22% was Chilean* and 18$ was repre
sented by enterprises owned jointly by Chileans and foreign
ers* Chile* Minlsterio do Hacienda, Comision Salltrera*
Informes 1 Actas de la Comision Salltrera (Santiago# Cervantes,
1 9 6 9 )* p#““i4 8 * l“ i9<58* an"SmglTsn consul estimated the
distribution of capital as follows# English— 38*8$ # Chilean-38^1 German— 12%$ Various— 11*2$* Alejandro Bertrand* ha
crisis salltrera (Paris# Louis Michaud* 1910)* p* 70*
9^SIllInghurst* Los capital©© salitreroa, pp* 6 lff*

that time Chilean interests controlled thirty-six per cent
of the productive power of the industry while Chilean and
English capital owned jointly another fourteen per cent*
Foreigners accounted for the remainder with th© English pos
sessing twenty per eent*

Most Peruvians lost their holdings*

Thus* Chileans held in the middle i860 *& the largest interest®
in the industry*

A reported attempt by Chileans to monopolise

the industry at this time apparently mis-carried, because in
subsequent years* their relative position in the industry
declined

s h a r p l y *
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Th© "Nitrate Boom11 considerably altered the relative
strength of English and Chilean interests#

The growth of

English interests continued after the boom for at least another five years*9^

Bo rapidly did British investments in

nitrate grew between 1885 and 1895 that a British Consul as-*
sorted they controlled as much as seventy per cent of th©
productive power of the industry*

However, the most reliable

data places the maximum at sixty per e©nt*9?

Thereafter*

depression* the effects of over-capitalization* and th© poli
cy of th© Chilean government regarding the sale of nitrate
lands brought about a decline in the proportion of productive

93>south American Journal* XXI (May 8# 1881^), 6*
^However* th© proportion of productive capacity con
trolled by English producers did not increase*
97Asociaelon d© Propaganda* Circular Trteestral* Mo*
13 {Eov* 25* 1897)* P* IV* Stat 1sti c a cimplled by 'Eduardo
Vljil* manager of th© association*

power hold by British companies*

By 1897* they represented

only forty-two per cent and at th© turn of the century only
forty*

M s

decline continued after 1 9 0 0 until by 1 9 X2 *

English interests accounted for slightly over on©«*third*9®
With the decline of British interests# the productive
power of Chileans rose*

From a low of thirteen per cent in

I8 9 5 # they gradually increased until by 1912 Chilean Interests
surpassed the English by a few per cent age points*

Apparent

ly* th© most important Chilean Investors in nitrates were
the great financial houses In Valparaiso and Santiago*

The

Bank of Valparaiso and the Bank of Edwards seem to have been
particularly interested in such investments* ^

Wealth cam©

to a number of Chileans from their nitrate enterprises;
however# almost no information concerning their activities
appears in the available records*
Besides the English# other foreigners held properties
in the nitrate industry*
or three large producers*

The Germans were represented by two
In I8 8 I4.# the Glldermeister and th©

Folsch and Martin interests accounted for seventeen per cent
of productive capacity; the sal© of some of the Glldermeister
holdings to an English company cut th© German portion In half
by 1 8 9 0 *

Toward the end of the century a new German firm#

98ibid* 1 Cornejo* El Salitre* p* l6o, gives the esti
mate of Vi JSX for 1 9 1 2 *
99rbid., p. ll+iij Billlnghurat, Los capitaloa
Balltreros, pp. 37£*

12if
H# B# Sloman and Company, acquired large holdings in the
district or Tocopilla#

Germans controlled about twenty per

cent of production in 1 9 0 0 * ^ *
One Spanish nitrate baron, Matias Granja, maintained
a significant place in the industry from the lS7 0 *s onward#
For a long time he operated properties In Tarapacaj however,
it was his activity in th© district of Aguas Blancas that
makes him important •

During the I89 CMS GranJ a obtained ©on-

trol of valuable properties in Aguas Blancas, and he began
building a railroad into the region from th© port of Caleta
Coloso, Just south of Antofagasta#

The completion of this

railroad in 1903 opened up the Aguas Blancas deposits for
exploitation#

Granja and his associates controlled from five

to ten per cent of productive capacity#
Statistics for 1897 reveal that other foreign groups
controlled the remaining fifteen to twenty per cent of pro
ductive capacity#
wares

In the order of their importance they

French - 8 3/i|$S Peruvian - 5 3/if$; Italian - If 3/8$;

Austrian - 3/8$#^^

Thus throughout the nineteenth century

European companies led by th© British dominated the Chilean
nitrate industry#

1QQIbld## p# 157#
^^Vergllio Figueroa, Dicclonario his torloo y
blografico de Chile# IV, 372-375#
'~r
1 0 2 while members of these groups have not been con

clusively identified, the following Individuals probably
formed a part of the groups indicated: Eduardo Charm© and Gil
Galte (French), Pedro Perfetti (Italian), Jos© Devescovi, and

x%$

th© Mitrovitch brothers (Austro-Hungarian) * Most of these
men, but Charmo, Galt© and Perfetti in particular* are
listed as heavy purchasers of nitrate lands in the government
sales* See Semper and Michels* Industrie del sailtre«
Appendix No* 18* pp* 290-299*
~n “ rTrj

CHAPTEH XV
th e hxthath

mxmoAm

Those who worked nitrate deposit® during the early
years of exploitation faced a difficult obstacle in getting
their product across the high cordillera that separated the
oficliras from the sea and the nitrate markets#

At that time

and until 18?0, the slow and expensive process of freighting
by carte constituted the only means of transportation*

Its

inadequacy was a major impediment to th© expansion of produce
tion*

Full development of the industryfa potential rested

upon th© building of railway facilities which could carry
large quantities of nitrate across the Cordillera with case
and rapidity*

These facilities, first acquis^ed by the Tara**

paed' and Antofagasta producers, were later extended into
other fields*

The completion of a railroad in each of the

nitrate fields resulted in an immediate Increase In output*
Even though it was of primary irqportance, the process of
railroad building was not completed until after the turn of
the century*
The first railroad was built in Tarapoea* the only
nl trate^producing region prior to 1870 and the major one
thereafter*

The initial concession for Its construction was

mad© by the government of Peru in i860*

126

But the concession**

1g7

atooa Called to begin oonotruotiom m did a im noA g » u p bo

toom the privilege w&®

mvott to I66I&# L&©k or mrf£l*l«&t

capital m o m s s imis the pi^ob&bl# «*u*« or foilwo*

Scmw«rv

bb@ n&st gpeup to reeoivo %hm g3*ant# Hamon Monber© and
Brothers of Lima* wot with ouooom#^

They wore granted in

1668 a bw#nty«fiv# year ssonopoly and a guomntood return of
*#v®fla per cent for building a line from the isajior nitrate
seaport, Iquique, into the prodmotlon region m far m La
Norla*

It also promised that preference would be given to

the owners of this railway when <aithoriaatlcei m m mad® for
additional oonstruotion to the region#

Likewise, any railroad

built to Bolivia was to eonneet with th# Xquiqu# line#

to

other provision permitted the sale of the railroad to
foreigners if the approval of the government m m obtatoed#
but with the understanding that **lf assigned to foreigners.,
they shall submit to toe laws of the eoimtry* without power
to have m o a r w to any diplomatic remedy.”2 Additional eoncessions to ksontero and Brothers were made in 1669 end 1871.
Xn effect, the former granted the right to extend the railroad
threxu^i the nitrate district and to tlie port of Piaagua, while
the latter allowed the building of feeder lines to ofiolnas

Xm Is J. Gobenes, Pocmaentoa de loa Ferro-Oarrllea
de la Provldoracla de farapaetf*iMtaaf Sacional, IG7 3 ), pp.

37 ” •
2Budd
tteasre. Budd,
Hallways Co.,
antra Chile X

to Kimberley, Dee* 12, IQ^lf* F. 0. 16 / 2 9 8 .
Johnsons and Jeeks were lawyers for the nitrate
Ltd. See also Hose, M l aolones oomrclales
ifi
Breta£a, Appendix jfo, 23, p. T&ij7

us
Dot adjacent to the stain line.-*
in 1670*

The railroad began operating

Thereafter* construction proceeded intermittently

in convicting the sain lino and in providing roil connections
for oflolnee as the need for then arose*

Although originally a Peruvian enterprise* the
railroad in Tarapaea was finally controlled by an English
firm.

In 18?4. Montero and Brothers incorporated their held*

ings into the CoBgienig BaolonssO, do loe Fcrrooarrllea
Salltreraa del Peru with a capitalisation of & l,2Q0*0G0j

however* leans had to be secured in London to meet the costs
of construction.

Financial difficulties led the company into

receivership within a short time* and control was not re*
stored to it until just before the war of the Pacific began.^
In 1632* another reorganisation brought about the incorpo
ration of the company in l&igland* and the Tarapaca rail

system* now known as the nitrate Hallways Company* Limited*
acquired all of the assets of the previous organisation.
Sitrate Hallways kept the same capitalisation but had out*
f*

standing 6 1*100*000 in debentures.**

The transfer was duly

approved in advance by the government as the original con*
eesslcm required#

/

3 Ibld«. pp. 2l5f.

^Bussell*

a

Viait jgg thg Mfcgafes

pp.

355*358.

, W . I PP. 222, 5391
Po t 1& ,
Ccaipania M M
F e r ^ . a ^ | .lgft BdXlfa)! a l » HonorgBXe^oialslon
(Santiago* Z&E&pu.bilea# X0 0 3 )* pi So*

6Ibld.t Budd to P. 0., Jan. 15, 1894, 1?* 0. 16/ 298 .
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in the ensuing speculations#*? s v m so# th# price of Mitr&b#
Hallways stock# unlike the stock of most companies partiel**
pating in th# boo®# possessed a higher economio value than
its share capital Indicated#

Th© chief reason, for this lay

in th# monopoly th# company enjoyed which enabled it to charge
high freight rates without materially lessening the volume of
traffic rolling over its lines#
The main line of Nitrate Hailways# which was 190

miles long# started from Iqulqu© where it ascended the
coastal range# then turned northward and traversed the
nitrate region# and finally veered west and down the cordil**
leva to the port of Pia&gua*

Its many branch lines# which

provided rail connections to outlying ofjoins#* included a
I46 mil# extension to th# hagtm&a bed# south of Xquiqu©*

m

all# the road had 291 mile# of track by 1896 * By I903 its
10

trackage totalled over 330 miles#*

This railway system pro**

vided the main transportation facilities for nitrate into
th# twentieth century*

Before other railroad# were built In

Tarapace, Nitrate Hallways carried to port more then three**

fourths of all nitrate exported*^
As a matter of fact# Nitrate Hallway# proved to be

~
9«oa»f r n x m i p m a s s m s s ^ m m m
Dretana. pp. 67*.

Pm

AUBurd#t
7391 C U W M * .
^Delegateion de Salltraras.

P M M s. M

m m

ftp (London) {IO9 6 )#

rxa ®
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the real ”gold mine" of th© Industry until I8 9 6 *

From th©

time Col* Horth gained control of th© company In 1887 through
th© year 1 8 9 1 * shareholders received a fifteen per cent stock
bonus (in 1888) and dividends whose total value ©quailed the
amount of outstanding stock*

From 1 8 9 2 through 1895* dlvi*

dends for holders of eoBSfion stock amounted to 68 3/M5*1® P©3?
cent* while preferred stockholders received their seven per
cent and owners of debentures (which totalled h X*785*M>0 In
1895) received an interest of five per cent*

Because of

these large and steady returns on its high capitalisation*
the record of Nitrate Railways during these years far ex**
ceeded that made by any other enterprise connected with th©
12
nitrate industry*
Largely as a result of these hug© profits* consider**
able hostility toward Nitrate Railways developed in Chile*
Company officials were appropriately embarrassed by th© ad**
verse public opinion and they sought means of counteracting
It*

The solution they chose* however* did not involve low**

©ring rates and reducing actual profits*

Rather* it was to

undertake a financial reorganisation of th© company which
would enable th© shareholders to continue to receive large

^Statistics are taken from the Stock B&chan&0 Year*
book (1889*1896 )♦ See also Table X* p* i5o below* The
Investor*© Review* IX (1893)* P* 336 commenteds tfDlvT3ends
have been wrung out of th© nitrate producers of Tarap&ca by
the Infliction of excessively high rates* the directors of
the Railway© Company-^directors at the same time of the
producing companies— preferring the pecuniary benefit of th©
few to the welfare of the many*11

.

profits without the appearance of having done so#

In ex-

plaining the project to a meeting of stockholders* the close
associate of Col# Horth* Robert Harvey* remarked that
• • • it will be of very great advantage to the
shareholders# Unfortunately* our railway Is not
in England * and large dividends are not looked
favorably upon there and I would rather not say
anything on the subject; but It is really to the
advantage of all th© shareholders that the divi
dends shall not be so large apparently#”

When placed Into effect* the reorganisation plan
added to the common shares of the company seven per cent pre
ferred shares with a face value of & 276*000#

Since the pre

ferred was distributed to each shareholder according to a
ratio of one preferred share for each five shares of common
stock* the new stock added nothing to the actual capital of
the company#^

m

spit© of this measure* dividends remained

at twenty per cent for two more years#
Neither Peru nor Chile fully respected the monopoly
privilege granted the Monter© Interests#

The government of

Peru created the first potential competitor of Nitrate Rail
ways by granting a concession to th© Ksperansa Sociedad#*^

^South American Journal# XXX (Ian# 17* I8 9 D * 7lj^
^ X b l d #* May 9 , 1091* P* $82} Money Market Review*
hiII (Mayf7T891)* 1106; Ross* Re.laoiones ©pre;i^P^y''rla
Gran Bret ana* Appendix No# 21^* pp# 2 3 1 -2 3 5 gives a copy ox
tiie law tiiat authorised the reorganisation#
l^The Esoeranza Socledad received from the Peruvian
government certificates to tne value of S ^990*000# See
Valdes Vergara* Adminlstracidh de Tarapaoa# Appendix No#I*
p* lljjO#

Thin concession c a lle d fo r

th® b u ild in g of m ra ilro a d from

th® port of Fat illos* south of X^ul^ue* to th# &agu*msi

nitrate fields*

Although Momtor® and Brothers opposed th®

project es^th# grounds that it violated their z m m p ® % & priv
ilege©, their protests railed to halt lb# construction^ ^

However* the company was unable to finish laying brack before
the outbreak of the War of' the Pacific! end apparently# r©«*
sumption of work taae&imbely following th# war was impossi
ble**^

But plana for collating the line were being mad#

wzmn CoXm Berth became th# guiding hand of Nitrate Railways#

Realising that additional protests would be useless* Horth
personally bought a controlling interest in th# Pafcllla#
enterprise*

hater he sold hi# interest to Nitrate RalX#*^®

In this way the first major threat to th# rail monopoly was
successfully met*
while all challenges to the transportation monopoly
of Nitrate Railway# were stoutly fought by that oofspsny* its
efforts were never entirely successful*

Many nitrate pro

ducers and the Chilean government saw in the monopoly and in
the company fs policies a harmful influence on the industry *
and they worked to lessen it# great powers#

The hostility

toward Nitrate Hallways was based on several considerations*
»

*6ibia.
^•Stm delay In ecaapletlng the Patillos railroad may
have resulted from lack of funds*

ie M 2 tiB X

mm*

< *« •

Q*

W98>« 3 8 ,

tw *

13k
to th® ftost pl&G®* pmtfkmmm of nitfmt# saw
profit® being sljdioMa off by th® rail MSQMflSr a® a »#ulfc
of it® high flight charges.

£M$ss&ly» th# gowfttio^t fe*»

lleved that th# high- rat## SNwftugstt tte #en«atltgr of ssltr&b®
oxportad. a&d eon##<ju*ntly th# w m m m m ® it collected f r w th#
toe on sitrat# ©sports**^

fttotly* m i m ® it m m a foreign

company, profit® m d d by litrat# Mailway# avoussd xsuMNstaMttt*
smo33g CSiiloana*

Many Chil#«m# favorod gowiroat action to

curtail th# mompoly*

mourn supported

th# ids# of

mllmm&mg

othar railroads to b@ built either by th# stats or prtyab#
interests in eos^xrtitioa with Hltr&t# Hallway#* as was wmsfa&»
ally don#| still others sought to add th# system to th#
owned railway mtworM#^
Thus* because of its high rates and largo profits*
Hitrate Hallways became to Chilean# th# symbol of their
failure to win the greatest profits from th# industry and of
British control over nitrates#

President Balmaosda* being

in agreement with this sentiment# inaugurated a policy do*
signed to reduce foreign dominance of the nitrate fields by

91

encouraging Chilean investments there. *

k beginning

had al-

ready been made in the latter months of the proceeding

*9i£ba export
nitrate trade.
20
tc

tax was. likewise, a burden on the

•*'®o. 1*2 Sept. 3,

^Bussell, a I M £ 12 ifet Mfcrat.o fields, p. 312.

administration when by executive decree President Santa Maria
annulled the privileges of Nitrate Railways#*^

Balmaceda

supported this action over the protests of both the company
and the British Foreign office#*^

He also took advantage of

a bitter and vigorous controversy over rates between Nitrate
Railways and th© of iclna Agua Santa to grant a concession
for the building of a railroad to the ofiefna in competition
with Nitrate Railways•

Th© result was the formation of th©

Campania de Salitre 1 Ferroearril de Ague Santa in 1890#^
The Agu© Santa line became the first effective com**
petitor of Nitrate Hallway and it was owned by Chileans#
Construction of its sixty-four miles of narrow gauge track
began in 1 8 9 0 #

Two years labor It started operating#

By

1 8 9 6 th© Agua Santa Railroad had tapped the freight of the

central section of the Tarapaea fields so effectively that
through its Port of Calebs Buena more than fifty per cent as
much nitrate was shipped as passed through th© Port of
Iquique#^

While the company was not an immediate success

^Budd to Sanderson, Jan# 11, I8 9 I4., F# 0* 16 / 2 9 8 ,
Enclosure No# 1# Apparently th© British government supported
the company and protested the action#
23see Kennedy to Salisbury, No# ijlf, May 12, I8 9 O,
F# 0# 16/2591 and Budd to Sanderson, Jan# 11, loglj., F# 0*
16 / 2 9 8 *
^Russell, A Visit to the Mtrate Fields* p# 197$
Budd to Sanderson, Tan* TI,TC8^ , F# 0 * I6/598, Encloauro
No# 1* Th© grant was made to J# H r a Errassuris who subs©**
quently transferred it to the Agua Santa Nitrate and Railroad
Co#
^South American Journal# XXXIV (Feb# 18, 1893), 189$

financially, it

toftleuticm© ©f becomtog © p»fltmbl©

©&b©rprl@© before th© «Mi of th© ©cs&tury*
d a r e d on Xta

h 600*000

BiirMen^o d**

of oonncm ©bom* totalled bwciity^w©

p#r ©*&& by 1900 # ^
to 1090# Balmac©da tosued a ooaeeeBioB
competitive railroad to b© built to Tarapaoal
this privilege the Qtmmm&pi dp Sail toy £
tosato was fomeiSU

imothdr
To ©xerci©©
d#

Like the Agua Sa&fea Oo^su^ it was ©««&•*

trolled by Chileans»

to operation by X89if# the tonto sNdLMey

tapped the nitrate bods in the north of Tttrapa&tt# just south
of Ftaagua#

By X896 it carried w a r Its fifty*eto mil® line

of narrow gauge track more nitrate than was exported from
Fiaagua*^

Hitrate Railway© was imeeaatog to its efforts to
maintain its monopoly against- thee# projects*

The support of

th© Foreign Offlee was solicited and obtained for the fight*
But in spit© of official protests* the Chilean government
refused to respect the monopoly privilege© el&taed by the

XXXIX (July 27* 1895)# 102$ Dalegaolon.,d© Salltrera©* ]
Chile (Hew York* JfeuKl-McBally, 1912}* p* 196 *

^ 7 h s Agua Santa Railroad was listed in the St<
Exchansse Yearbook (1901) • This probably indicates fclw
fepgilali tmreafeaants in tho corapany Imd becaw© either quite
significant or the controlling ones*
2 ^C« A# Mason to J< H« Sadler* Hoverabor 11, 1896 ,
Hncl. uo* a in Sadler to F* 0* Ho* 36, F* 0* 16/ 290 * Great

Britain* Foreign Office, DlBlffi3atl.o and Consular Reports,
Annual series (London, Harrison and JonaT,. *8 9 9 7
22Q'?*
p* 10*

Burtng nemt of BAXs&aes&a

Hibr&be

Railways @ m foimd it JtapoMlbl* to got a court fctwfag on
the question*

Nevertheless, in X89 O a suit m

initiated against the Ague Santa BaiXroad*

successfully

It dragged m

without a judgement being m d © for o w four years* and no
remedial action was obtained by the company from the Chilean
c o u r t s * ^9

in 1892 * the Foreign O ffic e was advised by it s

le g a l counsel to w ithhold any fu rth e r p ro te s t a u n t il th e
C h ilean co u rts rendered it s d e c is io n * A lth o u g h th e Foreign
Office continued to support the n itr a te R ailw ays* ap p aren tly
i t h e ld no hop© o f preservin g th e rig h ts o f th e company**^

Meanwhile* in 1881** the Chilean government was g iv in g
consideration to an application node by an English firm*
Anthony aibbs and Sons* fo r another railway concession in
fTarapaca*

Gibbs and Sons were successful in making i t appear

in chile that the scheme had the support o f th e Foreign
^Kennedy to Sanderson* May 2?* XQ^G* F# 0* 16/2591
Budd to Sanderson* yen* 15* 1894* $*» 0* 16/298*
^Buddl to Sanderson* Jan* 11* X89I1* F* O* 16/ 298*
Enclosed Is a precis of the suit brought by nitrate Hallways
against the Agua Santa Railroad* on one occasion# a mpm**
eentative of the k m m Santa called nitrate Hallways wan
odious monopoly which attests to destroy the national
Industry and the freedom of trade*11
3°X#aw officers to F* 0** Jan* l6# 189 (1* F* 0* 16/ 298*
^^Budd to Sanderson# Jan* 18* X89iu X*1# 0* 16/ 298*
Sanderson noted on the flap of this ccmMunlcation that nlt
Is useless to plunge into controversy**

Office#^

The British Minister at Santiago* hail previously

advised Chile against granting the concession on the grounds
that it infringed upon the rights of Nitrate Hallwaysf
however he was later instructed not to oppose the project
but merely to ^reserve the right of remonstrating against
it* *33

For the next several days representatives of both
Nitrate Railways and Gibbs and Sons exerted pressure on the
Foreign Office*

The lawyers for Nitrate Railways wrotet

®The Directors have learnt with some surprise—
I might almost add with dismay— that, in consequence
of some telegram received by Mr# Kennedy from the
Foreign Office, the Senate in Chili are under the
impression that Her Majesty *s Government favour
the granting of concession to Messrs# Gibbs and
Sons • • • «
We have always tinderstood that Her Majesty fs
Government were satisfied as to the propriety of
,the position taken up by the Railway Company and
were doing ell in their power to prevent the granting
of these concessions by Chill • • • «
/She company/ is counting upon— and 1 trust
not without reason— the strong support of Her
Majestygovernment #3q.
On the other hand, Gibbs and Sons expressed its
appreciation for the instructions directing Kennedy to ab
stain from opposing the proposed concession#

Yet the refusal

of Kennedy to retract previous statements, it was said, oper
ated to the disadvantage of the company#

A request was made,

S^hord Rosebery to Kennedy, Tel* No* 2, Jan. 11,

1891*., F* 0# 16/298#
33*»d Rosebery to Kennedy, Tel* No# 2, Jan# 11,
I89lf, F# 0# 16/ 296 #
3^Budd to Sanderson, Jan. 11, I894 , F# 0#

16 / 2 9 8 *

therafore, that Kennedy be instructed to withdraw his previ
ous opposition to the project*

If this were done, the e^pt-

ny maintained* "Nitrate Railways and ourselves /will hayg/ a
free field with the Chilean authorities#
Congress adjourned late in January without baking
action on the proposed concession, and the Foreign Office
welcomed the opportunity to clarify its position*^

While

it was an established policy to maintain strict neutrality
in the rivalries between English interests before a foreign
government, the Foreign Office preferred that no action be
taken regarding the proposed concession to Gibbs and Sons
until the Chilean courts rendered their decision in the Agua
Santa case*

When further study revealed that once passed

by Congress the concession could not be vetoed by the PresIn
dent, the Foreign Office changed its policy again*

It re-

verted to its original position of unofficial opposition to
the passage of the bill*^
In the spring of I89 I4., at the suggestion of the
Foreign Office, Gibbs and Sons initiated direct negotiations
with Nitrate Railways for the purpose of making a satis
factory freight rate settlement#

Had this been accomplished,

^Gibbs to Sanderson, Jan# 11, 189 ^, P* 0. 16/2 9 8 *
36Joel to Lord Rosebery, No* 3, Jan* 17, I89lj.,
p. 0 . 16 / 2 9 8 .

^ L a w Officers to P. 0#* Jan# 16, I89 J4* P. Q« 16/298 .
Their recommendations were carried out* See Sanderson to
Kennedy, No* 3^, May 2lj., 189^, F* 0# 16/ 298 #

Gibbs sad sons war® willing to give up their attempt to ob
tain a railway concession.

However, Nitrate Railways would

go no lower than eight pennies par quintal ntfiile Gibbs wanted
that rate reduced to six pennies when the monopoly rights
expired in 1895.3&

Stas Foreign Office advised a second at-

teopt at eea^uromlse but nothing was done*
As a natter of fact# by the suasaer of 1894 Nitrate
Railways was not seriously concerned over possible eorapetitlen by Gibbs and Sons*

The outloolt for the Gibbs con-

eeaslon had dissued considerably*

Minister Kennedy reported

that opposition to the concession had increased*

ffloe re

luctance to lessening the importance of Iquique as a port and
the desire to respect the wishes of Her Majesty's government
had constituted the basic reasons for past opposition to tbs
concession.

Added to these was the hostility toward Gibbs

and Sons created by recant revelations of that first's par
ticipation in currency speculations which adversely affected
the rate of exchange.

By September the Gibbs concession was

almost a thing of the paet.^9
At this time the Chilean government made an offer to
Nitrate Railways*

In a conversation with Minister Kennedy#

the Chilean Minister of Interior noted that public opinion

38<jibbs to Sanderson# June 34* 1094# F* o* 16/ 298 *
Also see enclosures.
3$Ksnnedy to Lord Klsherlsy* Ho. 11* May 12* 189 k#
p. 0 * I6/ 29 Q1 Kennedy to Kimberley, Ho. ill, Sept. 1, I894 ,
P. 0 . 16 / 298 *

dmaaided something be dene to curb the railroad mompoly in
Tarapaoal

After agqpveMlng the desire of doing as l i t t l e

injury as possibl© to mooted interests# the Chilean sslnleter
proposed a plan whereby Ultimate IMilwiiye and the f f m m m m n t
might cooperate to mutual advantage#

*gfa* plan provided for

only a moderate reduction in rates and fspeeds f n a further
competition*

Xn return the railroad was to assume rasponai**

b illt y for making major i M p r o m m m t m in the port of Xquique
and building a railroad to ha Fas# Bolivia#

Although titrate

Railways was informed of the proposal * it was apparently
rejected#^*
Another point of controversy between the gweramnfc
of chile and Hitrate Railways involved the latter*a claims
for images incurred during the Revolution of X89 X#

Chile

rejected these claims because of the clause in the original
concession prohibiting foreign owners from having ^recourse
to any diplomatic remedy*11^

Support given the railway by

the Foreign Office engendered a spirited debate#

The point

was mode that Chilean opposition to the claim for the reason
stated above was Incompatible with the revocation of the
monopoly in 1886 and the subsequent concession to the Ague
Ssstft Railroad#

still# Chile maintained her position and

^%fwmedy to Kimberley, Ho#
F# c# 16 / 2 9 8 #

^hsam

1^2, Sept*

to Kimberley# Deo* 12# 1894*

3# 1894#
0# 16/ 298 *

ffltrat© Hallways collected no claims*^
After 1895 Nitrate Hallway® tmderwsab a period of
readjus taiont* necessitated by a successIcn o f events which
altered the status o f th e company#
three In numbers

llie s e now fa c to rs were

the com plete 1 osa o f th e M m p e lia $ l* po**

slbicsi) the spread o f a depression a ffe c tin g th e e n tire
nitrate industry* and the death o f Ctot* N orth in X896 *
first two ©wonts required a re v is io n o f p o lic ie s *

*fhe

9h# death

of Gal# North* who* w ith aloe# asso ciates* had ruled th e
corapuny in an arbitrary and s e c re tiv e s in n e r* gave o th e r
stockholder© an opportunity to exert an in flu e n c e on company
affaire#

fha effective competition provided by the Ague Santa
/

end Junln Hallways forced the eompany to cut rates drastic
eally#

Rates that had averaged 9 3/^ pennlea per quintal

^La» Officers to F# 0 ** Sept* 27 # X$95* F# 0 *
1 6 /2 9 8 1 Budd to Kldborley# Doc* 12* I89 I4., F* 0* X6/ 29 O#

See
also note of w* B« Davidson on badfe of this coomanicaticKa*
British claims arising out of the Revolution of I89 I in
volved m a m nitrate producing ecapsa&eft and railroads oper
ating In the mining region of north Chile* Most of the
claims, however* wore disallowed# Marolal Martinss* Infcm
£& A i m

$& c m e

^

iygtemlB

JSSuSiS^St s r c i i i * * logo)» PP* l a o r f * & H a t of those
olatos can bo found in

ggeaontadoB jfc

enterprises totalled #1,133«U£0# Of this sue. the ©laira of
Sltrate Railway© equalled |Q58*457» Chile paid only #29,026
in ©lalas to British companies*

dropped to an average

of k V

2 pennies by 1903 * ^

consti

tuting as this did a more than fifty pax* eeat drop in freight
rates* it largely explains the reduced earnings of the compa
ny after 1396*
Robert Harvey, who replaced col* Worth as chairman of
the company, stated in 1696 that he hoped Nitrate Rails could
Just hold its o w , ^ but even this proved impossible*

Hot

earnings, which had averaged Si 1*86,500 between 1338 and I89 I,
dropped ever forty-two per eent between 1895 and 1896 to an
average of & 279*71*6*^

Dividends disappeared altogether

in 1696 and never did exceed five per cent thereafter*
Because of the sharp decline in dividends and in the
market value of the stock of Nitrate Railways Which occurred
after Berth*a death, stockholders became more Insistent in
their demands to have a knowledge of the actions of the di
rectors.

Zhey realised that the financial position of the

easpany was weak and that administrative costs had been high*
Criticism grew until charges of mismanagement were put be
fore the board in November, 1896 *

A committee was appointed

by the board to investigate conditions; but because of the
lack of confidence in its members, a now committee was created

ssdJtou* p *

XQu*

^m &S&SSlB. MZ&SS* v m

(July, 1896), 50.

^ a m t h American f-ffOTrt# xxxu

(April 23, 1892), Itfl*.

the feUoving year*^1
late in 1897 * the eosnralttee oneated a sen
sation with Its revelations,

it was charged that the board

had entered Into contracts with the Tarepaea waterworks
Company on such terras as could not have been entertained if
tha interests of the water Odspany had not been largely
represented on the board of the railway***-?
ooncorned

an item

Another eharge

of & 9 3 *6 1 5 listed in the books under the

heading "legal expenses* losses* and compensation in Chile."
Shown as the secret service fund* the amount was expended
between 1337 and 1395 at the direction of Col. North.
sides these fields* North received
1096 for legal expanses.^

h 156*693

Be

between 1393 and

Concerning these disclosures the

South American Journal remarked*

"fhe directors make no

secret of the faot that they knew perfectly well for what
purpose the sums paid were to be used* which was to oppose
in the Chilean Legislature and Law Courts any scheme for
rival lines threatening their alleged monopoly* and they
claim that they were successful in so doing* and in putting
off the evil day for some years**

According to the report

two lawyers in Chile were in charge of disbursing the

^letter, written by H* Allen (stockholder la Nitrate
Railways) to the BooncNolst. I.IV (Hov. 28, IG9 6 ), 1576J see
the issues of Uov. S * lS96, p. 1531 and Deo, 12, 1896 , p.
1642.

^Railway Tims* KOtV (Jen, 15* 1890)* 06,
m »

u i v ^ ’f a ^ , 1? ! 1890' "■ 6I^I*, a s s a a a U s s a a s s u .

11*5
£unda*^9

one o f th ese* J u lio &egera*

wm m prom inent mmftmr

o f th e government p a rty * but he denied th a t
used is^roporX y o r th a t be

wm

money wee

p aid e& eesalvely fo r M e

s e rv ic e s #£°
The Chilean re p re s e n ta tiv e in London a lso denied th e
charges o f c o rru p tio n made ag ain st h ie government# p o in tin g
o u t that north’s fa ilu r e in m ain tain in g th e monopoly proved
in te g r ity o f h ie government*

But he did estim ate th a t

& 15*000 would have been s u ffic ie n t to ©over le g itim a te
le g a l expenses* th e im p lic a tio n being th a t Iforbh# perhaps#
pocketed a la rg e p a rt o f these funds*

A

C hilean in v e s tig a tio n *

although proposed* was never c a rrie d o u t* ^

2h a l l probe*

bility some of these funds sere used in a m rm er th a t would
not bear re v e a lin g ! however* from th e company*© standpoint#
an e ffe c tiv e e ffo r t to preserve the monopoly
fin a n c ia lly *

wm

Such expenditures by fo re ig n f ir m

b e n e fic ia l
o p eratin g

in L a tin America were not unusual; and furtherm ore # I t la 1m*
p o s s ib le to c a lc u la te the sums necessary to achieve th e
purposes for which th is money was used#
Bven though the re p o rt emphasised th e fa c t th a t the
p ast p o lic y o f the ra ilro a d had s u ite d the in te re s ts o f the
North~Harvey group ra th e r than the company* the board a b ly

^9Xbld. . pp. ? 0 f.
Ibid*. March 16, I6 9 8 , p. 3531 So® also V.
Figueroa, TWMMBfftfP BlOKr&loo. ZIX, 3 6 9 .
Jan .

^ S o u th tearlegn J o u rn a l. XLXV (Jan* 15,

22, 189S , p i iB S l ««y ^ 1S9O, pp. 5Q 5f.

1898) , 67)

defended it® actions*

Stressing the need for board members

vfcn had influence to producing companies# it pointed with
pride to it® past

The statement Issued by the board

claimed that fro® 1 8 8 ? through 1 8 9 6 # & 8#$06*J9$ had b o m
paid to shareholders and that thi® represented
per cent in dividends*^

168

Indeed* th® oompimy had returned

largo profits to investor© | but because of

pmt

polioio®

m i competition from new railroads, prospect® of dividends
to the Immediate future were not bright*
toe investigation by the committee ended the doml*
nance of the Hwtfc-irarvey clique*

Hebert Harvey

wm

ousted

front hi® position as Chairman of the Board and another Berth*
Harvey lieutenant also lost hi® position#^

Criticism m s

levelled at Horth9® policy of building the extension to
Lagunas*

Originally warranted on the supposition that the

maximum freight
materialise*

rate would be charged# the plan did not

since the ss&enslon vastly increased the value

of the property and because Berth held Interest© to that pro*
due tog company* it was alleged that the welfare of the
railroad m s not adequately protected*
sold one*third of Its lands for
vestment being

h 110 #OOQ~~the

Inasmuch as Laguna®

h 0£0#GO0****the

original to*

charge seems to be well**

founded*^

£ 2 Ibld.. XLIII (July 31* 1397)* 121.
53xbict.« Aug. 14, 1097* pp. 176f«
^%yyULw#ar Ttooa. o o t . > t ® d
i j T O m a l . x l t csov. 7*

in South

The Antofagasta fields had boon the second nitrate
area to obtain access to the sea via rail*

Here# both the

fields and the railroad were operated by the same company,
/

the Corapania de Selltre i Perrooarrll da Antofagasta* whose
organisation has been treated elsewhere#^

Just prior to and

d u rin g the War of the Pacific# production in Antofagasta rose
sh arp ly as a re s u lt of the diminution of exports from Tarapaea where the monopolization policy of Peru and the war had
le d to a partial paralysis of production*

Maximum exporta

tio n from Antofagasta was reached in 1879 when over a million
q u in ta ls were shipped*

But by the end of the war and with

the revival of the Tarapaca fields, the freight carried over
Ferrocarril Antofagasta fell to one-quarter of a million
q u in ta ls — a level it maintained throughout the remainder of
the century*

This railroad# however# served other interests

in addition to that of nitrates# and in I881f it received
permission to build its lines to the Bolivian border*^

In

1 8 8 8 # the nitrate and railroad activities of the company

were divided Into two separate and Independent organizations#
/

The railroad became known as the Comp an! a de Ferrocarril de
Antofagasta*
The Taltai region was the next to obtain rail

^ T h e Antofagasta Railway was an Anglo-Chllean enter
prise established as a result of a concession Issued by the
Bolivian government in i860* See Chapter I# pp* 23ff*
^ South American Journal* XXVI (June

I8 8 9 )# 71^8*

T A B U XX
Railroads in the Nitrate Region
assesaseessaaasaaB«emaaa^a^^^pBss«s^M^nias»^^nws^^naw
Railroad

(Jeilceaetera)
-----

,-

Nitrate Railways Co*.
I»td«

Served
„.T1..
.r..

ia©nfc*,° 1900
(Metric Quintals)

539

Tarapaca

7 *3 9 3 *3 3 6

123

Tarapaca

3,686*355

1Q5

Tarapaca

6 8 8 ,7 6 0

113

Tocopilla

lr“
iitS

Antofagasta

/

Cewsinia de Salltre 1
<R Anna
/

Angio-Chilean Hlfcrat©
and Railway Co*, Ltd*

la6 9 1 a6 U

OoapwyU de Ferroearrtl
I S 3 S g& dgl
de caieta coiesa
Taltal Hallways Go* *
Ltd*

p*

5o*

90

212

Agues Blancas
Taltal

353*935
{Not completed
until 1 9 0 3 )
886,087

*D#legacion Fiscal de Salitreraa, ttUSXtB tt M »
bIblcU * p. 81**

transportation*

An English concern, Taltal Railways Company,

Ltd* * began constructing lines In 10G2 and completed the
major portion by the middle of 1888*

Its one hundred tixirty

miles or track made possible a vast Increase In nitrate
production In Taltal; and by 109& that region ©xported over
two million quintals* approximately eisbt per cent o£ the
nitrate exported in that year*^

The profits reaped by

S7SffiSsms MXivXal JBfeemaiMMWgj 1896 * p. 777*

taltal Hallway# m w
Hallway#*

P m

reached the lucrative levels or Bitrafce

1882 through 1896 total dividend# equalled

only 1*1 3/2 par ©eat and never exceeded seven par want in
any one year*
The rail facilities of Toeopllla ware built by an
English f l m organised In 1887# the &nglo^Shllwaaa Hlbrate and
Hallway Coeapany# Ltd*# and were completed in I89O*

By 1900#

that rail line waa tarrying about the &&sm quantity of
nitrate as the Taltal lino*
had re ached & 500 #000*

By 1895# its capitalisation

Ho dividends for eojamon stockholders

were declared but nost of the stock of the ooaip&ny was in
seven per cent preferred shares*^

while noting that the

building of this railroad was of izssenae significance- In
permitting an increase in overfall production# Billinghurst
charged that the coc^ony# like others created in I88Q-89#
was over capitalised*^
Tha Agues Blancas field was the last Major nitrate

region to acquire rail transportation*

Until 1903 its output

had to be transported by Eaile^-pulled carts*

Its railroad

which was built by the Spanish nitrate f1 » of

$

Campania led to the port of Caleta Golosa# just south of

Delegacion de Salitraraa, Mroari* «& M3Z» P* ?0# IBBBEte

tp X9Ql» P. 58.

5 0 t ^ ## p, 5 7 ,
Britain* EfflffHiyM: jjgBadtfl*
Annual GorTes, 1899 * Ho. 2287, p. 28.
S^Bllllnghurat, £g£ oaaltalog SSUSSSSSS* P* 96.

TABUS X
Capitalisation and Dividend statistics
for Hitrate Railroads*

Anglo-Chilean
Nitrate and Hall
way Co*# Ltd#

1888

UL »<% ?,100

nilb nil

nil

Sa g Ms i a a a z ^ e
earril de Ahto1888

y y ? -1 Fgrroccrril

de

Santa

1890

6 0 0 ,0 0 0

✓
fawffMKBta
de
Sal— _
S M M U fM M t «M
a«t w«aw#sa
itre 1 .Ferrocarrll
de Junin

1890

2 6 5 ,0 0 0

Hitrate Railways
Co* 0 Ltd#

1882

Taltal Railways
Co# 1 Ltd#

1882

acts

—

nil

3 ,9 3 8 ,0 1 0

60 *

108

6 0 0 ,0 0 0

1 ?#

2i ^

ZS$

3
/1& l6 £

•statistics conpilad from Stock Bacchants Yearbook.
I891-19d# passto.
^Most of the shares of this company were in 7 per
cent preferred stock#
Antofagasta#**0
The organisation of the Taltal and Anglo~Chilean
railways# like those that directly eorapetcd with nitrate
Hails# met with loud but unsuccessful opposition froxa Col#
north#

ills purpose was to disparage these enterprises by

^sensor and Michels, Jtodusfcrfft dgl saUfcys. p. 108,

1SI
raising doubts regarding the productivity of the fields upon
«hieh their prosperity would be based* thereby preventing
thera from obtaining capital in England*®'1’
She'se seven railroads* which served the nitrate
industry almost exclusively* comprised an liaportant portion
of the railroads of Chile*

In 1903, their main line tracks

accounted for approximately twenty-three per cent of the
railroads of Chile and forty-four per cent of the private
railroads*

fihen branch lines arc included* they represent
Aj»
thirty and sixty per cent respectively* ®

6lBiUinehurst*
footnote*

oapitales aalitreroB* p. 9 6 ,

chapter

v

PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION
After the first successful shipment of nitrate to
Europe was made in 1831, the nitrate industry gradually ex
panded Its output*

However, it was not until the decade of

the l860*s that the rate of expansion Increased significantly*
The rapid growth of the industry at this time was brought about by the opening of additional markets and by improving
the technique of production#

Since nitrate was used princi

pally as a fertiliser it had to compete with guano in the
markets of America and Europe*

In the contest for markets

nitrate was at a disadvantage because guano had appeared
earlier and farmers were accustomed to using it#

However,

the depletion of the guano deposits early In the decade of
the 1870 *s simultaneously reduced competition in the ferti1
U s e r market and enlarged the demand for nitrate#
Thus,
with their position greatly improved, nitrate producers be
gan to expand their production facilities*
The improvement of the technique of processing
caliche* however, was necessary before productive capacity
could be expanded sufficiently*

The really Important changes

^Hutchinson, Two Years in Peru* I, 57*
Chapter I, pp# 5ff#
152

See also

mlong this line came during th© letter half of the nineteenth
century* a period characterised by advancements in technical
knowledge in many other industries*

Before that time* pro

duction of nitrate on a large scale had been iu^possible be
cause the procedure used in elaborating caliche was timeconsuming and expensive*

In addition* this early method

could process only caliche containing a high percentage of
nitrate#^
made*

Beginning in 1853* major technical advances were

The use of steam in the processing method was intro

duced; and between X87 6 and 1880* a new method of elaborat
ing caliche based upon the use of steam was perfected and
introduced*^

The new procedure* called the Shanks Process*

permitted greater economy in production and made possible
the use of lower grade c a l i c h e While the older process
required caliche having at least twenty-five per cent
nitrate* the Shanks Process could refine caliche having only
*■>
thirteen per cent*^ Consequently* producers could utilise
p
Apparently the process in us© was Introduced early
in the nineteenth century by a German Immigrant named Otto
Harneeker* See V* Figueroa, Plccionario bio&rdflco* III*
1*29*
^Semper and Michels* Industrie del Sailtre* pp* 6lf*
^For a description of th© Shanks process see Ibid* *
pp# 62ff* Although no precis© date for the introduction of
the Shanks process can be given* it was in us® at least by
18814.* The development of th© process seems to have been a
gradual one for idiich no one individual was responsible*
^The Shanks process also made possible th© utili
sation of iodine found in the caliche* While iodine became
the most laaportant by-product ol the industry* even Its pro
duction was limited by agreement among producers* Th©

a larger amount or the nitrate deposits round on their
property*
The growth in nitrate production* resulting from the
increased demand and the improved processing techniques* can
be followed in Table XX below* ^

For most years when the in

crease in output declined* the reason lay in the formation
of a combination*?

Moreover since the productive capacity

of the industry was usually much larger than actual produc
tion* output could have been increased even more if the de
mand for nitrate had warranted*
The expansion of production was brought about by en
larging existing oficinas as well as by the creation of new
ones*

Statistics indicate* however* that the number of

oficinas in operation month by month varied widely* and that
a
rarely were all running simultaneously*
Bven with a number
of establishments closed temporarily* because of the war*

iodine combination made agreements with producers of iodine
in other countries beginning in 1886* At that time* Chilean
iodine was allotted almost sixty per cent of the world
market* Some form of restriction was necessary because of
the limited market for iodine* See BiXXinghurst* &&s capi**
tales salitreros* pp* 72ff! Delegation de Salltrera* MeSorla
eZHreol* PP* g g *
^The figures given for nitrate exports can be con
sidered equal to production since only a small amount of
nitrate was consumed on the oficinas*
^Combinations operated during the following periods!

1685-1886! I89 I-I8931 1896-1897*
8Asoo, de Propaganda. Circular Trteegtpal, Mo, 9
(July 25, 1 8 9 6 ), p. xx±» and MO. 17 (Jan.31, 1 8 9 9 ),

p* xviii*
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there were twanty-seven ofieinae working in 1880*
the number reached fox^ty-four,

By X881f,

Continued expansion brought

new concerns into operation until X8 9 7 when seventy-two
o fie in a ® were operating*

Many ©f the®© new of1 cin&a were

c rea te d as a result of the selling of ©tate^owned land® in
I89 I4. *»d 1895«

However, a decline resulting from the nitrate

depression o f the late 1 8 9 0 *8 brought th© number of working
o fio ln a a down to sixby~one by 1 9 0 0 *9
Because oficinas operated under a wide variety of
c o n d itio n s , there was no \miformity in the cost of produc
tio n *

This m s true even though the same type of equipment

was used in a l l oficinas*

Th© chief factors responsible for

v a ria tio n s in production cost® were the quality and location
of caliche worked, the sis© of the processing establishment,
and the cost of administration*

10

Oficinas with high grad©

caliche located in shallow veins near the processing plant
had an advantage over those whose deposits lay deeper in th©
earth and farther from th© plant*

Then too, th© larger plants

could process nitrate for a lower unit cost*

Most of the

more efficient oficinas were located in Tarapaca where th©
quality of caliche was highest, and practically all ware

9 Cruchsga, Or-K&nlzaclon ecpno^ca M _gMlg_, I I *
Appendix No. 2, p. 191 H & m r f a m m S I g g & M M B I m * 1684,

Xqulqu© quoted in Semper and M ich els, In d u s trie d a l ® © litre *
p* 1391 Bee also D elegacion de B a lltre ra s , ^M©Ji9r|^|^,lon Xo9T*
pp. $ot, and Mamorla an 1903,» p . 20.
l°Seinper and Michels, Industrie del sall.tre. pp. 9S£X.

owned by foreigners*

11

Comprehensive studies of the cost of production to
the nitrate industry are wanting for the nineteenth century#
However* a study based on data accumulated around 1900 placed
the m inimum cost of producing a Spanish quintal of nitrate
at

pence* the maximum at 36 pence* and the average cost

at 21*1 pence#3*2

toe fact that slightly in excess of fifty

per cent of production costs went for wages indicates that
the Shanks Process was largely a manual one#3*^ After trans
porting the nitrate to port* placing it at boat side* and
paying the export tax* the cost was greatly increased#
Calculations made in the study referred to above place the
minimum cost of nitrate at boat side at l$S*9 pence* the maxi
mum at 7lf pence* and the average cost at 57*6 pence# ^

Since

the export tax was 27*9 pence* It represented from 37*7 to
57 per cent of the cost of nitrate at boatside#

Another

important aspect was the tendency of costs to increase*

Pro

ducers were responsible for this trend because they followed
the practice of elaborating the caliche of highest quality
first* and left the poorer grades until last*3^

^ I b l d ** pp# 96# 112#
P* 96.

13Ibld.. p. 95.
lj<1bld.. p. 96.
P* 97*
this
work it is estimated
that the average cost of production between i860 and 1092 was
from thirteen to twenty pennies per quintal# See pp# 9of#

XS8
Throughout th© nineteenth century Tarapaca maintained
it© position a© th© center of th© nitrate industry*

Under

normal conditions exports from that province ©quailed eighty
per cent of all nitrate shipments*

During the War of th©

Pacific* however* when operations in Tarapaca were unsettled*
those districts to the south became significant temporarily*
In 1830* forty-eight per cent of all nitrate exports cam©
from the southern fields $ but by 1383* this proportion fell

to sixteen per cent#

Two of the southern f!©Xd©*-TaXta! and

Toeopilla— rose In importance again after I8 9 O* yet together
they accounted for only eighteen per eent of production by
1902.

The pattern of nitrate consumption in the late
nineteenth century changed only slightly in spite of the
fact that total consumption increased significantly*

The

great market for nitrate was Europe* especially in Germany
end France where the cultivation of sugar beets was under17
taken on a large scale* * Although accurate statistics on
consumption are not available before th© l8 9 0 *s* they portray
the distribution of consumption before 1 8 9 0 #

Uhtll 1 9 0 0 *

Europe accounted for no less than eighty-six per cent of
annual consumption and sometimes more#

With an average of

^ x b l d *» pp# 136f#
^ F o r th© growth of the sugar beet Industry in
Germany and France see J* H. Clapham* The Economic Development
of Franc© and Germany* iSlg-lQlk (3rd edition* C^brxSge 4 '
University Press * X 9 2 o )* pp* 1/7*217*

thirty*fiv# per cent* Germany constituted th# chief user
throughout the entire period*

Other European countries in

the order of their importance to th# nitrate trad# were
France* Belgium* England* and Holland#**® She demand for
nitrate in the United state# began to expand quit# rapidly
after 1897* so that in the following century approximately
one quarter of the world *a consumption was represented by
that country*

In addition* th# Hawaiian Islands and South

Africa consumed a good quantity of nitrate*

However* Chile

and other Latin American states provided insignificant
markets*

Of the nitrate sold during this era over eighty

per cent was used as fertiliser while th# remaining portion
went mainly to the manufacturers of explosives**'^
She rapid expansion of the world*# consumption of
nitrate was In part due to the efforts made by producers to
enlarge the market for their product*

Th# first such attempt

was promoted by the combination of producers organised in
l631j. as the Comite Sailtre* Aside from its connection with
the activities of the combination in restricting production*
it was given the responsibility of devising means to promote
nitrate consumption*

The committee developed a comprehensive

program which it carried out with apparent success*

Its

^^Delegacion de Salitrera* Memorla m 1897* Appendix
Ho. 8, pp. (>$££', Chile, Comlalon Sailfae£a.~TsM. PP. l&8fj
Semper and Michels, Ixidviatrlangel aalltre. Appendix No. 21,
pp. 330-332*

x9 ib ia .. p. 332.

activities acre financed toy funds collected from producers
for that purpose*

The committee sponsored an essay contest

in which seventy-nine papers were entered* and also published
pamphlets designed to explain the benefits and Illustrate
the use of nitrate as a fertiliser*

Representatives were

sent to important agricultural centers and to agricultural
colleges tooth in the United States and in Europe*

These

individuals held conferences and gave demonstrations*

Sup

port was also given to those desiring to make scientific
studies and to conduct experiments in which the (qualities of
nitrate as a fertilizer were tested*

Of equal importance*

too, were the efforts made to establish new distributor® of
nitrata.20

with th® exception of the essay contest, these

techniques were the major ones used In later years after
promotion activities had been expanded*
With the collapse of the first combination, all pro
motion efforts of the producers lapsed until the formation
of the second combination in 1891*

Then* the policy was

Initiated of levying a small contribution baaed upon exports
-one-half cent per quintal— to obtain funds for the support
of measures designed to stimulate consumption*

This exaction

was eventually lowered in l89if to one-eighth of a cent#2***

2®$bld*s p* lip.; J* W* Merriam to Dept* of State,
No* 310, Iquique, II, pp* 37-ipU

^Chlle, Comision aalitrera, 19°9* PP« 33f*

In 1 8 9 2 * th® Chilean government and Nitrate Railways made
contributions to this work, and the latter consistently gave
financial support from that time onward,*^
When the second combination dissolved, the permanence
of the sales promotion activity was assured by the creation
of the Aaoclacion Sailtrera de Ih^pagsndAi This organisation
had its headquarters in Iquiquc, and although its governing
body was drawn chiefly from the Tarapaca producers, other
fields had representation.

It published reports and data

connected with the nitrate trade and through the Permanent
Nitrate Committee in London sent representatives to major
nitrate consuming regions, ^

The Asoeiaoion Issued tri

mestrial circulars and published other information when the
occasion required.

In these circulars the statistical po

sition of the industry Is revealed* and news of current
interest to producers reported.

In the appendices of the

trimestrial circulars voluminous reports from propaganda
agents overseas were reprinted#

These frequently comprise

as much as ninety pages of email type and Indicate the vari
ous activities undertaken by the AsoeiaoIon, ^
Its work was directed by a manager n&io for most of

22South American Journal# XXXIII (Nov# 5# 1 8 9 2 ), 511#
230elegaclon de Salitrera* Mesnorja ©n 1901# p, 39*
Judging from the list of officers of tae Asooiacion* English
interests seem to have dominated its activities,
2*hFh» distribution of propaganda funds can bo aecertained from any of the trimestrial circulars#
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the period m e Eduardo Vijil*

Vijil was a cons 1stexit sup-*

porter of combinations and or the propaganda activities that
he directed*

According to figures quoted by Senor Vijil*

the propaganda work from I8 9 I to 18 96 had produced quite
beneficial results*

Be state© that for the $84*1*235 spent

during the period* the total value of nitrate consumed in
creased by sixteen million pesos while the revenues of the
government were increased by seven million pesos#^
Since any expansion of nitrate exports would bring
greater revenues* promotion activities were in tune with the
interests of the Chilean government#

therefore# the govern

ment gradually adopted the policy of cooperating with
TABXS XII
Expenditures for Sales Promotion* 1885-1908®'

Year

Amount

1885

Year

Amount

19 00

h 52*920

1901

1891

1902

1892

36,000

&Chlle* CoralaIon aalltrera an 1909. p. 1(2*

25a.aoe. de Propaganda* Circular Trlmeatral. No. 11

(May 8, 1897)* P» xil*

producers in promoting the sale or nitrate*

Through her

consular corps* meanwhile* Chile became increasingly active
in furthering the nitrate trade*

By the time close cooper*

atlon had developed between producers and the government*
these agents were devoting much of their energy to propaganda
activities chiefly in E u r o p e I n 1897# the government gave
its official approval to the work of the Asoclacion* and from
that date begins full-scale participation by Chile in the
effort to promote consumption*2^

Public funds were henceforth

contributed to the work and after 1 9 0 1 * the original author*
isation of twenty thousand pounds annually was increased
significantly* 2®
The table on expenditures for sales promotion indi
cates the increase in activity that resulted from government
support*

Of the total sum of h 580*331 spent during the

years indicated In the table* & 194*726 had been contributed
by the government•29

Most of this money was spent in western

Europe and in the United States* but some was expended in
Canada* the west Indies* Russia* and elsewhere*

The

^ S o e Chile* Delegacion Fiscal de Salitreras y
Ouaner&s* Informes Consulares sobre Propaganda Salitrera
(Xqulquef El WacXonal* 1B9T)*
2?An investigation conducted by the government in
1 8 9 8 concerning the operations of the European branches of
the Aeoclaelon resulted in a favorable report* Bee Asoc* de
Propaganda* circular Trlmeatral* Ho* l6 (Aug* 18* 1 8 9 8 }*
p* xl and p* H4 *
r...
^®Seajper and Michels* Indus trla del aalltre* pp* ll\2t*
2 ^Chile* Com!slon Salitrera* 1 9 0 9 * p* 43*

effectiveness of the propaganda efforts is heat attested by
the increasing emphasis placed upon them#*^®

3 ° m 1 9 0 0 * according to the report of the DeXe&ado
de Salltreras# propaganda funds were expended as follows"* J
British 1sies— & 6*l|5o; Germany— $*
Franc© and French
Switzerland--fe 7*000; The Low Countries— b 3*000! Italy—
h 1*100; Spain and Portugal— fc 2*250| South Russia— & 1*750;
United States* Canada* and West Indies— h 8*000« Since the
total sum equals b 36*000* the preceding table may give only
approximately accurate figures# Delegacion de Salitroras,
Memoria en 1901a PP# 7!f*

CHAPT1B VI
THB ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL PRODUCTION
Producers of nitrate were and are today deeply af
fected by the competitive nature of the industry and by the
economic changes that result from fluxions
demand*

of supply and

Although in the nineteenth century the industry

faced only minor competition from other fertilisers in world
markets* there was a great deal of internal competition among
the growing number of enterprises engaged In the Industry*^
This* coupled with the tendency of production to outstrip
consumption after i8 6 0 * led to a lowering of the level of
prices*

During the period between i860 and 1900* three sharp

price drops occurred*

Nitrate interests considered the re«*

suiting conditions calamitous; and they tried to combat them
by forming combinations*

Basically* the theory behind the

nitrate combinations was to restrict production in order to
bring supply into line with demand**-thus raising the price
of the product— afoile simultaneously preserving to each pro**
ducer his share of the market by allotting to each* according

R* H* Whitbeck and Prank E* Williams* Economic
; of South America (New York; McGraw-dlill* 194 U

to a fixed standard* his share of production#^

In most

oases* when there was a fall in nitrate exports for a given
year# the cause lay in the formation of one of these combi-*
%

nations*-* Had no such organisation in the industry appeared
during the nineteenth century* the production and exportation
of nitrate would have steadily Increased<A
The first sharp price decline affecting the nitrate
industry was brought about by rapid increases in production
in the few years after Chile gained possession of the
provinces of Antofagasta and Tarap&ea*

Exports that had been

7*700*000 quintals in 1881* increased by three million
quintals in 1882* and almost reached the thirteen million
mark by the end of 1383*

Advances in production such as

occurred in these years were unprecedented*

While eon*

sumption expanded simultaneously* It did not keep pace with
the increases in productive capacity*

Because of the new

relationship between the supply of nitrate and the demand
for It* the price received by producers for nitrate declined
continuously*

In 188!$.* the drop measured at least twenty-

five per cent when compared with the level of 1881*

Veldes

2Hlguel Cmchaga* Salitre y Guano (MadridI Beus*
1929)#

197*

3See the Table on Production* Chapter V* p# 155*
Compare the drop in production for the years when combi*
nations were operating; i*e** 188£*1886* 1891 ^1893 * 1896 *1897 #
All statistics on production# consumption* and prices re«*
ferred to in this chapter ere based on this table*
^Delegacies* d© Salitreras* Memoria en 1897# PP*
28 ft,

Vergara* who was Jefe Foli'tico of Tarapaea during these
years* asserted that these changes disrupted not only the
normal commerce in nitrates but the entire Chilean economy
and that the effect was equally ruinous on both*^
Although Valdes Vergara probably exaggerated the ill
effects of this decline in price* many nitrate producers were
dissatisfied and sought means to restore the higher price
level of past years*

Some method of limiting production was

deemed necessary to achieve the goal that producers eonsid*
ered essential if they were to continue to operate profit*
ably:

the restoration of prices to their ^normal” level-*

which was a very high one*
Their opinions illustrate the characteristic re*
luctance that producers frequently manifest toward re*
orienting their enterprises to vastly altered conditions*
@ie high price levels that had prevailed in the past caused
producers to believe that the lowering of prices deprived
them unjustly of profits to be gained from their enterprises*
Hew producers of nitrate were looked upon with dismay and
criticized as the agents of ruination by established inter
ests*

The new producers* however* charged their critics

with misrepresenting the status of the industry and asserted
that* in reality* profits were attractive*

Excepting the

^Francisco Valdes Vergara# La crisis salltrera. y las
medldas que ee proporan para remedlarlo (s^tlaKoy loBlu . p. $,
“Semper and Michels, Induatrla del salitre. p, l?6 j
see also XT. S.. Cona. Reports.
¥o7 251JV 'Kay IS, 1902,
r . o. Mansfield to Dept, ofstate.

natural advantages new producers possessed* such mist have
h e m the o&se for rarely is capital attracted on a large
scale to an industry in which chances of gain are slim*
However* as new producers solidified their interests* their
attitude veered into line with the opinions of those they
had previously censured*

Undoubtedly* change in attitude

proceeded mainly from their new* established position In the
industry*
When in I88 I4.* all indications pointed to a continu
ance of the distressing economic situation* nitrate producers
in Tar&paea began to realize that relief would be forthcoming
only if they organized for the purpose of bringing about
immediate and drastic curtailment of production*

Although

the idea gained almost unanimous acceptance* It was not an
easy task for producers to decide on the exact method of
carrying out their plan*

What seemed reasonable to one set

of operators* appeared unjust to another*

Thus* producers

engaged in considerable discussion and controversy before
even a majority could reach an agreement on the procedure
to be followed*^
Even then* only producers in Tarapaca7 co-operated*
In the plan adopted in June, 1881^* it was agreed to establish
a committee* headed by a president* to administer the process
of determining the productive capacity of producers in Tarapacal

This committee was empowered to set up a production

^Valdes Vergara* I*a crisis salltrera* p* 10*

quota Cor each oflcina on th© bast© of its established ca
pacity.

The committee also bad th© responsibI1 Ity of

constantly evaluating market conditions.

When it considered

that market conditions warranted a ©hang© in production* it
had th© authority to vary the quota.®

The quota method* es

tablished by th© first combination* was adopted by succeeding
combinations as th© most practical basis for allocating pro
duction.

However* the procedure was not entIreiy satisfacto

ry or just* since some oficlnaa normally produced a much
smaller per cent of their theoretical capacity than others.
Consequently* th© quotas gave thm& a relatively more favor
able position than they had enjoyed under free production.
At a later time* means to correct this flaw were adopted.9
Even though the operation of the first combination
coBsseneed on August 1* I881j.* it produced no tangible benefits
before 1885.

Based upon estimated productive capacity* which

was approximately seventeen million quintals per year* the

committee established an initial quota of forty-five per
cent.

In September the quota was reduced to forty per cent

and on November 1 was lowered again to thirty per cent,10
nevertheless* the lessening of production during these months
did not affect the price structure, since large shipments
Q

J. W. Marr!am to Dept* of State* No. 310* April 8 *
1886* Iqulque* II* pp. 28-32.
Q
7See below* pp. l8 £f.
10

J. W. Merrlam to Dept, of State, No. 310* April 8 *

1 88 6 * Iqulque* II* pp. 32 -3 ]^

l?o

made early to the year— before restriction took effect—
kept exports at about the seme level they had been the year
previous*
In the following year* however* a concerted effort
to achieve results was made.

At a general meeting of oper

ators held in February* 1885* the production goal was set
at seven million quintals*

This level would have meant a

forty per cent quota In I88 i|^ Actually the quota was closer
to twenty-five per cent* because to the Intervening months
productive capacity had increased*^

Thus* nitrate producers

planned a precipitate drop in exports for 1885 #
But the combination could not attain these goals*
For one thing* the executive committee found It difficult to
enforce the quota regulations*

While one company made no

pretense of co-operating* others who had accepted the plan
did not keep within their allotments*

12

Therefore* at the

general meeting in February the President was authorised to
take legal action against those producers who did not abide
by the agreement*1^

But this threat was unsuccessful* since

the rules of the nitrate combination* like those of the
“pools* organised in th© United States at the same time* were

■**^J# W* Merriam to Dept* of State* Ho* 310* April 8 *
1886* Iqulque* II* p* 35*
^J* W* Merriam to Dept* of State* Ho* 310* April 8 *
South American Journal* XXII (July

1 8 8 6 * Iqulque* II* p# 38#
1 1 , 1885)* 320*

^J* W* Merriam to Dept* of State* No* 310, April 8 *
1886, Iqulque* II, pp* 3l|f•
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effective only 00 long as its members chose to honor tlie
stipulations of the agreement#

The general meeting* likewise*

sought in other ways to make its organisation more effective*
It tried to discourage the creation of new oficinas and the
scansion of those already in operation; moreover* it strove
a second time to gain the co-operation of producers in other
nitrate districts#

None of these designs* however* were

accomplished#^
In spite of the difficulties * the combination began
to produce results#

While the goals for 1665 and 1666 were

exceeded* the actual decline in exports* which was about
half that contemplated* proved to be sufficient to affect
the nitrate markets#

Prices rose to rta desirable level**1 and

remained there into 1686; but never did the price of nitrate
approach the level of i860 and 1881 # ^
Even though prices dropped slowly during the remainder
of I8 6 6 * it proved to be a monumental task to hold the combi
nation together#

bow^cost producers became restive under the

restrictions which they felt essentially favored others whose
costs of production exceeded their own#

16

Then,too* since

certificates permitting the acquisition of lend were being
redeemed, new companies* to over—haul or build nitrate works,

ljtXbld,
Se® &3-so Table XX on p* 155*
1A
-“^Semper and Michels* Industrie del sailtre, p# lljl#

were forming*

Unless th© combination could absorb the now

producers, it could not continue to function*

Because their

lands were of high quality and frequently not previously esc**
ploited, the new producers insisted upon high quotas for their
adheranc© to th© combination*

Even then, some refused to

agree to restrain production*

The new companies that were

basically well-situated to produce on a competitive basis saw
evidences of an increasing demand for nitrate at the reduced
prices and wished to take advantage of the greater total
profits that could b© garnered tinder free production#
These conditions made the demise of the combination merely
a matter of time*
In reality, th© continuance of the combination was
not required by any adverse economic condition*

Producers

who had foreseen more favorable times saw their predictions
materialize even beyond their most optimistic hopes in the
three years following th© first combination*

A sharp in

crease in demand kept prices stable while nitrate exports
doubled*

The resulting prosperity, as has been noted, at

tracted much foreign capital and made th© corporate form
of business organization dominant in the industry*

These

new factors affected the reaction of the Industry to th©
nitrate crisis that loomed ahead*
By the middle of 1 8 8 9 , nitrate groups noted with un
easiness the growing surpluses of nitrate that filled the

Ibid*t South American Journal* XXIV (Jan* 8, 188?),
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warehouses and the lower* market prices#

With shipments con

tinuing to exceed th© rate of consumption during the suxn&er
months* by fall th© decline was so insistent that talk among
producers of reviving the combination became commonplace*
By the beginning of th© year X89 Q* there was no longer any
doubt but that the nitrate slump was a reality#

Although a

periodically depressed market arose out of the nature

the

of

industry and was characteristic of it to a -degree that made
effective preventive action impossible for individual pro
ducers# a part of the distress felt by operators at this time
can be attributed to their own doings#

Because of th©

fe a r

prevalent among producers that th© period from October to
December, 1889 would b© the basis for assigning quotas when
a combination was organised# an exceptionally high rat©
export prevailed during those months#^®

of

Thus# th© disparity

between supply and demand was heightened and aggravated#
Furthermore# it was principally the British nitrate
companies in the North-Harvey group that favored the for
mation of a second combination*

Hapidly organised with ex

cessive capitalisations# they were not prepared to operate
profitably under th© condition© that faced producers in 1890 #
In the prosperous period they might have been able to declare
respectable dividends# but on their Inflated capital their
future in a free market held only small profits and, perhaps#
no dividends at all*

So British nitrate capitalists took the

l8Ibld## XXVIII (April 12# 1890)* l|i>2#

H b

lead in bringing to fruition the second combination# ^
The major problem they encountered in this endeavor
w « fee reluctance to co-operate manifested by the West Coast
producers, a heterogeneous group composed of Chileans and

resident foreigners— chiefly Germans, Spaniards, and Italians#
For the most part West Coast producers were family enter**
prises, unencumbered by high capitalisations and large over

heads, and able to produce with adequate even if not large
profits at the low prices British producers considered insuf
ficient*2^

Furthermore, the reluctance manifested by some

Chilean entrepreneurs to enter a combination dominated by
British producers might well have been created by the
widespread antagonism toward British supremacy in the Indus
try then current in Chile*

But it is far more likely that

disagreement between British and West Coast producers over
the system to be adopted and the allocation of production

provided the main divisive force and the chief obstacle to
an early conclusion of an agreement of combination#

The formation of the second combination was accom
plished in I89 I only after months of arduous negotiations
between English and West Coast producers during which the
nitrate depression deepened*

If limitation of production had

been initiated early in the year I89 O, it might well have
effectively cushioned th© decline and prevented th© slump
^journal of Fiaanae. IV, (August, I8 9 8 ), ?16.

Relaclonea comercialea entre Chile
Bret ana* pp# 80f*
2 0 Rosb,

j

la Gran
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from booming so grave*

Certainly* as the year I89 O pro*

ceeded* a majority of producers showed a willingness to co
operate* but none of the various plans gained wide enough
acceptance to warrant implementation*

In August all of the

London companies agreed upon a plan that did not involve th©
difficult process of establishing quotas and allocating pro*
duction#

Instead* it was based upon the complete stoppage

of productive operations for three selected month© out of
eaeh year*

West Coast producers* however* were not attracted

by the plan* which made necessary a return to the quota
pi

method*"

The quota plan supported by the English companies

late in I89 O allocated thirty per cent of production to West
Coast producers and aimed at a total output one-tenth below
the prevailing rat© of consumption*

Th© latter group now

refused to endorse this proposal unless they were granted
forty per cent of production and unless total output was set
at th© level of consumption prevailing in 1890 * ^

Final

arrangements* when concluded some months later* appeared to
have been brought about by English acceptance of th® higher
quota for West Coast interests* with th® latter acquiescing
in th© lower rat© of production favored by the English*

A

delay in bringing limitations into fore© was caused by six
West Coast and three English producers* all of whom wished

^South American Journal* XXIX (Aug* 9» I89 O)* 15?*
2 2 Ibld.« Nov. 22.1890, p. 628; Dec. 13, I8 9 0 , p.
711* Deo. 2 0 , 1890 , p. 765.

for higher quotas*

When restriction went into effect* one

Important West Coast producer—»the German firm of Folach and
Martin— did. not co-operate#

The second combination in an

attempt to eliminate th© troublesome process of assigning
quotas abandoned* for th© first year, th® productive power
basis and relied upon limiting production to seven months
each year*

This new time basis, however, was unsatisfactory

to many! and after a year*® trial, the older quota system was
re—adopted*^
Even though the negotiations leading to the creation
of the second combination had to be carried over into 1 &9 1 #
a curtailment of production began in January of that year*
This limitation was brought about not by producers, but as a
result of the outbreak of the Revolution of 1891 , which
centered during the early months of that year in the nitrate
provinces*

A complete stoppage of work occurred in many

oflcinas; and for a time, no cargoes of nitrate left Chilean
ports * ^

After fighting ceased in the nitrate region, exports

continued to fall below normal levels because the continuance
of the revolution elsewhere disrupted shipping and created a
scarcity of l a b o r * T h u s , even with the combination

^Ibld** XXX (Jan* 10, 1 8 9 1 ), 351 Boss, Reiaciones

comerciales entre Chile y la Gran Bretana. p* 85*

^fAsoc# de Propaganda, Circular Trtoea.tral* Ho* 15
(May 13, 1 8 9 8 ), p* lv*
25south American Journal* XXX? (July 25, 1895), 95*
26 Ibld.* XXVII (April 23, 1892), 1*69*

operating for only a part of th© year# production in I89 X
fell four and one-half million quintals below th© mark
reached in I89 O and approached the limit established by th®
combination*
Production at a reduced rat© continued through th©
year 1893 and brought the benefits that had been expected
from

it i# Exports remained within the bound© of the ©a**

tablished quotas, and consumption in X89 I and X892 eacceeded
them sufficiently to reduce th© stock© of surplus nitrate
that had plagued the market in previous years*

This con~

dition was reflected in steady rises in the price level#

A

measure of the effectiveness of these improvements can be
discerned In the dividend reports of English corporations#
*

In I8 92 , they increased their dividends over th® proceeding

year, and with a fairly well stabilised price, did at least
as m i l if not better in 1893 #
Even while these improvements were being made,
however, several forces developed which strained th© ties
that held together the combination and, eventually, brought
about Its disruption#

One of th© most influential of these

was the attitude of the Chilean government—
slgnifleant earlier*

factor not

The government under Balraacoda had

been strongly opposed to the formation of the second combi-*
nation*2^

with his downfall, nitrate producers looked for

better co-operation from the government • However, nothing

Ibid*, XXVIII (Jan*

I89 O), supplement, p* 6 #

could annul the fact that any government at that time would
have carefully scrutinised restrictions of nitrate exports*^®
If these restrictions appeared detrimental to the interests
of the country, the government would naturally oppose them*
Actually, because of growing financial troubles, two such

measures were adopted in 1893 .29 Although these difficulties
were not caused by the loss of revenue incident to the cur*
tailment of nitrate exports, they were undoubtedly aggravated
by restriction.

The first official Indication of the govern*

mental attitude was a "polite warning” issued by President
Montt to English interests "not to go too far” in limiting
'SO
exports
The second step was the announc ement that in the
following year the practice of offering state-owned nitrate
lands for sale would be revived*
The attitude of the government would have been an
appropriate one regardless of whether native or foreign
28 "Gperaciones de la combinacion sallfcrera," edi*
torial in La Patria (Valparaiso) in I8 9 2 , published in
Charles Le Crand, ed#, Questioner Salltreras (Santiago*
Gutenburg, I8 9 2 ), pp* Ijfi-pJ* ^
2^The South American Journal noted that in "high
official circles" there was developing a hostile attitude
towards foreign capital with the nitrate interests being
singled out for "direct attack" because the forming of a
combination, from th© Chilean view-polnt, constituted an at*
tempt to create a monopoly "against public well-bdlng#" Xt
was also observed that this Chilean attitude was of rocent
origin, since in times past, "the Chileans were conspicuous
amongst South American nations for th® adoption of an en
lightened policy in their treatment of foreigners* * • *"
South American Journal, XXXV (Sept* 30, 18937, 331*

3°Xbld.. July 29, 1893, P. 95.
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capital had been instrumental In bringing about restriction
of production*

However* It 1* clear that the second combi-

nation— unlike the first— m s considered by Chileans as
primarily an English project which was promoted by over
capitalised English concerns and which unfairly prejudiced
the interests of th© state by reducing its revenues#

The

fact that Col# North had been a leader in the formation of
this combination gave credence to this view#

Chileans be

lieved that not only the combination but British companies
as well would be seriously affected by the sale of nitrate
lands#

A sale would result in a great increase in productive

power#

Moreover* if Chileans became the chief purchasers*

the British would find it more difficult to form an effective
combination in the future#^
In addition to th© attitude of the Chilean government*
several factors that had brought the first combination to an
end also affected th© duration of th© second#

Thus* the im

provement in the status of th© nitrate market in 18 92 and
I8 9 3 hastened dissolution* just as a similar Improvement had
done during the later months of the first combination when
restriction proved disadvantageous to low-cost producers#
Another parallel existed in th© immediate and impending en
trance of new nitrate producing companies into th© field#
In 1893* a group headed by Col# North was completing a new

^Chilean Times* June 10* 1893# as Q uoted In the
South Ameri'c^^oufnaTr X3QCV (Jhly 2 9 , 1 8 9 3 )* XOijf*

£80
o£tclm^~the Lacunas — sfoich had good lands and a high cam
pacity •

Ha demanded a high quota for bringing this unit

into the combination#-^

The prospect of new works being

brought into production after the sale of 1 8 9 4 was an additlonal incentive to established producers to return to free
production iraaediately*

They wanted to gain the full bene**

fits expected in the few months following the break-up of the
combination that would come from full productivity at the
high price level than prevailing*

For these reasons* no re

newal of the combination agreement was made when it lapsed
early in 1 8 9 4 *
With the return of free production in 1894# the
industry experienced its most profitable year since I8 8 9 #
but as in the past# prosperity was impermanent•

An Increase

in exports of three million quintals for the year 18 9 ? failed
to raise th© total value of the product#^

Moreover# indi

cations that another slump was beginning multiplied as that
year drew to a close#^
With a decline in consumption and persistent surpluses
continuing th© following year# the formation of a third
combination was inevitable*
unsuccessful*

Attempts made in £895 were

Th© opposition of Chilean firms to the for

32 Ross# Belactones comercialea entre Chile y la Gran
Bretaga* p* 83#
... .
^South American Journal* XLIII (Sept* 2 6 * 1 8 9 6 )# 336*
3^-Jbid.. XXXXX (Nov.

23#

1Q95)* 51+1* 51p.
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mation of a combination was a major obstacle*^

Many

oficin&g were expanding their capacity# and this# according
to the manager or the Asociacion# IMuardo Vijil* made it
extremely difficult to obtain agreement on quotas*^

But

idien they were given special consideration# along with one
English firm# in the allocation of production# an agreement
was reached on April 1# 1 8 9 6 #

The production goal for that

year was set at forty-seven per cent of capacity— or slightly
over twenty-one million quintals#

Th®third combination was

to be maintained for a period of three years*^
This third combination was a total failure*
tion limits during the first year were far from met#

Produce
For the

most part# this was due to the exceptions made in the origi
nal agreement and to the provision permitting all companies
to produce freely# if they so desired# in the three months
following the conclusion of the agreement. 3 8

Perhaps this

latter concession had been necessary in order to obtain the
co-operation of some producers# but it prevented the drastic

^Letter written by M* Nicholson to the Economist#
L U X (Aug* 2lf# 1895)# 1118#
36Asoc# de Propaganda# Circular Trimestrain Ho* 8
(May l±, 1 8 9 6 )# ppm vl-vii* Se© also app^dfi, pp# 1-2 for
a brief resume of the difficulties encountered in forming
the third combination from the English view-point*
37Money Market Review. LXXII (March Xip, 1 8 9 6 ), giji*..
The TMnannial Times asserted that eight finns In the North
group werealinost ruined by the slump. See extract published
^•n South American Joumal. XLI (Sept.
1 8 9 6 ), 266.
3 8 Xbld.. XL (June 6 , 1 8 9 6 ), 6 2 9 , 6i|2f XLI (Sept. 5,

I8 9 6 ), 266,
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curtailment of production that had boon planned#
the combination a bad start from which it never

This gave
r e c o v e r e d

*^9

Even in 1 8 9 7 when restriction m s somewhat more effective in
reducing exports, prices continued to drop#

The combine was

not producing th© results that had been forthcoming under
earlier combinations#^

By this time# too# a number of new

concerns and older ones whose position in the industry had
improved by the purchase of additional properties became
dissatisfied with the quotas allotted to them*^

When they

began producing beyond their fixed quotas in October# I8 9 7 #
the third combination collapsed ^eighteen month® before the
date that had been set for dissolution In the original
agreement #^
All efforts to reorganise the combination following
its collapse proved futile#

Eduardo Vijil urged producers

to agree to & drastic curtailment of production# but his
ceaseless efforts could not revive the combination#^

Those

concerns that had destroyed the combination in 1897 refused
to resume "nursing their competitors* by cutting their pro
duction to maintain a price below which the poorer enterprises

39jbld.» XLII (May 29, 1897), 598*

-.

4°D©legaclon de Salifcreraa, Memorla an 1897. pp.

25 28

Ip-South American Journal. XLIV (Jan. 29, 1 8 9 8 ), 115*
^Aaoc. de Propaganda, Circular Trlinestral. Mo. 13
(Nov. 25* 1 8 9 7 )* P* 111.
^Journal of Finance. IV (Aug., IS9 8 ), 7l6f.
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could not produo# profitably*^-

Actually* a alight Im

provement in th© nitrate market occurred in I8 9 8 I yet during
the remainder of the century the upswing in nitrate affair©
remained slight*

Because of lessened demand, many companies

continued to operate on a part-time basis * ^
In the absence of a combination* English interest©
sought to control prices in another Wiy*

In the fall of

1899# they revived a plan that had been suggested a decade
earlier when proposals were being made to alleviate another
period of depressed prices*
supporters*

At that time it had gained no

The project involved the formation of a market

ing organization which would posses© the exclusive right to
permit nitrate shipments, determine their destination* and
organize and control their sale*

Th© latter objective was

to be attained by apportioning ©ales among various con
signment companies— those already in the business*

The

English firm of Anthony Gibbs and Company, which had earlier
engaged in the same type of activity for the Peruvian guano
industry* was to direct th© operations of the consignment
companies and to head th© entire organization*

However* the

refusal of West Coast producers and the nitrate merchant© of
Valparaiso to participate prevented fulfillment of the d©«»
aign*^

Had it succeeded, the plan might have constituted

^ S e e Asoc* de Propaganda* Circular Trlmestral* Ho*
16 (Aug* 8* I8 9 8 )* pp* vi ff*
^South American Journal* XLV (Oct* 1* I8 9 8 )* 3 6 7 *
^Aa s q c * de Propaganda* Circular Xrlmestral, Ho* 12

a revival of Feru*s monopolisation of nitrate sales policy
in a more effective forra#^
The failure of this scheme indicates the growing
strength of the West Coast producers and the decline of
British influence in the nitrate Industry#

Although the

British interests remained the most important group, their
control over productive capacity had dropped from fifty-nine
to forty-two per cent between I8 9 5 end 1 8 9 ?*^®

This decline

continued in the twentieth century#
A favorable climate of opinion among producers had
developed by the turn of the century which made possible a
renewal of the combination#

Realising eventually that pro

ductive capacity would always be in excess of consumption.

(Aug# 21, 1 8 9 7 ), P# vi# On p# 2 in the appendix a West Coast
producer suggests bounties be given poorer companies to ke$p
thesn from producing?# See also Semper and Michels# Industrie
del sailtre# p# iyj-#
^-7At a meeting of the shareholders of the Santa Rita
Nitrate Company in 1899 ^he chairman was asked if "some form
of amalgamation" of the producing companies was possible#
The chairman replied s "There is no doubt that if we had the
»go* of the Americans, a trust would be formed of the entire
nitrate interest, and we should see the price of nitrate
placed at about A 2 or even more above the present price#
Shareholders would be receiving enormous dividends, th©
people handling the trust would make enormous profits, and
the trade would not be any worse off than at present • • # #
X guarantee to say that if this nitrate Interest were in
America a trust would be formed within If8 hours, • • #/and^w©
should go away for our holidays having thousands of pounds
in our pockets# Instead of pence# South American Journal#
XLVI (May 27, 1899), 597.
‘-----^®Asoc. de Propaganda, Circular Trimestral# No# 13
(Nov# 2J?, 1897)# P« TV#

nitrate interests began to see that some type of regulated
production on a permanent basis was the only solution to the
maintenance of price levels*

Thus a combination was the only

practical means of bringing this about*

If such an organ!**

zation could be formed free of the flaws that had crushed
previous attempts of this nature, producing companies would
in all probability enjoy a greater measure of stability than
at any time in the past*

To a large extent those pitfalls

of past combinations were surmounted when the fourth combine
was established in 1900*
The following policies, incorporated by the fourth
combination in its regulations, did much to preserve the

Integrity and increase the workability of the association.^9
The provisions established a set standard for calculating
the productive capacity of oflcinas and a procedure for
appeals by operators who desired a re-evaluation*

In ad

dition, another article of th© agreement defined what consti
tuted grounds for allowing Increases In quotas so that
controversy over this point was minimised#

The quota of each

oflcina was also to be affected by th© output of the previous
year*

In the event an oflcina did not fill its quota, it

would not be allowed to produce in excess of the lesser
amount*

Th© adoption of this principle was motivated in part

by the desire to prevent more favorable conditions being

^Asoe # de Propaganda, Escrituras Fublicas de la
flambinaclon Salitrera d© 1901 a I9O0 (Tqulquei La 'PaTTrTa*
1900;, p p * 3-12*
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established Ter weaker producing units than for others; and
in part, so that errors in the original estimate of pro**
ductiv© capacity could be corrected*

Another article pro

vided sever© penalties for exceeding assigned quotas#

Finally,

producers were protected from having to acquiesss against their
wishes in a limitation groater than twonty-f iv© per cent of
the output of the preceding

year#

Of groat importance to the success of the fourth
combination was the improved relationship between th© govern
ment and nitrate interests#

Co-operation in sales promotion

activities led to a more harmonious relationship between the
producers and the government *as did the strengthening of
Chilean nitrate interests#

Furthermore, in drawing up the

regulations of the association, the members of the combine
did not overlook the interests of the government#

Those pro

visions which assured a level of production at least equal
to the consumption of the previous year and which limited
quota reductions to twenty-five per cent, minimised the
effects such restrictions would have on the government*©
nitrate revenues#

Moreover, th© purpose of the association

was to allow a moderate yearly increase in production, enough
to keep pace with growing consumption without outstripping
it and sufficient to permit an increase in nitrate revenue®,
without endangering an orderly development of th© industry#^0

^Semper and Michels, Industrie del salitr©, pp# lJ|5ll^T#
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In thin way* it was hoped* th© interest of both producers

and government would be protected#
The fourth combination met with immediate and con*
tinuous success*

Within on© year the price of nitrate rose

significantly and thereafter maintained a perceptible in*
crease#

Even the sale of nitrate properties by the govern*

ment in 1 9 0 1 and 1 9 0 3 did not disrupt these well-laid plans#

The companies created as a result of the sales were absorbed
by the combine#

Thus* the formation of powerful new compa

nies did not result* as they had in the past* In the collapse
of the organisation nor in excessive production*

In effect*

this combination was renewed immediately upon the ©aspiration
of the five year term originally agreed upon#^

With oc

casional exceptions* the prosperity of the industry lasted
until the close of World War I#
Thus* the earlier combinations were unsuccessful In
bringing stability to the industry#

They had, at times*

brought temporary benefits to producers* but for no signifi
cant period could the downward price trend be halted#

Un

doubtedly, that trend created unfavorable conditions for the
industry which could be ameliorated only by the imposition
of permanent production controls#

This fact was seen as

early as 188^ when a Chilean economist explored the various
ways of achieving stability#

As h© foresaw then* the di

vergent Interests of the government and producers and the

^ T h e combination was not renewed* however* in 1 9 1 0 #
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existence of a large number of nitrate operators were obsta
cles that virtually precluded the establishment of effective
controls#^

Th® achievement of an organisation that had the

necessary permanence, however, came with the formation of th©
fourth combination*

hater on in th© history of the industry

the formation of a nitrate trust was more widely suggested
and eventually, brought into being**^

Yet that development

required not only the co-operation but the leadership of the
government of Chile#

aides Vergara, Crisis aalitrera, pp* 13-26*
^Bertrand, Crisis aalitrera, pp* 70,
53ff* For
a review of the history of the nit rat e industry in the
twentieth century see Karl Falk, "Chlle^s •white gold1 Stages
A Comeback”, Foreign Commerce Weekly, VIII, Ho* 10 (Sept* 5,
19^2 ), 3-7, 30-Sl#

CHAPTER VII
THE LABOR FORCE

The enlargement and expansion of operations by
nitrate producers in th© period following i860 attracted Increasing numbers of workers to the nitrate provinces#

They

came from th© agricultural areas in the neighboring countries
of Peru and Bolivia as well as from Chile*

In i860* th©

majority of laborers in the fields of Tarapaca were Peruvians*
In the fields to the south Chileans comprised th© majority# 1
However, this relationship was considerably altered as the

size of the labor force increased#

The number of Bolivians

and Peruvians working in the nitrate fields grew slowly in
comparison to the number of Chileans; thus, by 1902, Chilean®
accounted for seventy-one per cent of the labor force#
Together, Peruvians and Bolivian® comprised one-quarter of
the workers#

As had been the case in i860, th© preponderance

of Chilean labor increased according to the proximity of th©
field to the center of the country*

2

^Guillermo E# Billlnghurst, Condjcion Legal de log
Peruanos Nacldos en Tarapaca {Santiago: El IProgreso, x8BYT,
pp*
Bulnes, chile and Peru* p* 43*
%imon B# Rodrigue®,
Eatadlatloa del Trabajo
(Santiago: Cervantes, 1908 ^1909 ), it, Appendix" "No# C, p. 28#
I89
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Nitrate producers found a permanent source of cheap
labor in the populous central region of Chile#

There , an

agricultural economy existed in which the immense haciendas
of the Chilean aristocracy constituted the characteristic
economic unit#

The peons, or inqulffnos* who worked on these

large estates were poorly paid and had almost no opportunity
to improve their status by becoming independent farmers*^
They were, therefore, attracted by the higher wages obtain
able in the mining regions of northern Chile, especially in
the nitrate districts#

Many of th© peons who left their

haciendas to work in the industry did 00 with the intention
of remaining only a few years5 however, some settled pemmnently in the nitrate region*
their homes with their savings*

Others eventually returned to
Because of this practice

there occurred a constant shuffling of laborers between
central and northern Chile#
The supply of labor was sufficient to meet the normal

requirements of the industry*

Occasionally, however, th©

bargaining position of the workers was enhanced by a tempo
rary scarcity of manpower*

This condition existed several

times before the turn of th© century#

The first recorded

shortage occurred in 188 ? and during the early months of

^Robert E# Mansfield, Progressive Chile (New Yorks
T* Y# Crowell Co*, 1913), PP# 93-Ilifc* 'inquffllSo is the name
given to an illiterate agricultural worker in dliile« The
word roto is used to describe inqulllnos who have left th©
rural areas to work in industry, particularly in the mining
region of northern Chile# However, the two words are fre
quently used interchangeably*
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1888#

Th© shortage was attributed to two ©auseef

an in*

crease in th© demand Tor workers in the copper industry which
attracted some nitrate laborers * and an epidemic of cholera
along the west coast of South America#^* Although a slight
Increase in wages resulted# nitrate producers were not ad
versely affected*

Their prosperity was ©aid to have been

promoted by th© shortage since it prevented an excessive ex
pansion of production*
Nevertheless# with the beginning of the nitrate boom
late in the year 1888# a serious need for more workers did
occur*

Promoters of nitrate companies being organised at

that time were predicting Immediate profits for their enter
prises*

For that reason and because nitrate was bringing a

high price in the European markets# the promoters felt
obliged to hasten the process of bringing new oficinaa Into
production*

To do this it was necessary to import into the

region a large number of additional laborers*

In their rush

for results nitrate promoters sent agents to central Chile
who offered attractive inducements to the agricultural
workers there*

An Englishman described the situation and

its outcome as follows s
It was necessary to show dividends with the

least possible delay* Labour on th© spot being
all employed# it was obligatory to obtain men from
any quarter and at any price# The 60 or 70 cents
per day labourers of the south leaped at the

^South American Journal* XXV (April 28# 1888)# 230|
Grt* Br*# Consular Reports * Misc * Series# (I8 8 9 )# No# 122#
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enhanced offers from th© sunny north, idxer© the
price of labour rapidly advanced with the increasing
demand of the new companies, until $ dollars, and
even as high as 7 dollars, per day was paid in their
desperate need and rush for results .5
Peons from central Chile flocked to th© nitrate
provinces in numbers sufficient almost to double the sis© of
the labor force by 1 890 # But with the collapse of the boom
in that year, the demand for labor began to decline.
In 1691* a few oficinaa found it difficult to maintain
a full crew of workers, because the revolution drew some of
them into the army*
workers.

Even so, no benefits were gained by

The market for nitrate was depressed and a cutback

in production with a consequent reduction of th© number of
employed, would have been inevitable.

Finally, toward th©

close of the 1 8 9 0 1s it was reported that th© revitalization
of the copper industry was giving ”the nitrate producers a
good deal of anxiety,” since they saw many of their workers
leave for jobs in th© copper Industry and feared the comp©**
tit Ion for labor would necessitate wage increases.

After

I89 O, however, nitrate workers did not realize much toprovement in wages or working conditions as a result of these
temporary scarcities of labor.
Actually, the presence of an excessive supply of
labor had more effect on the well-being of th© nitrate

^W. Anderson Smith, Temperate Chile# A Progressive
Spain (London! Adam and Charles Black, 1899J pV 5>'3.

^South American Journal. XLVI (June 17, 1899), 6 6 7 •
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workers#

The over-supply of labor was most apparent daring

the periods when producers formed combinations#

These organ

isations curtailed production; and that* naturally* limited
employment opportunities and caused distress among the
workers#

At these times* efforts were made by the government

to re-settle unemployed nitrate workers in the country *s
agricultural areas* but the results of this policy were
slight#7

nevertheless* the flow of labor both to and from

the nitrate fields had an important affect upon th© labor
situation in central Chile#
Statistics presented in Table XIII below Illustrate
the affect these combinations had on the size of the labor
force#

As a result of th© formation of th© first combination*

one-third of the workers lost their Jobs#

While th® effect

of the second period of restriction Is difficult to assess*
since It coincided with the advent of the Revolution of I8 9 I*
It probably retarded the expansion of th© labor force*

The

most serious and precipitous decline in th© employment of
nitrate workers set in with the organization of the third
combination#

Over six and a half thousand workers lost their

jobs between 1895 and 1 8 9 8 #

However* some unemployment at

this time would have been unavoidable even without th© for
mation of a combination Inasmuch as the depression in the
nitrate Industry during these years was quit© severe and a

7Ibid.. XLI (Sept.

1 9 , 1 8 9 6 ), 307*

“Smith, Temperate Chile, pp. 531•

number* of ofieima ceased operating#
TABLE XIII
The Orowth of the Nitrate Labor Force*
1880-1903*

ifamber ~o£.....
2SS£_______ Workers
2,8L8
k »906
7 *1 2 k

M
il
5*505
4*571
k*534

T~.. 1~.... r
... Wumfcer..c2f
Year
1892
1893
189k

13*5X0
lk*?56

^95

f2*|8|

I896
189?

7 *2 0 1
9 *1 8 0
1 1 *1*22

1698
18 9 9
1966
1901

13*060
11,675

1902
1903

1 6 *0 9 2

19*Jip

16,7Zl
15*95
1 8 *9 1

19*67
20*26]
21**^

^©legacion Fiscal de Salitreras, Megoria op,
Figures for th© years 1961 ^X 90 3 Sere
taken from Semper and Michels* Industrie del aalltre*
p# 333* likewise, based on later report s ro f t h o
'
Delegaelon*

1901^ pa 8 6 #

Even though the wages of labor In the nitrate fields
exceeded wages paid workers in the agricultural areas* all
reports and observations made concerning the status of the
nitrate workers indicate that their way of life was con**
aiderably degraded*

Shortly after he visited the nitrate

region, Reginald Enoch* an Englishman familiar with most
countries in Latin America* reported the following*
• • • It cannot be said that • • • /Eh© Chilean
nitrate worker/ represents any growing standard of
civilisation* His work Is hard* his life semi**
bestial and Illiterate* his dress and habitation
primitive* his customs semi ••savage* his surround
ings dreary* sterile* and lacking in amenities
which might make for social betterment; and he is

a hard drinker* due largely to the arduous nature
of the work*9
Thus* for nitrate workers the cost of Hiring was high*
living conditions were poor* and working conditions left much
to be desired*

No apparent difference in this regard existed

between Chilean and foreign producers; and with a few ex
ceptions* reported after 1 9 OO* the situation was general*"^
Basically* the high cost of living in the nitrate
region was caused by the lack of a near-by agricultural
region and the consequent necessity of importing all food
stuffs as well as other supplies and merchandise*

But* the

situation was aggravated by the practice of the nitrate
companies of seeking to monopolise the sale of food* liquor*
and other products consumed by the workers*

The method em

ployed to obtain this end was known as the truck system*
Each oficina established a company store for the purpose of
selling goods to its workers* and rules prohibiting sales by
peddlers and other merchants on company property were
strictly enforced*-*'*

Except in a few sections of Tarapaca^

most ofielnag were sufficiently isolated from one another

9c* Reginald Enoch* The feepubHcg of Central and
South America (London: J• M* Dent
Sons * 19 IJ)* P*
•
10Comejo* El Sal itre* p* II4.7 * Among the few firms
that provided better working conditions one was German*
another Peruvian* and a third a Chilean enterprise managed
by an Englishman*
i1^* W* Merriam to Dept, of State* Ho* 310* April 8*
1886* Iquique* XX* p. l*£f Theodore Child* The D anishArable an Republics (Hew York: Harper* IO9 1 J* p* ITS*
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ana from other villages to assure the effectiveness of the
monopoly#

As a result # workers spent at least sixty per

cent or their earnings in such establishments#

Because of

this system and the high prices charged by the company
stores# each oflcina was able to regain a portion of the
wages paid to workers#

It has been estimated that on the

average# one and two-tenths pennies of the cost of producing
& quintal of nitrate was restored to the companies from the
profits of their stores#*^
In spite of the attraction the nitrate Industry had
for agricultural laborers in central Chile# th© wages# hours
of labor# and other working conditions in the oflcinas were
at a low standard#

It is impossible to present an accurate

account of wage levels in th© industry before 1 9 0 0 # because
of the differences existing between ofieinaa# th© lack of
reliable statistics# and the varied mode of wage payments#
Some worked on an hourly basis while others were paid accord*
ing to the task system#^

There were at least fifteen

different types of jobs— -blasters# miners# cart drivers#
blacksmiths# common laborers# etc#— and the remuneration for
each varied#^*

Moreover# higher wages were paid in Tarapaca^

than in the other nitrate districts#

12Semper and Michels, Industrie del aalltre. p. 9 2 .
•^rbld., ppa 1 0 3 -1 0 6 .
-^Rodriguez, Eatadistlca del I’rahajo, II, Appendix
Ho. C, PP- 3of.

Nevertheless, there appears to have been a gradual
increase in money wages*
varied between

It was reported that wages in 1886

$0*75 and #2 *G0 | in X89 I, from #3 *0 0 to #S*O0 j

and after 1900 , from $4*00 to #6*00 per dsy*3^

With these

increases, however, there was a simultaneous decline in the
value of the Chilean paper peso, the monetary unit in which
workers were paid*

For instame, the average annual value

of the Ghilean peso in 1890 was

l/16th pence; by X89 I4.,

the peso was worth only 12 9/16th pence; during the remainder
of the century, the value of the peso fluxuated between
17 9/l6 th pence and llj. j/ 2 pence * ^

In th® light of this

development, the money wage increases gained by the nitrate

workers, perhaps, were sufficient only to offset the depr©cit
ation of the peso*

In any case, the increase in real wages,

if any, was slight*^
Many nitrate workers, it seems, experienced an added
disadvantage because some oficlnaa issued wages in company
tokens*

Since the tokens could be spent only at the company

store, the practice was designed to aid operators in

^ I b i d * t Child* South American Republics* P* 1731
G-aldames, JTeografla de ChiXe* p# lHo| jTWeMerriam to Dept*
of State, tfo* 3l(J, April 8 , 1886, Iqulque, IX, p* 1|5*

^Fetter, Monetary Inflation in Chile, pp* 13f*
^South American Journal* XXIX (Nov* 8 , I89 O), 580f *
This report" observes that the decline in the rate of exchange
of the Chilean paper peso meant lower wages for labor and
benefits for the producers*
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malnta.itd.ng that monopoly*

Wei11 ® workers could redeem their

tokens Tor cash at the end of every month, the system un~
doubtedly served the end for which It was contrived*1^

me

practice was severely criticised by the titrate Commission
established by the government early in the twentieth century
on th© grounds that it limited the economic freedom of the
workers and because the tokens constituted an unauthorized
currency*

Th© Commission*© recommendation that th© use of

tokens be declared illegal# like many of its other enlightened
reeoifflaend&tions, was ignored by the government**^
Working conditions were also at a low standard*
usual work-day began at six A*M* and ended at six P.M.

The
A

lunch period of an hour or less was allowed all workers#
and some oficinas also permitted a short rest period in th©
afternoon.

Variations in working hows, however, did exist

sine© th© task system prevailed in a few types of employment
and because th© processing schedule required th© completion
of certain tasks regardless of th© length of time it took*
Safety devices were inadequate and slow in being adopted*
While medical care was available for the worker and his
family (and this was probably a great advance over medical
opportunities for Chilean agricultural laborers)# only

W. Merriajn to Dept* of State* No* 310* Iqulque*
ix, p. 1*6 .
*ys&mpar and Michels* Induatria del aalltre. Appendix

No. 2 9 , p. M>2 .

routine treatment was given#

One doctor would serve several

oficinaa* and Cor his services he received weekly from each
worker a required payment amounting to several pence#

20

Until the development of the nitrate industry* the
region in which it is located was considered so inhospitable
that Tew people resided there#

When the pricings were built*

rows of small dwellings constructed of corrugated Iron were
erected by the companies as housing for th© workers*

These

crude structures housed from on© to three thousand persons*
Together with the manager*© hous© and the company store* they
formed a little village whose existence depended upon the
near-by nitrate plant#^*

Life in the nitrate region has been

aptly described by a British journalist who travelled in the
area shortly after th© turn of the century*
Profitable though the working of nitrates may
be* it is a deadly dull occupation • • * * There is
nothing more depressing or gloomy in appearance than
a nitrate-fieId, the whole country in which it is
situated being of the most dreary nature-^sand* sand*
sand everywhere, except where the bare* brown* cruel**
looking mountains intervene* Most people who go up
to the nitrate-fields feel at first the greatest
depression of spirits* and invariably look forward
to the time when they are to be released from their
voluntary but trying imprisonment#22

20 Ibid# * pp* 103**106$ Percy F# Martin* Through Five
Republics of South America (Londons Vfta* Heinemami, I906T*
'
raakes the following comments The attitude of the
average nitrate worker was Hthat he would require neither
medical advice nor medicine if he had nothing to do with
nitrates#”
2iChild* South American Republics* p* 177 *

22Martin, Ttoflaggi Five Republics, p. 32+2.

These people had no recreational facilities for none
were provided by the nitrate companies*

Neither did th® few

scattered hamlets in the area offer the workers much in the
way of diversions*

Only th® port cities of Iquiqu© and

Fisagua provided entertainment facilities in the nitrate
region* and they were not accessible to the nitrate workers
except occasionally*
Thus* there were no wholesome activities available
for relieving th© monotony of life in the nitrate desert*

A

reknowned Chilean historian* noting th© status of the nitrate
workers* has written that among them "gambling and alcohol
consume all of the time dedicated to rest*"^

while others

have recorded the presence of these vices among the nitrate
workers too, it is nonetheless true that "the propensity of
Chileans for getting blind drunk every pay-day" prevailed to
an equal degree in other areas of the country**^
In criticising* on on© occasion* the demand for
higher wages made by the nitrate workers* an Englishman ob«*
served that it would be foolish to grant their requests sine®
"they don*t have restraint, decency* /or knowledge^ about
how to liv©*" and a Chilean asserted that "the worker is not
able to save and the high wages com© to be for most a

2^Galdames* JeoCTafia de Chile* p* 120.
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temptation rather than a benefit*"*^

However true that

might have been, the poor living conditions made even more
unsatisfactory by the oppressive climate, were major obsta
cles for the development of such desirable qualities*

I'hose

who denounced the type of life led by the nitrate workers,
however, did nothing to alter or improve the environment in
which they worked.
In this regard both the producers and the government
of chile were negligent in their responsibilities*

Since

capitalists the world over during this period failed to
recognize an obligation toward labor, nitrate producers need
not be singled out for special criticism*

However, the

Chilean government --whose major source of revenue was derived
from nitrate exports— was seriously remiss in providing
public services for the people of the northern provinces*
After 1900, a growing recognition of the distressing condltlon of these people led to the establishment of a few
schools, hospitals, and entertainment facilities by the
government in the nitrate region*

But even then it could

"not be said that much benefit accrues to the immediate com-

munlty that produced this wealth* **
Beginning in I89 O, journals and newspapers which
followed nitrate developments periodically noted "labour

2^South American Journal* XXXVI (Jan* 13, I89 I1J * 36fs
a a ld a m e s , ? e ^ a f ^ ^ e ^ I Y e ;

pT

128*

^Enock, Central and South America, p* 325*
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outbreaks” or ”labour riots” occurring in the nitrate field©#
Nitrate workers were considered much more unruly then any
other type of laborer in Chile*

According to Percy F*

Martin# an English historian and traveller in South America#
th© ”wretchedly desolate” way of life of the nitrate workers
was the major reason for their "feeling of unrest and dis
However# the strikes engaged in by nitrate workers

quiet*”^

in the nineteenth century did not achieve permanent success#
because there was no organization to protect and preserve
the few concessions occasionally won from producers*
The most successful and widespread effort of nitrate
labor to obtain higher wages before the twentieth century

was made in I89 O*

Sine© it occurred shortly after the nitrate

boom had collapsed# the fundamental cause of the ©trike lay
in the circumstances attending that event*

The ©scansion of

nitrate production during the boom# it will be remembered#

led to wholesale additions to the labor force and an Increase
in wages#

oA

However# the subsequent decline in th© price of

nitz»ate reduced the amount of profit for producers and re
quired a lowering of production

c o s t s #**9

producers generally

reduced wages in their effort to cut costs*

They achieved

this in cm indirect manner— by increasing the prices of

^Martin# Through Five Republics* p* 3kk>*
*^Smith# Temperate Chile* pp# 2-3# 53#

29see Table XX, Chapter V# p# 15$ • The average price
of nitrate from I889 to I89 O declined from 9/3 d to 0/ 2 |d*

articles sold at the company

s t o r e s * ^ ®

por the workers* this

unexpected rise in the cost or living not only seemed unfair
hut also meant a decline in real wages#

with inflation

undermining their standard of living simultaneously* the
workers felt acutely the affects of th© rise in prices*^

While this was the basic grievance of th© strikers* their
animosity - toward foreigners was probably a factor of second*
ary ia^portanoe#^2
The walk-out in I89 O extended from Antofagasta through
Tarapaca and affected the port cities as well as th© oficinas#
In effect the workers asked for a sixty per oent Increase in
wages when they demanded that they be paid in silver currency
instead of in the depreciated paper m o n e y * T o support
their demands demonstrations were organised in the oficinas*
These degenerated into riots* however* and in several nitrate
establishments th© workers sacked the company stores* pro-*
vision depots* and the house of the manager*^

In th© port

cities the stevedores and boatmen joined in th© strike*

Be

cause of their demonstrations many foreign residents took

•^Chilean Times as quoted In the South American
Journal* XX
(Sept* 6*" 1890)* 279*
^Fetter* Monetary Inflation in Chile* PP* 75f*
^2South American Journal* XXIX (July 19* I89 O)# 65*
See also JT W ,Kerri am to Dept* of State, No* 507 * July 23*

I89 O, Iqulque* II,

33South American Journal. XXIX (July 19, 1090), 65.
3 H-Ibld.. July 12, 1890 , p. 34.

refuge on the ships in the

harbor#

Th© produeers, naturally, strongly opposed the demand
for higher wages made by the workers and called upon th©
Chilean government to provide adequate protection for their
lives and property*-^6

Since th© Intendsunt had too few troops

to attempt the suppression to the strike, he advised ac«*
eeptance of the strikers* terms*

While that advice was ac**

eepted reluctantly, the consular corps in Iquiqu© protested
and the British minister in Santiago urged that adequate
protection be given to British interests*’5*
The Chilean Times# a British newspaper published in
Valparaiso, blamed President Balmac&da for instigating the
riots, while the complaint of nitrate manufacturers was
voiced by the South American Journal which said*

wAssuredly

the Chilean government which benefits so largely by the
nitrate industry might spare some troops to protect life and
property* ”3®

in an editorial published by the same source,

^ J * W* Merriam to Dept* of State, Ho* $07, July S3,
IS9 0 , Iquique, II*
^Tiie American consul in Iquique denied that the
workers had legitimate complaints, stating that there was no
need for wage increases* His reasons for holding this o»*
pinion were as follows: the workers were improvident* their
houses were small and had little furniture* their clothing
was cheap* the climate mad© heating unnecessary* Thus, since
the workers had relatively nothing, they dldn*t require much
in wages to live on I See J* W* Merriam to Dept* of State,
No. $07, July 23, 1890, Iquique, II.
37 Xblg.: South American Journal* XXIX (July 19, 1890),

6$; See also F* 0* to Kennedy, Tel* ¥ 0 . 11, July 9 , I89 O,

F. 0 * 16 /259 .
38
Chilean Times as quoted in South American Journal*
XXIX (Sept. 67189377^79J see also J C T T T C ’IBW;' PpT35?f

ms
it was stated that ”th© owners of the nitrate pricings are
well entitled to some compensationsw to obtain this# the
government "might fairly be expected to reduce their present
excessive impost on nitrate*”39
Th© established policy of th© Chilean government in
regard to labor disturbances in the nitrate region was to
use troops to quell disorder and to coerce workers into r©»
turning to their jobs*

The basis for this policy rested

mainly in the understandable desire of the government to
assure a steady flow of revenue into its treasury from the
nitrate export tax*

Although only a few soldiers were

stationed in the nitrate region at the outset of the strike
of I69 O, it was not long before reenforcements arrived*

They

quickly restored order, but not without some bloodshed*

When

protection was assured, producer® planned to withdraw most
of the wage advances won by the strikers#^®
Intervention on behalf of th© producers was th© major
type of action taken by the Chilean government in regard to
the nitrate workers before the twentieth century*

Sporadic

disturbances and strikes occurred following X89 O, but none
reached as serious a stage as that attained by the strike of
1890 *

Actually, the stationing of troops at oficlnas seems

not to have been an unusual occurrence*

A description of a

representative incident Is provided by a report originally
39X b M ». July 1 9 , I89 O* p. 77*

^ X b id .. p. 65.
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published in the Chilean Timesi
The North hagunas Nitrate Works was the scene
or a serious riot on the 2nd instant ^August 2/#
100 or more of the workmen having made a demon*
stratlon in front of the manager1© residence*
Missiles* and even it is ©aid dynamite cartridges*
were freely used against th© building* Th© ring
leaders were arrested* and brought here* and a» «
force of cavalry remains on duty at the works *Z4J*
While efforts were made to form unions among the
workers in the oficinas* on the railways * and in the port
cities* little was accomplished toward this end before the
turn of the century*
ment*

There is one exception to this state*

A government-sponsored union of stevedores* called th©

Gremio de Jornaladoa* existed until I8 90 * This group had
been organised while Peru still ruled Tarapaca^ and was con*
tinned in operation by the Chilean government*^

By X89O*

it was composed of some three hundred laborers who worked
ten hours a day and were paid by the task system*

The rules

and practices established by the union were in effect decreed
by the government*

The issue of reforming th© Gremio d£

Jomalados was precipitated in I8S3 by th© Jefe Foljftioo of
Tarapaca* Francisco Valdes Vergara; but according to his
statement* action was prevented by the opposition of th©
nitrate producers who wanted to abolish th© union#^

In

spite of this opposition* the Jefe Politico did carry out

^ C h i lean Times as quoted in South American Journal*
XXXIX (Oct. iCltf95TtjJ¥> •
^Valdes Vergara* AdmlnistracIon de Tarapaca'. p. 91 ,
telbid.. p. 9 5 .
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a few changes in the union*© organization designed to permit
the workers to retain a larger proportion of their earnings
Gremio continued in operation until X8 9 O when it was
abolished, probably because it cooperated in the strike oc~
currlng in that year#^
After 1900, labor unions began to achieve strength
among workers in the nitrate region*

The strikes they en

gaged in, while frequently marked by violence, were con
sistently fought by nitrate producers* merchants, and th©
r

owners of the railroads#

Employers relied upon strike

breakers , the lockout, and probably government troops to
resist the advance of unionism among their workers#^
The operation of a nitrate plant required the ©mployment of trained engineers to maintain and operate the
processing machinery and chemists to conduct the necessary
analysis of the nitrate solutions#

‘These technical positions

and the managerial staffs as well were filled almost entirely
by Europeans, most of whom were Englishmen#

By 1900, ap

proximately one thousand Europeans were employed by the
nitrate producers#^

^ I b i d *. p#

92m

^llartner, Polltlca comercial de Chile# XI,
^ S e e Semper and Michels, Industrie del salitr©» p#
105l A* F# Brodle James# Nitrate Facts TaneO?Xf?ure&# pp# Ilfs
U* I* Cons# Reports, hXVlT S 7 “^ o 7 ^ p p ^ W :
^Delogacion de Salitreras, Memoria on 1901# p# 21#

CHAPTER VIII

THE NITRATE INDUSTRY AND THE REVOLUTION OP 1891
While th© significance of th© territory acquired by
Chile during th© War of th© Pacific rest© in part upon th©
changes it effected in the Chilean economy and In the organ
isation of her public finances, the acquisition of th©
nitrate region also hastened, perhaps even made possible,
her first successful revolution in over half a century*

This

was the Revolution of I8 9 I, and its outcome determined a
constitutional question of fundamental significances

whether

presidential power would be preserved or whether Congress
would enforce the parliamentary principle of ministerial
responsibility#
For several decades preceding 1 8 9 1 , the presidents
of Chile had striven to maintain the powers of their office*
These powers, granted by the Constitution of 1833» made it
possible for the chief executive to choose and elect his
successor and to dominate the legislature*

This 11autocratictt

power remained intact until l8 6 l; but thereafter, sentiment
in favor of limiting presidential power began to grow#

The

feeling was reflected in Congress,uihIeh gradually assumed a
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more influential and independent role in the government#3,
Chilean presidents opposed this trend hut they could not
stop it#
During the presidency of Joae Manuel BaXmaceda (18861 8 9 1 )4 th© relationship between th© executive and congress

was considerably altered*

Rampant factionalism within th©

President *s own Liberal party, along with hie attempt to
maintain an harmonious relationship with Congress by choosing
ministers acceptable to it* led to cabinet instability and
political confusion#

p

Moreover, presidential interference

in elections could no longer assure a tractable Congress#
In fact, Congress

criticised governmental acts with uncon

trollable persistence•
As in the past, Congress represented the dominant
landholding aristocrats*

By I8 9 O the majority had turned

against Balm&cedaf because in spite of his many concessions
to congressional wishes, he planned to name his successor in
I8 9 I*^

In the eyes of Congress this constituted a perpetu

ation of presidential power which it was unwilling to accept#

In addition, many aristocrats feared BaXmaceda *a democratic
electoral reforms might result In thoir loss of political
power*

So to them, the establishment of congressional

^Galdames, History of Chile * pp# 2lfO-2l0* 2J>5ff♦
2 Ibid., pp. 342, 344.

^Ibid.. p. 3 4 5 ,
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control over the government became a pressing necessity*
Congress used its power over appropriations in an
effort to compel BaXmaceda to give up his attempted perpetu
ation of presidential power*

After much controversy a tempo

rary compromise was arranged*

A ministry acceptable to

Congress was appointed and th© appropriations bill for IB90
was passed*

But no action was taken on the appropriations

bill for 1 8 9 1 *

Then, following the adjournment of Congress

in October, I8 9 O, BaXmaceda replaced th© cabinet of compro
mise with on© of his own choosing*

On January 1st, he an

nounced that th© appropriation bill for the previous year
would b© enforced in 1 8 9 1 *

Congress considered this an

unconstitutional act and deposed BaXmaceda on January 7th*
6
With this event a revolution was started*
The revolution was organised by the congressional
majority and it received th© support of the Chilean navy*
The army, however, remained loyal to th© President, who was
thereby able to preserve his authority in th© populous
sections of the country where the majority of the troops were
stationed*^

Meanwhile, th© revolutionists took to th© sea.

Being deprived of the opportunity to organize a resistance

5Ibid* * pp* 3l|iff; Some historians consider BaXmaceda
the champion of a more popular government in Chile* See
Osgood Hardy, "The Itata Incident,” Hispanic American His
torical Review, V (May, 1922), p* 200 ana notes*
A
Oaldames, History of Chile« pp* 3k$£f *
?Ibld*, p* 3 ^6 *
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force la th© major province® and with only a small contingent
of soldiers at it® command* Congress saw that its future
success depended upon the establishment of a base in Chilean
territory where an array could be formed and trained free
from the danger of harassment*

Since the nitrate region was

virtually inaccessible by land* it provided an ideal nest
for the revolutionaries »
there*

They quickly imposed their rule

The navy won control of the nitrate ports in Tarapaca*

Revolutionary forces drove B&lmaceda*s small garrisons
inland* and after a brief struggle ©merged victorious*

A

Possession of northern Chile gave Congress not only
an ideal base of operations* but also access to the immense
revenues derived from the tax on nitrate exports*

This be-*

came their chief source of funds for th© support of the war*
Another important aspect of the relationship between the
nitrate industry and the Revolution of 1092- lies in the aid
given that movement by the British nitrate capitalists*
Without these advantages* it Is highly improbable that the
Congressional forces would have won the struggle in which
they were engaged*
There are indications that foreign economic interest®
in Chile* especially th© British nitrate capitalists* were
involved in the political conflict preceding the revolution
as partisans of the aristocrats*

The open hostility of

Balmaceda toward the British nitrate Interests provides the

8 Ibid
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major reason why they identified their welfare with the
Congressional party*
3almaeeda*s statements and actions pertaining to the
nitrate industry were leading him to the formulation of a
Chilean nitrate policy*^

There is no doubt that he hoped

to return the industry to Chilean control*

The President

considered combinations the work of the British enterprises;
and early in 1889* he proposed the prohibition of these
organisations as a means of protecting Chilean interests*
His influence may have been an Important factor in forestall*
ing the organisation of the second combination in I6 8 9 and
I8 9 0 *

At the same time* the President suggested that the

expropriation of the Nitrate Railways Company and the nation*
alization of the entire nitrate industry might be necessary
10
to achieve his goal.
Balmaceda*s opposition to Nitrate
Railways rested upon his belief that the high rates it
charged were detrimental to the welfare of the industry*
Consequently* he sought to destroy the monopoly position that
siade these rates possible**^*

He also deplored the wholesale

incorporation of large companies on the London stock exchange
during the boom years*

According to the President* corporate

^Cornejo* El 5alltre« p* 133*
10Chlle, Pomenfco de la Industria salltrera, pp.
Billinghurafc, LoacapTEaXBs aalitreroa, p. 113*
11

The British government supported Nitrate Railways
before the government of Balmaceda* 111 hope*11 wrote the
British Minister to Chile* "after some settlement of the

enterprises, unlike personally owned nitrate works, did not
promote either public or private interests#

t2

His policy,

in the words of an American consul, was to encourage "small
and independent companies19 in order to erect an "obstacle
to the formation of a trust of English companies#"^
While Balmaceda did not relent in his opposition to
British domination of the nitrate industry, he did come to
the conclusion that nationalisation was not a practical course
of action*

"It is true," the President said, "that we should

not exclude the free competition and manufacture of nitrate
in Tarapaca; but we cannot consent that this rich and ex«*
tensive region should become simply a foreign factory*"^
Opposition from Chilean nitrate capitalists and the expense
involved were, in all probability, the chief obstacles to the
nationalization of the industry*
Although Congress, apparently, failed to echo
Balmaceda1s ideas concerning the nitrate industry, his view

Nitrate Railways question to get on a friendlier footing with
the President for he really governs the country. So far he
looks upon me as a disagreeable person because I bothered
him in regard to Peruvian Bond-holders, thwarted his ©ml**
grat Ion designs upon Britishers and now attack him in regard
to Nitrate Railways*" Kennedy to Sanderson, May 27$ 1 8 9 0 ,
F# 0* 16/259* See also Chapter IV*
^ C o m e j o , El Salltre, pp# 131-133#
1% . S* Cons* Repts*, XXXII {IB8 9 ), I4.O8 #
^Russell, A Visit to the Nitrate Fields * p* 312$ See
also Billinghurst, %oa caplValeo aalltroros, p* 120 where
Balmaceda Is report ed to have cit ed the ant I-trust law of th©
U n i t e d States as an example of what he wanted#

2ll±
received popular support*^

A newspaper published in

Santiago, the hlbertad Electoral, voiced the fear that the
entire nitrate region was In danger of being dominated by
the British nitrate capitalists*
this view* entitled "Tarapacat

The article containing
Its Northisat ion,u noted with

great apprehension the monopolistic activities of Col*
North*

In addition, a leading West Coast writer on nitrate

affairs Guillermo Billlnghurst, gave hi® support to Balmacedars ideas when he declared that
these floatations in London, have (1) not increased
the public riches of Chile, nor (2) the industrial
riches with small exceptions, and they will produce
bad effects upon the industry# More important Is
the effect on state revenues, especially their
contraction due to the efforts of the combination# ■
Moreover, In pointing to the Important political and
financial effects foreign ownership of the nitrate Industry
could have on Chile in the future, Billlnghurst posed the
question which many Chileans considered of fundamental im
portance*

He wrotes

Is it prudent, for the state, whose principal
financial resources come from the tax on nitrate
exports, to remain passive, seeing that this
industry is being concentrated in the hands of
a determined group of foreigners?1,0

^Cornejo, El Sailtre, p# ll|l*
^Quoted In the Nitrate Craze, pp* l£f#
^Billlnghurst, Los cap!tales salitreros, p* 113#
^ X b l d *, p* I).#

Balmaceda continued his opposition to the British
nitrate interests throughout the year lOgO# and in the fall
of that year he conducted a speaking tour during which he
consistently evinced a hostile attitude toward British inter*
ests#^

He voiced his antipathy to British control over an

industry that had been won by the shedding of Chilean blood
and through the sacrifices of her citisens#

Moreover#

nitrate capitalists claimed that the president

instigated

labor riots in the oficlnas and that he supported and was
largely responsible for the successful demands mad© by the
workers for higher wages*^

On© of Col* North*© friends#

the journalist William Russell# coimnented that he "found
the foreign communities much exercised by the declarations
he ^falmacedja^ had made in the course of his official
journey* "
This anti*Balmaceda sentiment among British nitrate
interests was essentially the outcome of the refusal of the
President to make an agreement satisfactory to the English
capitalists*

An opportunity had been afforded him when the

leading nitrate Investor# Col* Horth# visited Chile in
1889*22

The British entrepreneur# apprehensive about the

^9rh© Times (London)# Jan* 19* 1891# P» 5*
^South American Journal* XXXX (July 12# I8 9 0 )# 3i|4
Sept# 6# lBgtf# p*"2Y 9 #
^Russell# "The Troubles in Chile#" p* IjSlj,*
^Other implications of North*© voyage to Chile in
IO89 are discussed in Chapter III# pp* 106ff*
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security of hi® investments, declared that the purpose of hi®
voyage to Chile was 11to solidify and extend /Kijl? interests/1
and perhaps, even to conclude an agreement with the Presi03

dent# -' But hi® journey proved fruitless#

Although he re*

ported to the pres® that his conversation with Balmaceda had
been successful, his optimism was totally unfounded#

Col#

North*s proposals received scant consideration, and the gifts
that he had brought for the President were refused*

The

President went so far as to single out for attack North*®
most powerful company, the Nitrate Railways#

He obtained a

court decision nullifying that firm*® monopoly privilege,
and he granted concessions to others which led to the
building of competing rail lines

The unsatisfactory re*

lations between Balmaceda and Col# North were confirmed by
a consul of the United States, who happened to be in Santiago
at the time#

The latter described a ^large and imposing

representation” which had come to Chile from Great Britain
to obtain ^such concessions and changes in nitrate regu*
lations as would render them masters of the situation and
give them a virtual monopoly of the nitrate trade*”

The

consul1a conclusion regarding the result of the encoimter is
a precise summatipn of the reception that the delegation*®
requests

received*^

f,I am convinced,” he wrote, ”that the

^Russell, a Visit to the Nitrate yields * p# 81#
Budd to Sanderson, Jan* 11, 1894,
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impolicy of strengthening th© hands of the would-be monopo
lists was fully appreciated at Santiago#”2^
The continued estrangement between the government and

the English nitrate capitalists is indicated by Col# North*s
close association with members of the Congressional oppo
sition to Balmaceda#

One leader of the opposition gave the

visitor a banquet, and Col# North *3 chief legal advisor in
Chile was Julio Zegers, a prominent member of the antiBalmaceda group, isho sided with the revolutionists in 1891»

26

Balmaceda*s supporters both directly and indirectly
identified British nitrate capitalists with the Congressional
party#

In a speech Julio Banados Espinosa declared1
The • • # true source of the revolution • # #
is that of personal Interests, • • # # What has been
the influence of the Tarapaca nitrate kings in our
parliamentary wrangling©, and In our political
affairs, for the last five years? • • • • The same
interests, which have contributed to throw us into
a revolution are, at the present time, knocking
at every door in foreign countries to bring us
27
into discredit, and to dishonor our foreign affairs# ‘
More direct testimony Is rendered by the special

correspondent of the London Times,Maurice Hervey, one of the
few Englishmen in Chile who favored the cause of the Presi
dent#

2£u« S» Cons# Rents#, XXXII (I8 O9 ), lj.08#

^Creat Britain, Foreign Office, 0orrespondence
Respecting the Revolution In Chile (Londont Harrison "and Sons*
It»9 2 ), !no7 P 7 pV
^outE",‘American Journal, XLIV {March 26,
1 8 9 8 ), 353$ Russell, A visit io 'k\ie"titrate Fields« p# 9 5 #
Julio Banados Espinosa was a writer and professor#
He became an outspoken supporter of President Balmaceda# II©
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Without quoting names, soma or which are as
well known upon the London Stock Exchange as the
cardinal points or the compass, the fact remains,
beyond the possibility of contradiction, that the
instigators, the wire-pullers, the financial
supporters or the so-called revolution were, and are,
the English or Anglo-Chllean owners of the vast
nitrate deposits of Tarapaca « • . # The fact further
remains that outside certain portions of these
nitrate districts (and mostly of course, Iquique and
PisaguaJ^ghe revolutionary appeal ha® proved a total
The link between the British nitrate capitalists and
the opposition prior to the revolution was strengthened after
the revolt began#

In the spring of I89 I and before the

Congressional forces achieved any notable success outside
their stronghold in the nitrate region, Col# North e&pressed
his wholehearted support of the revolution and his belief
that the "political difficulties" in Chile would soon be
settled in such a manner that Nitrate Hallways would attain
a position more advantageous than heretofore#^

in th©

columns of almost every English newspaper, periodical and
journal, the revolutionists received unquestioned support#
There are two major reasons for the prevalence of this atti*
tude In the English press#

In the first place, the welfare

of English economic interests w<as identified with the cause
of the revolutionists; and secondly, since the Congressional
party favored the establishment in Chile of a parliamentary

held posts in cabinets during Balmaceda*s presidency#
V#, Figueroa Pleolonario# II, 99*101#

See

2®South American Journal# XXX (May 23, I89 I), 65l|*#
^9The Time® (London), May 6 , I8 9 I, p# 11,

form of government similar to the British political system*

Englishmen naturally sympathised with their objective#^
A few of the articles published in English periodicals were
written by men Identified with the nitrate interests, and
they were uniformly pro-revolutionlst in sentiment; and the
London Tlaaea recalled its special correspondent in Chile#
Maurice Hervey, because his dispatches were favorable to
31
Balmaceda#
When the civil war ended with the triumph of
the revolutionists, the South American Journal, a consistent
champion of the nitrate capitalists, stated editorially8
It is with great satisfaction that we have to
record the realisation, not only of our hopes, but
of the expectations we have throughout ventured
to express, in the complete overthrow of BALMACEDA
and his servile supporters#32
While the charges that the British nitrate capital
ists contributed heavily to the financial resources of the
revolutionists cannot be unreservedly substantiated, availa
ble evidence, however, points in that direction#

One accu

sation, published by the San Francisco Daily Evening
Bulletin, asserted that between three and four million pesos
were contributed to the revolutionary regime by the nitrate

3°Hardy, "British Hltrates and the Balmaceda Revo
lution,* pp# 165ff»
^Russell, "Troubles In Chile," p# l81f| Edward Manby
"A Note on Chilean Affairs," The Fortnig^t ^ Review (London)
Hew Series, L (July-Dee#, 1 6 9 1 ), 10I-1Q5; South American
Journal, XXXI (Aug# 8 , I8 9 I), 1^7#
32ibid•, Sept# 6 , 1891 , p#

capitalists.^*

Although no source was cited# the allegation

might be ascribed with probable validity to a Balmaceda
supporter and a former Chilean consul in San Francisco named
C&ssanova.

He believed that)

It will be found that British money is the
mainstay of the insurgents against our government.
The British want to obtain control of the nitrate
deposits and President Balmaceda wished them to
be worked for the benefit of the Chilean govern*
ment.34
The English Journalist Hervey declared that the
"English or Anglo-Ciiilean owners of the vast nitrate deposits
in Tarapaca" are the "financial supporters of the so-callod
revolution. "35

Hervey was well-informed on the subject of

Chilean politics# and his opinion was not only derived from
his contacts with government officials of the Balmaceda
administration but also through his association with members
of the British community resident in Chile.

That M s deela*

ration was sincere Is indicated by the fact that he main*
tained his point of view even when it became evident that It
would result in M s recall.
The American Minister to Chile# Patrick Egan# was
another who charged the British nitrate capitalists with
aiding the revolutionists.

In a dispatch to Secretary of

^ The San Francisco Pally ffveMng Bulletin# as quoted
In Hardy, "British nitrates and the Balmaceda Revolution,"
p. 1 8 0 .
York Daily Tribune. May 8 , 1891), p. 1.
3i?South American Journal. XXX (May 23, I89 I), 6 5 I4..

State James g# Blaine he wrote on one occasion the followingt
nI may mention as a feature of much interest the fact that

the revolution has the undivided sympathy, and in many cases
the aetlve support, of the English residents in Chile*19 He
continued, ”it is known that many English houses have sub*
scribed liberally to the revolutionary fund*

Among others,

it is openly stated by leaders of the revolution, Mr* John
Thomas North contributed the sum of h 100,000# 11 Egan also
recorded a report from Balmaceda*s eoamaander in Tarapaca
that claimed the English managers of oflelnaa in the nitrate
district were urging their workers to Join the revolutionary
army by offering bounties to them if they did, and threat*
ening to fire them if they did not#
While Patrick Egan*s career as American Minister to
Chile has been the subject of much controversy, he, never*
theless, appears to have performed his duties with con*
slderable ability#^

Although h© was undoubtedly in favor

of the President fs party in the revolution and believed they

^^United States, Department of State, Papers
to the Foreign Relations of t M United S
t
f
(
ton: Government Printing Office, 1 0 9 2 }, P# 107• Col# North,
referred to by Egan as a contributor to the revolutionary
fund, had ample resources and could well have given fi*
nancial aid to the revolution# Not only was he © wealthy
nitrate investor, but between the years 1387 and 1696 he ex*
pended & 250 ,0 0 0 for expenses incurred in the attempt to
maintain the monopoly of the Nitrate Railways company# A
full accounting of these expenditures was never made#
^Osgood Hardy, ,fWas Patrick Egan a •blundering
m inis ter * *” .Hispanic American Mjgtorical Review* VIII (Feb*,
1928), PP* 6^*81#

would be the ultimate victors , Egan1s record shows that ho
maintained, as he was expected to do, the officially neutral
policy of the United States*

In spite of this, however, the

revolutionists considered him hostile to their Cause, and the
Balmacedists sought to identify the United States as one of
their supporters*3®

the large and important English

community in Chile and Egan were hostile toward each other,
his testimony regarding English aid to the revolutionists
must be evaluated with this relationship in mind,

Still, his

reports should be accepted as generally correct, even though
the details may be in error#

In Balmaceda1s friendly atti

tude toward the United States, Egan saw an opportunity to
promote American economic interests at the expense of the
British*

But though h© talked with the President on the

subject of employing American capital as a means of dimin
ishing English preponderance in the nitrate industry, the
victory of the revolutionists nullified his efforts#*^

it

should be noted, however, that economic and financial con
ditions In the world and in the United States in particular
at that time were not rip© for American investment on a
large scale in Chile*
The interests of the English and the Insurgents were

3%©nry Clay Evans, Chile and Its Relations with the
united States (Durham Duke tfniversliy"Press," l^S?), pp«

T38-T£l.

^Hardy, "Was Patrick Egan a ‘blundering Minister,»"
P«

7k»

related in a manner similar to the connection existing be*
tween the Balmaceda government and the United State©! and
because English interests in Chile were stronger than those
or the North American republic, they had a more important
effect In determining the course of the revolution#

W© have

already seen how the English identified themselves with the
revolutionary movement •

In their turn, leaders of the revo

lution urged the English to give them support because the
success of their party would be, they claimed, advantageous
to British interests*

This does not mean, of course, that

the revolutionists were fighting for British interests*
Rather, the welfare of the latter, especially those interested
in Chilean nitrates, was Incidentally furthered by the at
tempt to overthrow President Baimacedaj and need for foreign
assistance required the cultivation of those who could render
aid in obtaining necessary supplies and arms*
British diplomatic reports record the attitude of
leading insurgents towards the English*

In reporting to the

Foreign Office that many revolutionists had urged him to
request British recognition of the revolution, the English
Minister in Santiago remarked that they
* * * look to are at Britain for money and ships,
manufactured goods, and all necessities of life!
that they had relations with British capitalists
and desired to encourage the Investment of foreign
capital in Chile,4°

bpQrtm Br*, Correspondence Respecting the Revolution
in Chile* P« 185*

2*%
Th© point of view expressed in this dispatch would
undoubtedly appeal to the English nitrate capitalists who
were anxious for an opportunity to make additional in
vestments in new nitrate properties*

They knew* as th©

insurgents had reminded the British minister* that Balmaceda
was opposed to th© introduction of additional English capital
in th© nitrate industry*^*

Revolutionary ©gents in Europe*

likewise* made direct representations to the Foreign Office*
The British Foreign Secretary informed his minister in
Santiago that

Agustin Ross* one of th© most important revo

lutionary agents in Europe* had told him that^

h c h e policy of selling state-owned nitrate properties
was resumed after the revolution# See Chapter XX* pp# 6lf#
This action has been interpreted as a redemption of th©
pledge made during the revolt to promote foreign investments
in Chile* {See Hardy* "British Hit rates and th© Balmaceda
Revolution*" pp* 179i*«) However* such was not the case*
The real reasons for the sal© were® (!) the need of ad
ditional funds to support th© monetary conversion scheme|
(2) the desire to increase Chilean investments in nitrates;
and (3) th© plan of undermining th© nitrate combination by
creating new producers* Apparently after achieving power*
the congressional Party was no longer so anxious to stimulate
British investments in th© nitrate industry* As an English
man wrote a few years later, "
• • • th© *parvenus foreign
nitrate adventurers1 have lost cast© as well as influence
with all parties • ♦ • • " Smith, Temperate Chile* p* 2*
^Agustin Rosa was a Chilean banker. He wrote nu
merous articles about the economic problems of Chile* Rosa
was in Europe when the revolution began* H© became an agent
for the Congressional Party; and with th© triumph of hi©
cause* Ross was appointed Minister to Croat Britain* As a
revolutionary agent* Ross worked with August© Matte* Matte
was also a banker and diplomat* Both men had served in the
Chilean Senate* See V# Figueroa, Diccionario* IV-V, pp*
221f, 1067.

it la very important to English eomereial
interests that the Congressional party should
be speedily successful# and /$§/ stated that
President Balmaceda was under the influence
of Mr* Egan# the United States Minister# and
hostile to British merchants*h3
This quotation shows how the revolutionists expanded
their request for British support by associating the President
with Horth American economic interests and by inferring that
English and insurgent interests were in harmony with one an*
other*

According to Times correspondent Hervey# wstill more

indiscreet was th© oft-heard boast of the revolutionists
that they had the whole nitrate interest at their backs , as
well as th© moral support of th© British Government , and of
th© British navy**^*
British policy during the revolution reflected the
attitude of the English press# the English nitrate capital**
ists, and the English coiamunity in Chile*

VS/hen Balmaceda

issued decrees prohibiting exports of nitrate and closing the
nitrate ports to all trade, tho British refused to recognise
their validity*^
The British fleet cruised off the Chilean coast and
protected British ships from molestation} however, their
action was followed by the United States,■which also sent a

U3art* Br., Correspondence Respecting the Revolution
in chile* p# 157*
^Hervey, Dark Days in Chile, pp* 108f*
^Grt* Br*# Correspondence Respecting the Revolution
in Chile# p.
5 2 nd Congress, Vol« 3^*i «o*
p* 21*
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naval squadron to Chilean waters*

The major difference*

apparently# was that the United States did not protest the
action taken by Balmaceda 'while Great Britain did*

it one

time or another* both the British and American navies were
accused of acting as messenger boys* the British for the
revolutionists and th© American lor Balmaceda*^
In addition* the British materially aided th© insurgentgj cause by refusing to give more than nominal support
to Balmaceda *s agents in England*

Moreover# revolutionary

agents were permitted to procure supplies and ship them from
English ports without hindrance

from the government*

The

ability of the Congressional party to obtain munitions and
war materials in England (and elsewhere) was a determining
factor in th© revolution*

Th© Insurgents were in desperate

need of arms and ammunition for until those supplies were at
hand* no attack on Balmaceda could be made*
Efforts to procure war materials were made by revo
lutionary agents in th© United States* England# and on the
continent*

In the United States th© Chilean revolutionary

agent Ricardo Trumbull obtained a large quantity of rifles
and ansnunition from a factory in New York*^

These were

M >ibid«» pp* 6lf| Evans* Chile and the United States*
p .

li|2«

^Ricardo Trumbull was an excollent choice as th©
revolutionary agent In the United States* He not only spoke
English well but was also a distant relative of a well-known
American* Lyman Trumbull* Hardy# f,The Itata Incident”# p*
202

.

transported to California* then transferred to a schooner
which finally delivered them to the insurgent A* vessel* the
Xtatm* ^

In obtaining this cargo Trumbull was probably aided

by the New York commercial firm of w* B# Grace and Company*
although proof of this Is lacking#

Nevertheless* Grace and

Company admitted sending non«*ailitary supplies to the revo
lutionists* while his ooirqpetitor* Charles B# Flint and
Company* was shipping supplies to

B a l m a c e d a *

^9

George A*

Burt* sho had charge of the Itata1© cargo in California*
denied that "the credits used to purchase these arm© were
from Europe*

At any rate* the arms carried by the Itata

were not a decisive factor In the Chilean revolution because
the United States forced the return of the ship with Its
cargo until the legality of the shipment could be determined,
judicially#
When a similar incident involving Great Britain oc
curred* the Foreign Office acted quite differently*

The

chief revolutionary agents In Europe* Agusto Matte and
Ague tin Ross* dispatched military supplies from the important
nitrate commercial center of Liverpool aboard the English
vessel Aconcagua#

Labelled as a cargo of screws* these

munitions were transferred to the insurgent*© vessel Maipu

^ S e e Ibid* for the details of the Itata controversy*
4-9Mew York D a lly Tribune. May 10, 1891* p» 1.
June 2 6 * I6 9 1 * p* 1 #

in the Straits of Magellan#*^

Information to this ©ffect w

given tn© Foreign Office by the government of Balmaceda# but
no action ims taken to prevent the supplies reaching Xquiqu©*^
According to a United States HavaX Intelligence report# the
Congressional army was at last adequately equipped as a result
of th© receipt of these supplies#^
In one other instance th© plans of Balmaceda to
frustrate th© efforts of the opposition aroused discord be**
tween his government and that of Croat Britain#

Early in

the war# Balmaceda perceived the possibility of the Congres
sional forces establishing their rule in the nitrate region#
In an attempt to prevent them from gaining control over the
revenues derived from nitrate exports# the President ordered
the destruction of the nitrate establishments#

When the

British# and German Minister too# entered a vigorous protest
to this order# they received only th© promise that compen
sation would be forthcoming for all damages Incurred#^
Balmacedafs project# however# was prevented from being carried
out by the swift capture of the nitrate region by the revo
lutionaries#
^Grt# Br## Cor re spondenc e Respecting the Revolution
In Chile# p# 2 6 9 #
5 2 ibid., pp# 1$2£ % Jos© M# Santa Cams# “Chile and Her
Civil war#Ir Worth American Review# Chill (Oct## I89D # lp.2#

^ U W t e d States# Office of Haval Intelligence# The
Chilean Revolution of 1891. War Series Ho# IV (Washington!
Government Printing Office# 1 8 9 3 )# p# 26#
^Cornejo, S£ Salltre. pp. 139f.
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The conclusion that th© English nitrate capitalists
were an important factor in determining th© outcome of the
revolution seems valid*

They had sufficient reasons for

desiring the victory of the Congressional forces; their
sympathies were clearly with the insurgents! and influential
members of their group were closely associated with parties
ipants in the struggle*

The extent of their aid* ©specially

that of money or credit advanced, is impossible to estimate
precisely*

Even though the nitrate revenues probably

afforded most of th© funds needed by the Congressional party,
at least on© well-informed British nitrate investor wrote
that these duties would not provide adequate support for the
revolutionary cause*^

In th© light of that statement, the

numerous indications that contributions were forthcoming
from the foreign nitrate capitalists must be given serious
consideration*

Furthe rmore, It should be emphasised that

th© revolutionists never denied th© charges that they r©~
ceived financial aid from this source*

^Maaby, nA Hot© on Chilean Affairs#ff p* 101*

CHAPTER IX

THE IMPACT OF NITRATES ON NINETEENTH CENTURY CHILE
It can be seen from a recapitulation of the previous
chapters that the nitrate industry had an important afreet
on the course of Chilean history in the late nineteenth
century.

Many political and social trends as well as the

Chilean economy were either directly or indirectly shaped by
nitrate developments.
Even before Chile acquired complete control over the
industry, nitrate affairs everted an important influence on
her economy, which was expanding and prosperous between the
years 1866 and l87lj-« This prosperity was promoted in part
by Chilean capitalists who developed valuable mining interests

In territory belonging to Bolivia and Peru#

Th© working of

nitrate deposits was one of these enterprises.

After 1873,

the mining boom collapsed, and Investors suffered serious
losses.

Moreover, the difficulties of Chilean nitrate ©ntr©**

preneurs were increased by th© nationalization policy of Peru
^Toward the close of this period of prosperity a
Chilean economist observed that most Chileans believe the
country1a "life is tied up only with the development of
riches, stock exchange dealings, mining ventures, and specu^
1 atIon in securities and corporation©*"

Marelal Gonzales,
"Las Negooioa y las crisis," El Ferrocarrll, July 5, 1873,
as q u o t e d in Fetter, Monotary^nflation in Chi1©. p. 16.
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and by the hostile attitude of Bolivia#

p As a result#

Chilean nitrate interests in Tarapaca/ declined# and those in
Bolivia operated In an atmosphere of uncertainty*

A few

Chileans who had lost their properties in T&rupaea transferred their activities to th© Chilean fields of Aguas
Blancas and Taltal*

But even with the encouragement of the

government# they failed to establish themselves as important
producers because th© deposits they worked were inferior and
adequate transportation facilities were lacking*
Meanwhile* a depression hit Chile in 1673*

The

landholding aristocracy faced serious financial problems*
They were heavily in debt; and sine© the markets for their
products were depressed* the future outlook was dim*

In

addition* commerce was severely restricted; th© banks were in
a precarious status; and th© government did not receive suf
ficient revenues to cover its expenses*

The world-wide

economic crisis of the 1870*8 added to Chile *0 difficulties*^
By I8 7 8 # hard times affected every significant section of
the Chilean economy# and hope of recovery in th© foreseeable
future was small*

Because of this situation# specie payments

were suspended in 1 8 7 8 #

With th© outbreak of the War of the

2Gulllermo Subercaseaux# Monetary and Banking Policy
of Chile* Ed* by David Klnley (O ^ o r d T Slar©ndon Press# T922)
p7 857 ""Actually# developments in copper and silver mining
were more important than nitrates in producing th© depression
During the depression* th© price of copper declined by fifty
per cent while the price of silver fell fifteen per cent*

^Fetter# Monetary Inflation in Chile* pp* 17* 26 .
3 Of $ oaldames# His^QCT^of Ctiil© *T pp * j15 *3^Qf *
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Pacific a few months later, th© government began issuing
paper money *^“
During the period "when economic distress in Chile was
most acute, serious diplomatic differences between Chile and
Bolivia were renewed*

It is quite possible that the depress

slon in Chile significantly influenced the outcome of the
diplomatic crisis*

The hostile action taken by the Bolivian

government against Chilean nitrate Interests near Antofagasta
produced & firm protest from Chile*

The controversy that

ensued resulted in the revival of Chilean expansionism*
Chilean statesmen were undoubtedly aware of the economic
advantages to be gained by annexing th© Bolivian littoral*
In the first place, existing interests would be provided
protection; secondly, new groups would have an opportunity
to establish themselves there; and thirdly, new sources of
revenue for the government would be opened up*

Annexation of

the littoral would mean war with Bolivia; and because of the
alliance between Bolivia and Peru, the latter probably would
be drawn Into the struggle*
From the standpoint of the expansionists of Chile,
war with Peru would provide the welcome opportunity to ac
quire the rich province of Tarapaca*

Thus, through terri

torial expansion, th© depression might be alleviated*

The

determination expressed by Chile on th© first day of th© war

^Fetter, Monetary Inflation in Chile* pp* 28-10*
^See Chapter I, pp* 27f#

to retain Antofagasta# and her obvious annexationist designs
on Tar&paca# constitute evidence supporting the view that
the depression strengthened the Chilean expansion movement#^
In any event # the victory of Chile In the War of the
Pacific solved her major economic problems#

with the con

quest of Tarapaea, revenues obtained from th® nitrate indus
try replaced issues of paper money as the main source for
funds to carry on the war#

In fact, there was no need for

further issues of paper money at all#

At the same time the

distress of the landholding aristocracy was turned into
prosperity by the opening of markets In the mining region for
the products of the Chilean haciendas#^

In addition, Chilean

capitalists and merchants benefited from Chilean control of
the nitrate region#
Prom 1880 onward the nitrate industry continued to
contribute to the economic growth of Chile#

The rapid ex

pansion of production facilities in Tarapaea^ and later in
the other nitrate fields, gave Chilean agriculture increasing
markets for its produce#

Services required by the industry

^Dennis# Taena-Arlca Dispute* pp# 83ff#

7Subercaseaux» Monetary Policy of Chile# p# 97# By
the end of the war, writes SuDercaseaux# wthe economic and
financial situation of the country had undergone a notable
Improvement • • • # The debtors were able to take advantage
of the altered situation for th© purpose of converting their
old obligations into new ones carrying a lower rate of
Interest# The price of rural and urban properties rose con
siderably# so that many landowners# infoo shortly before would
have been unable to pay their debts by selling their
holdings# afterwards found themselves with a considerable
balance in their favour#*1

gave rise to smaller businesses and stimulated the building
of additional railroads*

Moreover* the large volume of

nitrate exported to Europe again gave Chile a favorable
balance of trad© and did much to provide her with a sufficient
supply of foreign exchange*®
Th® large revenues collected by the government from
the tax on nitrate exports gave Chile the means to restore
her currency to a metallic basis*

However* Chilean leaders

failed to take advantage of the favorable situation*

Instead*

they gave priority to an extensive program of public w o r k s *9
For the most part the schools* public buildings* railroads*
and harbor improvements constructed under this program were
located in the central valley* where th© politically dominant
aristocracy lived*

While th© nitrate region benefited little

from the program* the improvement of transportation f&eili**
ties aided the growth of both domestic and foreign trade*
This and the commerce In nitrates promoted th© development
of a wealthy commercial class that eventually exerted a
strong Influence in th© Chilean government*
Possession of the nitrate fields also led to a growth
of foreign investments in Chile*

Th© trend can be discerned

from statistics showing th© amount of British capital placed
in Chilean enterprises and securities*

From i860 to I8 9 O

®Fett©r* Monetary Inflation in Chile* pp* 22f list
Chilean Imports and exports from l^TO' to 'TP$2§•

9ibld** pp* 145-4^7*
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the total British investments in Chile rose from h 8 .If
millions to & 2l|, millions*^

Of this latter sum nitrate

producing companies and the major allied enterprises ac
counted for & 9*8 millions or two-fifths of the total*

For

the next twenty years investments continued to increase
substantially#

Although these investments promoted economic

development, th© dominance of British capital in th© nitrate
industry was one reason for rise of anti-foreighlsm in Chile#
As had been pointed out in Chapter Six, th© policy of re
stricting nitrate production was largely a British scheme
and was considered by the government detrimental to the
interests of Chile*
The attitude taken by the Chilean government toward
restriction points to one of the chief influences of nitrates
on Chile#

The revenues of the government, indeed the pros

perity of the country depended upon the status of nitrate
affairs#

Depressions in the nitrate industry adversely

affected all other phases of the economic life of Chile#
Fortunately, in the nineteenth century nitrate depressions
11
were relatively short-lived#
Finally, the nitrate Industry had an important influ
ence on political developments in Chile*

Luis Galdames, a

1 0 J# Fred Hippy, "Century of British Investments in
Chile,” Pacific Historical Review, XXI (Nov#, 1952f\* 3i|l*

^However, after the first World War a prolonged
depression in Chilean nitrates did occur# The development
of processes for th© manufacture of synthetic nitrates was
responsible for this#
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leading Chilean historian* points out that the history of
Chile in the late nineteenth century was largely determined
by two events*
of 1891*

the War of the Pacific and the Revolution

in both events * nitrate played a significant

role*

* % © © Galdames, History of Chile* pp# 336* 3&1, lfl&
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX
The following maps show the boundaries of oJCic^iae,
railroad lines, etc., as they existed in © a c h o f t h e five
nitrate fields around 1900. Areas enclosed in
repre
sent oficinas. These maps originally appeared in Semper
and Michels. Industrie del Salltre.
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